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According to Zadeh, the term “fuzzy logic” has two different meanings: wide and
narrow. In a narrow sense it is a logical system which aims a formalization of
approximate reasoning, and so it can be considered an extension of many-valued
logic. However, Zadeh also says that the agenda of fuzzy logic is quite different
from that of traditional many-valued logic, as it addresses concepts like linguistic
variable, fuzzy if-then rule, linguistic quantifiers etc. Ha´jek, in the preface of
his foundational book Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic, agrees with Zadeh’s
distinction, but stressing that formal calculi of many-valued logics are the kernel
of the fuzzy logic in the narrow sense. Ha´jek’s book undertakes the study of the
so-called Basic Fuzzy logic (BL), having continuous triangular norms (t-norm)
and their residua as semantics for the conjunction and implication respectively,
and of its most prominent extensions, namely  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product
fuzzy logics. Taking advantage of the fact that a t-norm has residuum if, and
only if, it is left-continuous, the logic of the left-continuous t-norms, called MTL,
was soon after introduced.
On the other hand, classical modal logic is an active field of mathematical
logic, originally introduced at the beginning of the XXth century for philosoph-
ical purposes, that more recently has shown to be very successful in many other
areas, specially in computer science. This success is mainly due to the huge
number of real-world scenarios that can be modelled using Kripke relational
structures, that are the most well-known semantics for classical modal logics.
Modal expansions of non-classical logics, in particular of many-valued logics,
have also been studied in the literature. In this thesis we focus on the study of
some modal logics over MTL, using natural generalizations of the classical Kripke
relational structures where propositions at possible worlds can be many-valued,
but keeping classical accessibility relations.
In more detail, the main goal of this thesis has been to study modal ex-
pansions of the logic of a left-continuous t-norm, defined over the language of
MTL expanded with rational truth-constants and the Monteiro-Baaz ∆ opera-
tor, whose intended (standard) semantics is given by Kripke models with crisp
accessibility relations and taking the unit real interval [0, 1] as set of truth-values.
To get complete axiomatizations, already known techniques based on the canon-
ical model construction are used, but this requires to ensure that the underlying
(propositional) fuzzy logic is strongly standard complete. This constraint leads
us to consider axiomatic systems with infinitary inference rules, already at the
propositional level. A second goal of the thesis has been to also develop an au-
tomated reasoning software tool to solve satisfiability and logical consequence
vii
problems for some of the fuzzy modal logics considered.
This dissertation is structured in four parts. After a gentle introduction,
Part I contains the needed preliminaries for the thesis be as self-contained as
possible. Most of the theoretical results are developed in Parts II and III. Part
II focuses on solving some problems concerning the strong standard complete-
ness of underlying non-modal propositional logics, as a necessary step previous
to the study of the modal expansions. We first present an axiomatic system for
the non-modal propositional logic of a left-continuous t-norm that makes use
of a unique infinitary inference rule, the density rule, that solves several prob-
lems pointed out in the literature. We further expand this axiomatic system
in order to also characterize arbitrary operations over [0, 1] satisfying certain
regularity conditions. However, since this axiomatic system turns out to be not
well-behaved for the modal expansion, we search for alternative axiomatizations
with some particular kind of inference rules (that will be called conjunctive).
Unfortunately, this kind of axiomatization does not necessarily exist for all left-
continuous t-norms (in particular, it does not exist for the Go¨del logic case),
but we identify a wide class of t-norms for which it works. This “well-behaved”
t-norms include all ordinal sums of  Lukasiewiczand Product t-norms.
Part III focuses on the modal expansion of the logics presented before. We
propose axiomatic systems (which are, as expected, modal expansions of the
ones given in the previous part) respectively strongly complete with respect to
local and global Kripke semantics defined over frames with crisp accessibility
relations and worlds evaluated over a “well-behaved” left-continuous t-norm.
We also study some properties and extensions of these logics and also show how
to use it for axiomatizing the possibilistic logic over the very same t-norm. Later
on, we characterize the algebraic companion of these modal logics, provide some
algebraic completeness results and study the relation between their Kripke and
algebraic semantics.
Finally, Part IV of the thesis is devoted to a software application, mNiB-
LoS, that uses Satisfiability Modulo Theories in order to build an automated
reasoning system to reason over modal logics evaluated over BL algebras. The
acronym of this applications stands for a modal Nice BL-logics Solver. The use
of BL logics along this part is motivated by the fact that continuous t-norms can
be represented as ordinal sums of three particular t-norms: Go¨del,  Lukasiewicz
and Product ones. It is then possible to show that these t-norms have alternative
characterizations that, although equivalent from the point of view of the logic,
have strong differences for what concerns the design, implementation and effi-
ciency of the application. For practical reasons, the modal structures included
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Logic is known as the science that studies valid reasoning. As such it has been
a prominent branch, since its origins more than 2000 years ago, of mathematics,
philosophy and, more recently, computer science. It formally approaches the
notion of truth and studies its flow across an argumentation, in the sense that a
logically valid argumentation transmits truth from the premises of discourse to
its conclusions.
A logic is characterized by a language and a deductive system. The former
one delimits the concepts and propositions that can be referred to and the lat-
ter characterizes the deductions or argumentations within the elements of the
language that are considered correct under the logic.
Even though logic has been applied in different formal fields, its origins are
linked to the representation and analysis of natural reasoning. In this setting,
the language is the one used in the human communication, that is the natu-
ral language and the deductive system consists on the “philosophically correct”
argumentations. Since the beginning, it was generally considered that natural
languages should be replaced by formal languages, given their vagueness and am-
biguity. These formal languages should represent an idealization of the concepts
expressed in natural language and entailment among the elements of the formal
language represents a paradigm of the correct reasoning in natural language.
This leads to the establishment of the so-called classical mathematical
logic. Nowadays, this term refers to the largest and most widely studied and
used formal logic, whose language makes use of conjunction, disjunction and
negation (with intended meanings of and, or and not respectively). It is char-
acterized by the following properties:
1. The law of excluded middle: for every statement, either it or its negation
is true.
2. The double negation elimination: a statement and its two-times negation
are equivalent.
3. The law of non-contradiction: a statement cannot be both true and not
true at the same time and in the same sense.
4. The principle of explosion: from a contradiction it can be deduced any
proposition.
1
25. Monotonicity and idempotency of the deduction: the same consequences
can be derived from many instances of the same hypothesis as from just
one instance and any derived fact may be freely extended with additional
assumptions.
6. Commutativity of conjunction.
7. De Morgan laws: disjunction and conjunction are mutually definable via
the negation.
Along the XXth century, the logical tradition, that regarded vague and un-
certain concepts as imperfect statements that should be avoided or translated
to exact notions, develops the idea of formalizing such non-precise propositions.
This creates an intermediate level of formalisms, in between the very restrictive
classical logics and the too informal natural reasoning. What is called truth
begins to be also seen as a concept relative to a state of knowledge and not
necessarily with respect to an objective, completely and precisely known state
of the world.
For this reason, the previous set of properties began to change, giving birth to
non-classical logics. This is a wide class that goes from logics that do not fulfil
some of the above laws to those that are defined over an expanded language and
fulfil a larger set of characteristics. Non-classical logics address the problem of
the replacement of natural language by formal languages in a more flexible way
that the classical one, allowing a more accurate characterization of real-world
statements.
In this work we are mainly interested in two classes of non-classical logics,
which were born at the same time but that have followed quite separated and dif-
ferent paths. We are talking about modal logics, which appear as an expansion
of classical logic with non-truth-functional (modal) operators and fuzzy logics
(and in particular, many-valued logics), that disregard the law of the excluded
middle (and motivated from this fact, generally also the non-contradiction and
the double negation elimination) and allow for propositions to take more than
just the truth values true or false.
The origins of both modal and fuzzy logics go back to around the 20s of the
XX century. Logics with a higher expressivity level than classical logics appear
or are formalized (from intuitive previously considered notions) at this time,
with different objectives and notations. C. I. Lewis publishes in 1918 [88] ideas
concerning the addition of certain symbols (in modern notation, 2 or 3) as
prefixes for a formula ϕ to get expressions like “the proposition ϕ is necessary”
or “the proposition ϕ is possible” respectively, defining new modes of truth.
On the other hand, historical examples from Aristotle challenging the bivalence
principle, based on propositions referring to future events inspired  Lukasiewicz
to define a new kind of logic. He came up with a three-valued logic whose third
value had the intended meaning of possibly.
These two formalisms quickly follow, nevertheless their near origins, inde-
pendent paths. Already in the 60s, when both are being intensively studied and
3reach the status of independent fields within the area of logics, very different
techniques, characteristics and applications are linked to each one of them.
Fuzzy logics are born with the foundational 1965 paper by Lotfi Zadeh en-
titled “Fuzzy Sets” [128]. Here Zadeh proposes the idea of fuzzy sets as those
whose characteristic function is no longer evaluated in {0, 1}, but can rather
take different values in an partially ordered set (usually in [0, 1], but also other
universes have been considered, e.g. complete lattices). The set-theoretic opera-
tions on membership functions are defined using the operations on the evaluation
set: the intersection is defined using the minimum and the union with the max-
imum. Fuzzy logic in its narrow/technical sense, as presented by Zadeh, refers
to many-valued logics that handle gradual properties (as opposed to fuzzy logic
in its wide sense, which is a generic expression that mostly refers to that part of
soft computing where fuzzy sets and rules are used).
Many-valued logics consist of formal systems that have a set of truth values
containing {0, 1} and whose truth functions are defined satisfying some natu-
ral monotonicity conditions on the other values of the set. A formalism that
has been commonly adopted in order to uniformly approach the study of many-
valued logics is that of taking as truth values subsets of the real unit interval.
The fuzzy connectives originate from the definition and algebraic study of the
set-theoretical operations arising from the fuzzy set theory and are essentially
developed in the eighties, when this field lives a significant development. It is
then when researchers recognise that an appropriate definition for the intersec-
tions and unions of fuzzy sets is a class of associative monotonic connectives
known as triangular norms (t-norms for short), together with their De Morgan
dual triangular co-norms. From here, related implication and negation func-
tions are also studied, giving place to a whole algebraic description of logics.
The syntactical issues of fuzzy logic followed these semantical definitions.
The first many-valued logic is introduced, as we commented before, by Jan
 Lukasiewicz, in 1920 [90], when the concept of many-valued logic as defined
above was still not developed. The logic presented there is a three-valued logic.
It includes the usual > (true) and ⊥ (false) truth values and a the third value
P is introduced in order to deal with contingent futures, meaning possible. The
semantics for this logic is given through the truth tables of its operations:
∨ ⊥ P >
⊥ ⊥ P >
P P > >
> > > >
∧ ⊥ P >
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
P ⊥ P P
> ⊥ P >
→ ⊥ P >
⊥ > > >
P P > >





Assigning a numeric interpretation to the previous set of values, taking into
account the behaviour of the minimum and maximum operations, leads to the
4more usual presentation of 3-valued  Lukasiewicz logic as the logic over the set
{0, 12 , 1}. Moreover, the definition of the implication and negation are the key
points of the further extensions of this approach towards the many-valued inter-
pretation of logics. Indeed, first  Lukasiewicz himself and later in collaboration
with Tarski, studied the generalization of the above 3-valued logic to n-valued
and infinitely-valued logics (taking this values in the [0, 1] interval). This is done
defining the new implication and negation operation as follows
x→ y := min{1, 1− x+ y}
¬x := 1− x
 Lukasiewicz also proposes a Hilbert-style axiomatic system for this logic, and
conjectures that the theorems of this system coincide with the tautologies over
the algebra over [0,1] with the usual ∨ and ∧ operations and the → and ¬
operations defined as above. However, it was not until much later that this fact
was proven.
In 1930, Heyting formalizes the intuitionistic logic [81], whose principles were
given by Brouwer during the early years of the XXth century in his proposal of
intuitionistic mathematics. It rejects the law of the excluded middle and the
double negation elimination but maintains the law of non-contradiction and the
principle of explosion. Its formalization is given syntactically, i.e., proposing ax-
ioms and inference rules from which the deductive system is inductively defined.
In 1932, Go¨del proved that the intuitionistic logic is not a finitely valued logic
[65] and defined a family logics intermediate between classical and intuitionis-
tic logic. These turn to have semantics over bounded linearly ordered algebras,
with the usual interpretation of ∨ and ∧ respectively as maximum and minimum
operations of the algebra, but a different definition of implication and negation.
Letting 1 and 0 represent the top and bottom elements of the algebras,
x→ y :=
{




1 if x = 0
0 otherwise
Later on, following the truth-functional setting of Zadeh, other formalisms
are proposed to model the operations between fuzzy sets and indirectly, of many-
valued logics operations. Some conditions are needed, like associativity and
commutativity of the conjunction and disjunction operations. Alsina, Trillas and
Valverde suggest, with the objective of modelling the intersection (conjunction)
of fuzzy sets, a very general class of functions used in other mathematical fields
([4]), the triangular t-norms (t-norms). From these, their duals and the so-called
weak negation functions arise, allowing the addressing of the union (disjunction)
and complement (negation) of fuzzy sets. T-norms are binary operations on
[0, 1] that are associative, commutative, monotonically increasing and have 1 as
the neutral element. Regarding implication, mainly two kind of operations are
5proposed. One is defined as in the classical case but using the weak negation
instead of the usual one, i.e., x→ y := ¬x∨y. The other satisfies the residuation
law over the conjunction ∗: x→ y := max{z : x ∗ z ≤ y}. Since only the second
kind of implication makes true in general the usual form of the Modus Ponens
rule (from x and x→ y infer y), this is the one that has been generally adopted
in the many-valued logics field.
It turns out that the implication operations of  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del logics
are, respectively, the residua of two continuous t-norms:
x ∗ L y := max{0, x+ y − 1} x ∗G y := min{x, y}
Later, a third continuous t-norm, the product of real numbers, appears as a
basic one together with the  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del ones: any other continuous
t-norm can be defined from these [101]. An axiomatic system for the logic of the
product t-norm is finally proposed by Ha´jek, Godo and Esteva in [75]. Once it
is shown that the logics defined by the three main continuous t-norms and their
residua enjoy a syntactical calculus (finitely given), Ha´jek proposes in [70, 71] a
new logical system aiming to capture their common characteristics. He names it
Basic Fuzzy Logic (BL) and conjectures it corresponds to the logic (in the sense
of valid equations) given by the class of all continuous t-norms, as finally proved
in [30].
However, continuity is not a necessary condition for a t-norm to have a
residuum: it is only necessary for the t-norm to be left-continuous in order to
enjoy this property. Motivated by this, Esteva and Godo propose in [49] the
Monoidal t-norm Logic (MTL), an axiomatic system aiming to characterize the
logic arising from these operations. Jenei and Montagna prove in [84] that MTL
is complete with respect to the family of standard algebras arising from left-
continuous t-norms. MTL becomes then the weaker axiomatic system arising
from t-norms having a unique residuum.
On the other hand, modal logics are deeply studied branches of mathemat-
ical logic. As we said before, they are formally introduced in the pioneering
work of C.I.Lewis of 1918 as a way to talk about modal notions (possibility and
necessity). In 1933, due to concerns in the foundations of mathematics, Go¨del
introduces modal operators as a way to formalise the notion of mathematical
provability (2ϕ means “ϕ is provable” and 3ϕ means “ϕ is consistent”). In the
following decades, many other modal operators are introduced and investigated,
formalizing truth from very different spaces. For instance, temporal logics in-
clude modalities of the kind of “eventually”, “always”, “never”...; deontic logics
models concepts like “it is permitted” and “it is mandatory”; epistemic logics,
use modalities talking about knowledge, belief or trust; dynamic logics are multi-
modal logics with modalities of the form 〈α〉ϕ meaning “after the execution of
program α, ϕ is possible” and [α]ϕ meaning “after the execution of α, ϕ neces-
sarily holds” etc. Many well-known researchers interested in non-classical logics
work on these areas, like G.H. von Wright, A. Prior, J. Hintikka and D. Lewis.
Up to the 50s, modal logic is understood as just a logic formalizing modal
notions. However, when the relational semantics, based on graphs, is developed
6in the late 50s and early 60s (by Kripke, Joyal and others), it is shown that
standard modal logics can be seen as fragments of first or second order predicate
logics. Indeed, modalities quantify, in some sense, over the worlds or states of
these relational structures: 2 quantifies universally while 3 does so existentially.
The mathematical study of modal logics in this vein has proves that modal logics
enjoy a good balance between expressive power and computational complexity
of logical systems. While the satisfiability problem on first order predicate logic
is undecidable, this is not the case for the more general classical modal logic K .
Later on, other disciplines become interested in using modalities for mod-
elling and working with their particular problems. In particular, temporal,
dynamic and epistemic logics are deeply studied and used in Artificial Intel-
ligence, economic game theory and computer science. Epistemic and temporal
operators are crucial in the formalization of knowledge-based programming and
belief-based agent systems, temporal and dynamic logics are used in industry for
automated verification of hardware and software, dynamic and epistemic logics
are used in game theory...
Modal logic today can be seen as a large family of studies concerning modal-
like notions, with the philosophical and mathematical basis above commented
but in constant partnership with other fields. The applications of modal log-
ics are living a particularly fruitful period and formalizations using modal-like
operators seem to happen in all kind of environments. Moreover, the develop-
ments done at the applied side of modal logics are also influencing the theoretical
studies in a circular way that enriches the whole theory.
The interaction of modal and fuzzy logics is a matter of study that has
received attention from different research groups and specialists within the logic
field. With this, we refer to the addition of modal operators, which mimic
the classical modal operators behaviour, to fuzzy logics. Significant differences
between the classical modal logic and the new systems can be easily detected,
since the formal definition of a Kripke structure can now include many-valued
notions. Thus, the idea of “related states” is brought to a fuzzy dimension
and understood as “related states to some degree”. Moreover, the fact that
propositions have a many-valued interpretation leads to interesting challenges
concerning the axiomatization and study of these logics. For instance, the fact
that the necessity and possibility operators are not in general mutually derivable
diversifies the modal expansions that can be considered, and problems solved at
the classical level, like decidability and complexity questions, do not have a direct
generalization in the new context.
Several works on fuzzy modal logics have created a setting for understanding
the possible ways to generalize the modal notions to a fuzzy context. In the last
years, there has been a growing number of papers dealing with the combination
of modal and many-valued logics. Some approaches do not fit in our framework
for considering different notions of many-valued modalities, like [29, 97], but
others stay as particular cases of our framework. Among the ones that fit in our
framework we can cite [57, 58], [18], [24, 21, 23],[77, 117, 78]. We will comment
here briefly the known axiomatizations in the literature of logics arising from
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The case when the algebra of evaluation is a finite Heyting algebra is con-
sidered by M. Fitting in the early 90s [57, 58]. He includes a truth constant for
every element of the algebra (i.e., for every truth value), which simplifies the
proofs and allows to give a unified presentation of the calculus to axiomatize the
logic of the class of Kripke frames evaluated over these algebras. The uniformity
refers to the fact that all these calculi share the same schemes without constants.
Other papers that study these cases are [86, 87, 85]. Moreover, concerning crisp
Kripke frames evaluated over arbitrary finite algebras have been presented in
[55].
Concerning the more particular case of modal expansions of MTL logics, three
main research lines have been followed.  Lukasiewicz logic expanded with modal
operators has been mainly studied by Teheux and Hansoul (see [116, 117, 78]).
They focus on the study of the logic arising from Kripke models with proposi-
tions evaluated over finite subalgebras of the standard  Lukasiewicz algebra and
also over the whole algebra, but considering crisp accessibility relations. Given
the involutive character of the  Lukasiewicz negation, the modal operators are,
as in the classical case, interdefinable. They present an axiomatic system for
the logic, and focus afterwards on the study of the duality between the modal
algebras that form the algebraic counterpart of their system and the original
Kripke models that gave place to the logic. It is remarkable that, in the case
of the modal logic built over the infinitely valued  Lukasiewicz standard algebra,
the axiomatic system incorporates an infinitary inference rule (with an infinite
amount of premises).
On the other hand, studies of Kripke frames evaluated over residuated lat-
tices, considering a non-crisp accessibility relation were developed in [18]. Within
that work, the authors extend finitely-valued MTL logics with the 2 operator,
and present axiomatic systems for the modal logics arising from Kripke models
where both the accessibility relation of the structures and the evaluation of the
propositions is done over finitely valued MTL-algebras endowed with canonical
constants (that is, a constant for each element of the universe). The authors
also study some other modal expansions, considering the classes of Kripke mod-
els where the accessibility relation is an idempotent element of the algebra, and
those whose accessibility relation is crisp.
To the best of our knowledge, other works treating the modal logics arising
from Kripke frames valued on non-Boolean algebras focus on issues related with
Go¨del logic. Caicedo and Rodrigez present several results (see [24, 23]) concern-
ing the addition of modal operators to the Go¨del logic. They study first the
expansion of Go¨del logic with each one of the modal operators separately, and
propose an axiomatic system for the logic defined over the Kripke models evalu-
ated over the standard Go¨del algebra, both in terms of formulas and accessibility
relations. Later on, also the expansion with both 2 and 3 is considered, ob-
taining an axiomatic system complete with respect to the corresponding class of
Kripke models. Moreover, together with Metcalfe and Rogger, they have faced
the decidability problem over the modal Go¨del logics in [21]. It was known from
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cidability of the satisfiability and validity problems were not known. It is proven
that these logics are decidable via the definition of an alternative equivalent
semantics that does enjoy the finite model property.
Concerning the modal expansion of MTL logics, several important open prob-
lems remain and our objective is to solve some of them. On the one hand, modal
expansions of Product logic have not been studied, which we think is an impor-
tant question because Product logic is, together with  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del
logics, the main continuous t-norms from which any other can be built. More
in general, studies concerning the axiomatization of modal logics arising from
arbitrary left-continuous t-norms without restricting the universe to a finite one
(as done in [18]) also lack in the literature. On the other hand, the practical uses
of many-valued modal logics have been long theoretically developed, but there
are no software applications that implement reasoners over them. We find this
lack of automated tools to be a big drawback in the application of the modal
many-valued logics.
These are the two main problems we develop along this dissertation. In
particular, we first study the problem of the axiomatization of modal expansions
-considering a crisp accesibility relation- of the logics arising from left-continuous
t-norms. We then develop a software for reasoning over some of these modal
logics.
In the path to do so, several interesting results have also been proved, con-
cerning different related fields. We consider of particular interest several results
from Chapters 4 and 5 dealing with strong completeness problems, studies of
the relation between modal algebras and Kripke models showed in Section 7.2
from Chapter 7 and the characterization results of some of the studied logics
oriented to efficiency issues presented in Chapter 9. The Doctoral dissertation
is structured in the following main parts.
Part I of the dissertation introduces the necessary preliminaries to make
this thesis as self-contained as possible. We describe the main elements of the
three topics that will be used and developed along the thesis. The first chapter
is dedicated to the more general ones, introducing some basic concepts from
universal algebra and notions coming from the so-called abstract algebraic logic,
which studies how logics are associated to algebraic structures. In this chapter,
we present the notation issues, basic definitions and some remarkable results
that will be referred to later on. The second chapter from this part shows the
definitions and results concerning the many-valued logic MTL commented above,
paying attention to its algebraic semantics and to its more common axiomatic
extensions and expansions (considering additional operations in the language).
Finally, the third chapter presents a brief survey on the aspects more relevant
to our dissertation of modal logics. In order to see the philosophical motivations
behind the work later done, we begin by defining the semantical framework that
gives place to the classical modal logic and state some of the most remarkable
results concerning it. We then focus on the state of the art on many-valued modal
logics and present a brief resume of the works dealing with modal expansions of
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Part II of the thesis presents the theoretical results we have developed for
what concerns the strong standard completeness problem (i.e., finding an ax-
iomatic system complete with respect to a given algebra on [0, 1], even when an
infinite set of formulas is involved) of the standard algebras of left-continuous
t-norms with truth constants. From our studies on modal expansions of many-
valued logics and also analysing the literature on the topic, strong completeness
and truth constants seem to be very important features of the non-modal logic,
in order to be able to expand it with modalities (in a recursively enumerable
way).
In the first chapter, we solve the above problem for the whole family of
left-continuous t-norms further expanded with the ∆ operator. The proposed
axiomatic system associated with the standard canonical algebra (where the
constants are interpreted by its name) expanded with ∆ has an infinite set of
book-keeping axioms that are needed to specify the value of the operations over
the constants, but it is defined using a unique infinitary inference rule, the density
rule. Axiomatic systems strongly complete with respect to many left-continuous
t-norms (including Go¨del or any ordinal sum with more than one component) in
the above sense were unknown and our proposal solves a lot of this cases. We also
study how it is possible to use the density rule to also build axiomatic systems
that expand the logic with new operations (defined in [0, 1]), that only need to
follow some regularity conditions. An interesting result whose scope not limited
to the logics we are studying here is Theorem 4.16, which proves the Prime
Theory extension property for extensions of MTL∆ using up to a countable set
of infinitary inference rules with certain characteristics. It turns out that the
density rule from Chapter 4 solves the strong standard completeness, but it is
not a rule well-behaved when the logic is expanded with modalities. For this
reason, in Chapter 5 we study the previous logics from the algebraic point of
view and search for alternative axiomatizations using only infinitary inference
rules with a determined schemata, named conjunctive inference rules. We prove
that this kind of axiomatic system does not exist for some left-continuous t-
norms (for instance, in the Go¨del case) so we restrict the rest of our research
to the t-norms that can be axiomatized in this more controlled way. We prove
that the class of left-continuous t-norms that accept such an axiomatization is
nevertheless quite large, since it contains for instance all the continuous t-norms
that are ordinal sums of  Lukasiewicz and Product t-norms.
Part III of this dissertation faces the study of the local and global modal
logics (with ∆ and truth constants) arising from the Kripke models with a crisp
accessibility relation but with the formulas evaluated on the standard algebra
of a t-norm admitting an axiomatization using (as infinitary rules) conjunctive
inference rules only. In Chapter 6 it is addressed the problem of axiomatizing the
above modal logics. We begin formally defining the (local and global) semantics
of a modal logic over Kripke models as the above ones. We then propose axiom-
atizations for these logics using the results from Part II of the dissertation and
prove they are respectively strongly complete with respect to the intended rela-
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tional semantics. Observe that, in particular, this solves the problem of finding a
suitable axiomatization for the modal expansions of logics arising from arbitrary
ordinal sums of  Lukasiewicz and Product components, which was a question not
solved in the literature. Moreover, some characteristics and applications of these
logics are presented, like some issues concerning partial interdefinability of 2 and
3 operators, canonical extensions of the modal logics presented before and the
axiomatization of the possibilistic logic based on left-continuous t-norms that
accept an axiomatization with conjunctive inference rules.
The second chapter of this part focuses on the algebraic study of the many-
valued modal logics presented in Chapter 6. We begin by classifying them within
the Leibniz hierarchy and presenting some algebraic completeness results for
them. Next we focus on the relation between the modal MTL algebras and the
class Kripke models evaluated over MTL algebras. We prove a strong relation
between certain subclasses of these models and algebras and we get a new com-
pleteness result for the local modal logic that relates it to the order-preserving
logic defined over the class of modal algebras.
Part IV of this dissertation is devoted to move the logics studied along Parts
II and III closer to possible practical applications.
On this point, we think it is important to remark that the idea behind this
part is not that of picking a particular problem and treating it with the logics
previously studied, which we consider to be out of the scope of this work. Rather,
what we do in this part of the dissertation is presenting a software application
(mNiBLoS, a modal Nice BL logics Solver) that allows to, automatically and
in a reasonably efficient way, work over a large family of the logics studied in
the previous parts of the thesis. Precisely, it is a solver for a large family of BL
logics and for some modal many-valued logics.
We begin devoting a preliminaries chapter to the software tools we are using
for implementing mNiBLos. It is not included in Part I of the dissertation for
being rather technical and not necessary for the comprehension of the results.
Nevertheless, it is included here because the understanding of SMT solvers and
the certainty on their correction play an important role in the design and devel-
opment of the software application we are presenting later. The study of solver
applications (that is, software oriented to check consistency of sets of equations
and mathematical conditions) is a very important area within computer science,
largely researched, developed and optimized and mNiBLoS is implemented using
a previously existing solver of the so-called Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT
for short). We begin by describing what SMT are, why they are interesting to
build a many-valued logics solver over them and explain some of the technical
results concerning the particular SMT-solver we are using, namely z3 [42].
In the next chapter, we define the class of logics that are going to be treated
with mNiBLos. For technical motivations the propositional level of these logics
(called Nice BL logics) is settled within the BL logics, while the modal expan-
sion considered is limited to finite Kripke structures (that is, models with a
finite number of states) with a crisp accessibility relation. We present a way of
computing more efficiently the previous logics than considering the operations
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as originally defined in the literature. This comes as a result of an alternative
characterization of non-linear operations arising in the so-called Product com-
ponents of BL-chains. We also develop an algorithm to pre-process the modal
fragment, that given a modal formula constructs a Kripke structure that can be
evaluated to a counter-model for the formula when it is not a theorem of the
logic.
In Chapter 10 a detailed description of the main result of this part of our
research is presented, namely a complete specification of mNiBLoS. Details con-
cerning the theoretical design and the technical implementation of the solver
are given and we also present some easy examples that could help an interested
reader to become a user of mNiBLoS.
Finally, we present a chapter with empirical results from several performed
tests. First, we show several tests run over two benchmarks already used in
these kind of applications and compare the results with the ones existing in the
literature. Then, we present some more general results, presenting a time chart
of mNiBLoS running over randomly-generated formulas of increasing complexity
and comment the results.
We close this dissertation presenting some conclusions about the work done








We devote this chapter to present a coherent and general environment over which
the rest of our work will be settled. We begin with some basic but important
notions from Universal algebra, which provide us with a uniform notation and
methodology that will be used along the rest of this work. Then, we will present
an overview on the issues from abstract algebraic logic that will be of use in the
following chapters.
1.1 Universal algebra
With the aim of being as self-contained as possible, we will begin by recalling
in this section some general definitions and results from universal algebra. Our
aim is not presenting a survey on this matter (for the interested reader, we refer
to a classical text-book on the matter, [20]), but rather creating a coherent envi-
ronment over which it is possible to develop our studies. We will use these basic
notions of universal algebra as a language in order to unify the most theoretical
part of this dissertation and for this reason we will focus on presenting some
logically oriented objects that will be used latter.
As commented in the introduction, one of the two defining elements of a
logic is its language. Formally, a language or type is a pair L = 〈L,Λ〉 where
L 6= ∅ is a set of symbols and Λ: L → ω is a function that assigns an arity to
each symbol in L. Symbols with arity equal to 0 are called constants, while
the other symbols will be referred to by operations or connectives.
A language L can be interpreted on algebraic structures that have the same
type. These are theL-algebras, structures of the form A = 〈A, {fA}f∈L〉 where
A 6= ∅ is the universe of the algebra and fA : AΛ(f) → A are the operations on
A. When the language is clear from the context we will often say “algebra“
instead of “L-algebra“. Moreover, if L has a finite number of symbols, we will
sometimes denote it by a tuple of finite lenght with the elements f/Λ(f) for each
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f ∈ L. Moreover, we will denote its type just by the tuple of natural numbers
given by Λ(f).
We will define here some particular class of algebras that will appear along
this dissertation.
Definition 1.1. Consider a language L extending 〈∨/2,∧/2, 0/0, 1/0〉. A L-
algebra A is a bounded lattice when ∨A and ∧A are associative, commutative
and idempotent operations in A and for all a, b ∈ A the following hold:
• a ∧A (a ∨A b) = a ∨A (a ∧A b) = a,
• a ∧A 0A = 0A,
• a ∨A 1A = 1A.
A is distributive if, moreover, for all a, b, c ∈ A,
• a ∧A (b ∨A c) = (a ∧A b) ∨A (a ∧A c),
• a ∨A (b ∧A c) = (a ∨A b) ∧A (a ∨A c).
A particular algebra that is very relevant in the field of logic is the algebra
generated from the language itself over a set of propositional variables. When we
talk about formulas of a language, we mean constructions from a countable
set of elements (the variables) using the symbols of the language. Formally,
given a language L and a countable set of variables Var , the set of formulas Fm1
is built inductively with the following steps:
• Var ⊆ Fm,
• f ∈ Fm for all f ∈ L such that Λ(f) = 0,
• f(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ Fm for f ∈ L with Λ(f) = n ≥ 1 and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Fm,
• No other elements belong to Fm.
Usually, when the maximum arity of the operations in L is 2, we will write
the formulas using the infix notation instead the above presented prefix one.
The set of formulas can be turned into an algebra of type L, denoted by FmL
and called the formula algebra.
The universe of Fm is Fm and the operations of the algebra are implicitly
given in the construction of the set of formulas detailed above, i.e., for each
f ∈ L,
fFm = f if Λ(f) = 0
fFm(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) = f(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) if Λ(f) = n ≥ 1
From now on we will assume that all algebras are in a fixed type L and use
this fact without notice.
1If it is needed to emphasize the language and/or the variables set, we will write FmL(Var).
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Given two algebras A,B we say that A is a subalgebra of B and write
A  B, whenever A ⊆ B, fA = fB for each 0-ary symbol f in L and, for each
n-ary operation f ∈ L (with n ≥ 1) fA(a1, . . . , an) = fB(a1, . . . , an) for all
a1, . . . , an ∈ A. Given a class of algebras K, we will write SK to denote the class
of subalgebras of the algebras in K.
We denote by Hom(A,B) the set of homomorphisms from A to B, that
are the mappings h from A to B such that
h(fA) = fB for f ∈ L s.t Λ(f) = 0
h(fA(a1, . . . , an)) = f
B(h(a1), . . . , h(an)) for f ∈ L s.t Λ(f) = n ≥ 1
for all a1, . . . , an ∈ A. Accordingly, given h ∈ Hom(A,B), we will denote by
h(A) the algebra 〈h(A), {fB  h(A)〉 (which is a subalgebra of B).
Injective homomorphisms are called embeddings, while bijective ones are
called isomorphisms. We will write A ↪→ B and A ∼= B to denote respectively
that there is an embedding and an isomorphism from A to B. Given a class of
algebras K, we denote by HK the class of homomorphic images of the algebras
in K i.e., the class {A : ∃B ∈ K and h ∈ Hom(B,A) surjective}. We will write
IK to denote the class of isomorphic images of K, {A : ∃B ∈ K with A ∼= B}.
A particular family of homomorphisms deeply related with logic that will be
intensively used all along this thesis are the so-called evaluations. An evaluation
e into an algebra A is an homomorphism e : Fm → A. Observe that these
homomorphisms are determined by their values on the set Var : indeed, for a
function h : Var → A, there is a unique homomorphism h′ ∈ Hom(Fm,A)
extending h. Given an evaluation e and a set of formulas Γ, we will write e[Γ]
instead of {h(γ) : γ ∈ Γ}. The homomorphims from the class Hom(Fm,Fm)
are called substitutions.
In our analysis we will make use of another kind of syntactic objects besides
formulas. Formally speaking an equation is a pair of formulas 〈ϕ,ψ〉 ∈ Fm ×
Fm. Nevertheless we will make use of the more suggestive notation ϕ ≈ ψ. We
will denote the set of equations (in the language L) by EqL. Given a class of
algebras K, the equational consequence relative to K is the relation |=K⊆
P(EqL)× EqL defined as
Θ |=K ϕ ≈ ψ ⇐⇒ for every A ∈ K and every evaluation h in A
if hα = hβ for every α ≈ β ∈ Θ, then hϕ = hψ
for every Θ ∪ {ϕ ≈ ψ} ⊆ EqL. Formally speaking a quasi-equation is an
ordered pair made up by a finite set of equations followed by a single equation,
usually denoted by expressions of the following kind2
ϕ1 ≈ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ≈ ψn =⇒ ϕ ≈ ψ.
By removing the limitation to a finite set of equations in the previous definition
we obtain the so-called generalized quasi-equations, i.e. expressions of the
2Observe ∧ stands here for the semantical and notion, so ϕ1 ≈ ψ1 ∧ ϕ2 ≈ ψ2 stands for
“equations ϕ1 ≈ ψ1 and ϕ2 ≈ ψ2 hold.
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following kind below (where I is an arbitrary set) 3:∧
i∈I
ϕi ≈ ψi =⇒ ϕ ≈ ψ.
It is clear that quasi-equations are just generalized quasi-equations with a finite
set of premises and that equations are quasi-equations with empty premises.
Therefore the following definition applies to these three kinds of objects. A
generalized quasi-equation
∧
i∈I ϕi ≈ ψi =⇒ ϕ ≈ ψ is valid in a class of
algebras K if
{ϕi ≈ ψi : i ∈ I} |=K ϕ ≈ ψ.
A congruence θ on an algebra A is an equivalence relation on A that respects
the operations. We denote by ConA the set of congruences on A. It is worth to
remark that it is possible to order ConA under set-theoretic inclusion and that
the resulting structure is a complete lattice whose infima coincide with intersec-
tions. Observe that the top and the bottom element of ConA are respectively
A×A and IdA := {〈a, a〉 : a ∈ A}.
Accordingly, we say that A is simple whenever ConA = {A×A, IdA}.
We will denote by A/θ the quotient algebra of A, that the algebra with
universe A/θ whose operations are defined by means of representatives of equiv-
alence classes. Observe that this process is sound, since congruences preserve
operations. Sometimes we will be interested in classes of algebras that are not
closed under the formation of quotient algebras. In these cases the following
device will be useful: given a class of algebras K, the K-congruences of A (also
called congruences of A relative to K) are the congruences of A that yield
a quotient in K. We will denote their collection by ConKA.
Observe that ConA = ConH{A}A. It is worth to remark that in general the
poset 〈ConKA,⊆〉 may fail to be a complete lattice (and to be a lattice as well).
We will make use of several kinds of algebraic product-like constructions.







i∈I Ai}f ∈ L〉
where
∏
i∈I Ai is the usual Cartesian product and the operations are defined
component-wise. If I = ∅, the direct product ∏i∈I Ai will be the one-element
algebra, that is unique up to isomorphism. Finally, given a class of algebras K,
we will denote by PK the class of direct products of families of algebras in K.
In order to introduce another kind of product-like structures, we will need some
more concepts. A filter F on a set I is an upwards closed subset of P(I) that
is closed under intersection and I ∈ F . We will say that F is proper whenever
F 6= P(I), that is when ∅ 6∈ F . Then, given a family of algebras {Ai}i∈I and
3The fact that the set of variables is countable is important for this definition: generalized
quasi-equations, as considered here, cannot have more than countable many different variables.
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a ∼F b⇐⇒ {j ∈ I : a[j] = b[j]} ∈ F
is a congruence on
∏
i∈I Ai. The quotient of
∏
i∈I Ai under ∼F is called the re-
duced product of {Ai}i∈I with respect to F . We will denote it by
∏
i∈I Ai/F .
Finally, given a class of algebras K, we will denote by PRK the class of reduced




Ai/F : {Ai}i∈I ⊆ K, I set and F proper filter on I}.
A proper filter is called an ultrafilter when it enjoys one of the following
equivalent properties:
• For all X ⊆ I, X ∈ F if and only if I \X 6∈ F ,
• For all X,Y ⊆ I such that X ∪ Y ∈ F , either X ∈ F or Y ∈ F ,
• F is maximal in the set of proper filters of I (ordered by the inclusion).
Reduced products with respect to ultrafilters are called ultraproducts. Given
a class of algebras K, we denote by PUK the class of ultraproducts of families of
algebras is K.
The last product-like condition we shall consider is the following: an algebra
A is a subdirect product of a family {Ai}i∈I whenever it is a subalgebra of
the direct product
∏
i∈I Ai and A[j] := {a[j] : a ∈ A} equals Aj for each j ∈ I.
Given a class of algebras K, we denote by PSK the class of subdirect products
of families of algebras in K. It is worth to remark that if K is closed under the
formation of subdirect products, then for every algebra A of the type, the poset
〈ConKA,⊆〉 is a complete lattice (but in general not a sublattice of ConA).
A class of algebras K is a variety if there exists a set of equations Υ such
that K = {A : ∅ |=AΥ}. A celebrated result of Birkhoff characterizes varieties
as the classes of algebras closed under the formation of homomorphic images,
subalgebras and direct products. It is not difficult to see that, given a class of
algebras K, there exist the smallest variety that contains K, namely the class
of models of the equations that are valid in K. This variety is called the the
variety generated by K and is denoted by VK. Tarski characterized it in terms
of class-operators as VK = HSPK.
Analogously, a class of algebras K is a quasi-variety if it is axiomatized
by quasi-equations. Mal’cev showed that a class of algebras is a quasi-variety
if and only if is is closed under the formation of isomorphisms, subalgebras
and reduced products. Moreover, given a class of algebras K, there exists the
smallest quasi-variety that contains K. This quasi-variety is called the quasi-
variety generated by K and is denoted by QK. It is possible to prove that
QK = ISPRK.
Finally, a class of algebras K is a generalized quasi-variety if it is ax-
iomatized by generalized quasi-equations. Blok and Jo´nsson introduced a new
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class-operator
UK :={A : if B  A and B is generated by a set
of cardinality ≤ |Var |, then B ∈ K}
and proved that a class of algebras is a generalized quasi-variety if and only if it
is closed under the formation of isomorphic images, subalgebras, direct products
and under the U operator (see [13, Th. 8.1]). Moreover it is easy to see that,
given a class of algebras K, there exists the smallest generalized quasi-variety
including K. This generalized quasi-variety is called the generalized quasi-
variety generated by K and is denoted by GQK. Blok and Jo´nsson proved
that GQK = UISPK (see [13, Cor. 8.2]).
It is worth to remark that generalized quasi-equations are preserved under
direct products and subalgebras and so generalized quasi-varieties are closed
under subdirect products. In particular this implies that if K is a generalized
quasi-variety, then for every algebra A of the type, the poset 〈ConKA,⊆〉 is a
complete lattice. Moreover it is evident that quasi-varieties are special general-
ized quasi-varieties and, again, that varieties are special quasi-varieties.
1.2 Algebraic logic
Abstract algebraic logic is a theory that aims to provide several methods to
uniformly study propositional logics using algebraic tools. We are particularly
interested in this field since, over the last 30 years, a large set of powerful results
has been developed for studying the different levels of the Leibniz hierarchy. This
consists on a classification of logics depending on some of their properties, which
can be defined equivalently from different perspectives (included syntactical and
algebraic characterizations). Classifying a logic into a level of this hierarchy
allows to use all the results existing in the literature concerning the corresponding
level in order to study it.
This classification is the reason behind our interest on this general approach
concerning the definitions and studies of logics. Even though the main work of
this thesis dissertation is that of studying a particular family of logics, defining
and working with them in the adequate terms will allow us to classify these
logics within the Leibniz hierarchy and so gain access to this large set of results.
The definitions and results existing in the abstract algebraic logic field can
be seen, in a lot of cases, as generalizations of the ones presented historically for
each one of the particular logics studied before. For this reason we see it here as
a theory unifying different mathematical logics and as such, is natural to present
it in the first chapter of the dissertation. In this way we will be able to uniformly
talk about particular cases of the notions presented along this section and make
the comprehension of the two first parts of the thesis easier to the reader.
Most of the definitions and results recalled here are folklore and have been
established after several works on the matter by groups of researchers, so in gen-
eral, we will not include references for the main definitions and results presented
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in this section. Instead, for a systematic exposition of abstract algebraic logic,
we refer to the main classical publications on the topic: [14, 15, 36, 60, 59].
We will begin by giving the formal definition of a sentential logic.
Definition 1.2. Let L be a language. A (sentential) logic of type L is a
pair L = 〈L,`L〉 where L is a language and `L⊆ P(FmL) × FmL is a relation
(called the consequence or derivability relation of L) satisfying the following
conditions for all Γ ∪Θ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm the following properties hold:
1. It is a closure operator, i.e.,
• If ϕ ∈ Γ then 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ `L,
• If 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ `L and Γ ⊆ Θ then 〈Θ, ϕ〉 ∈ `L,
• If 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ `L and 〈Θ, γ〉 ∈ `L for all γ ∈ Γ then 〈Θ, ϕ〉 ∈ `L,
2. It is structural, i.e., for any substitution σ ∈ Hom(FmL,FmL), if 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈
`L then 〈σ(Γ), σ(ϕ)〉 ∈ `L.
We will write Γ `L ϕ instead 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ `L and in such case we will say that
ϕ follows from (or is deducible from) Γ in L. We denote by Th(L) the
theorems of the logic L, which are the formulas ϕ such that ∅ `L ϕ (and we
will write instead `L ϕ). A logic L is finitary whenever for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} such
that Γ `L ϕ there is a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ0 `L ϕ. We will sometimes abuse
notation and write FmL (or FmL) instead of FmL (or FmL).
Logics can be defined both in syntactic and in semantic terms. One of the
most common ways to syntactically define a logic is to present it by means of
an Hilbert-style calculus. More precisely an Hilbert style calculus is a triple
H = 〈L, Ax, IR〉 where L is a propositional language, Ax ⊆ FmL is a set of
formulas called axioms and IR ⊆ (P(FmL) \ {∅}) × FmL is a set of the so
called inference rules. H induces a consequence relation `H (and thus, a logic)
as follows:
• For any substitution σ ∈ Hom(FmL,FmL) and any ϕ ∈ Ax, ∅ `H σ(ϕ),
• For any substitution σ and 〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ IR, σΓ `H σϕ,
• If there is an inference rule 〈Θ, ϕ〉 ∈ IR, a substitution σ and a set Σ ⊆
FmL such that Σ `H σθ for each θ ∈ Θ then Σ `H σϕ.
`H is the smallest logic that satisfies all the deductions expressed by the rules
and axioms of H . Another way of defining the consequence relation `H relies
on the following notion of proof.4
Definition 1.3. Let Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL, and H a Hilbert style calculus (on L). A
proof of ϕ from Γ in H is a well-founded tree5 labelled by formulas such that
4Observe that this is a generalization of the usual finite proof. We allow infinitary inference
rules in our Hilbert calculus (i.e., with infinitely many premises) and so the definition of proof
is more general.
5A well-founded tree has possibly infinite width and depth, but there are no branches of
infinite length.
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- The root is labelled by ϕ and the leaves are elements from Γ or substitutions
of the axioms of H .
- For each node with label ψ of the tree, with Σψ being its predecessors,
there is an inference rule in H , 〈Θ, θ〉 ∈ IR and a substitution σ such that
σΘ = Σψ and σθ = ψ.
We assume the reader is familiar with the finitary proofs in Hilbert-style
calculus. In order to get an idea on the meaning of an infinite proof given by













illustrates a proof structure for H such that:6
• H has finitary rules {R〈i,j〉}1≤j<=i,j,i∈N such that there exist substitu-
tions σ〈i,j〉 with σ〈i,j+1〉(prem(R〈i,j+1〉)) = γ〈i,j+1〉 and σi(con(R〈i,j+1〉)) =
γ〈i,j〉,
• H has an infinitary inference rule iR such that there exists a substitution
σ with σ(prem(R)) = {γ〈i,1〉 : 1 ≤ i ∈ N} and σ(con(R)) = ϕ,
• γnn is an axiom of H for all n ∈ N, n ≥ 1.
On the other hand, a tree like the one depicted at the
right side is not considered a deduction, even if the re-
quirements concerning the application of rules at each








Keeping this in mind one can define Γ `H ϕ if and only if there is a proof of ϕ
from Γ in H . It is easy to show that this definition of `H matches the previous
6For an inference rule R, we denote by prem(R) the set of premises of R and by con(R)
the consequence of R.
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one, i.e., it is the smallest logic that satisfies all the deductions expressed by the
rules and axioms of H .
On the other hand, logics can be defined semantically by means of certain
mathematical objects that allow to interpret their consequence relation. The
most general way of doing this, at least in the propositional case, is given by the
so-called (logical) matrices, i.e. pairs of the form 〈A, F 〉 where A is an algebra
of the type and F ⊆ A is a set that represents truth among the set of possible
values A. According to this intuition, any class of matrices M determined a logic
as follows:
Γ |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ for every 〈A, F 〉 ∈ M and evaluation h in A
if h[Γ] ⊆ F , then h(ϕ) ∈ F
for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm.
It is well known that every logic can be determined both by a Hilbert calculus
and by a class of matrices. Nevertheless it is in principle not evident how to
associate to a given logic L a class of matrices M that reflects the meta-logical
properties of L (and clearly such that |=M coincides with `L). In order to explain
how this process can be carried on in general, we need to introduce some new
concepts.
Definition 1.4. Let 〈A, F 〉 be a matrix. The Leibniz congruence ΩAF of
〈A, F 〉 is the largest congruence θ of A compatible with F in the sense that
if a ∈ F and 〈a, b〉 ∈ θ then b ∈ F.
In the case where A is the formula algebra we will omit the superscript and
simply write ΩF . The Leibniz congruence naturally gives rise to a map
ΩA : X → ConA,
called the Leibniz operator, that sends a set F ⊆ A to its Leibniz congruence
ΩAF . The other fundamental concept that we need in order to construct al-
gebraic semantics for a given logic is the one of filter. Given a logic L and an
algebra A, a set F ⊆ A is called a filter of L (or a L-filter) on A when it is
closed under the interpretation of the rules of L, that is
Γ `L ϕ =⇒ for every evaluation h in A
if h[Γ] ⊆ F , then h(ϕ) ∈ F
for every Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. In case L is presented by a Hilbert calculus, the filters
of L on A are exactly the subsets of A that contains all interpretations of the
axioms and that are closed under the interpretations of the rules of the calculus.
In this sense Hilbert calculi may help to describe the structure of logical filters.
We will denote by FiLA the complete lattice of L-filters on A ordered under
the inclusion relation. We are now ready to define the class of models of L as
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ModL := {〈A, F 〉 : F ∈ FiLA}
It has long been known that any logic L is strongly complete with respect to its
class of models ModL, that is L is the logic determined by the class of matrices
ModL. Filters of a logic over the formula algebra are called theories of the
logic.
As we already mentioned, it is not the case that every class of matrices,
that yields a completeness result with respect to L, reflects the meta-logical
properties of L. An example of this phenomenon is the construction of the
algebraic semantics ModL that is by no means the intended semantics of the
logic L.7 Nevertheless, thanks to the Leibniz congruence, it turns out that the
artificial semantics ModL can be refined in a way that (at least in well-behaved
cases) it becomes the intended semantics of L. More precisely, the reduced
models and the reduced algebras of L are the following classes:
Mod∗L := {〈A, F 〉 : F ∈ FiLA and ΩA = IdA}
Alg∗L := {A : 〈A, F 〉 ∈Mod∗L for some F ⊆ A}.
It is easy to prove that L is (strongly) complete with respect to Mod∗L.
Moreover in well-behaved cases the reduced models of a logic coincide with
the class of matrices that was traditionally associated to logic, e.g. the reduced
models of classical (intuitionistic) logic are Boolean (Heyting) algebras equipped
with the singleton of the top element.
The general study of the relation that holds between a given logic L and its
algebraic semantics Mod∗L gives rise to the so-called Leibniz hierarchy, in
which logics are classified by means of two basic features: the fact that logical
equivalence (which is identified with the Leibniz congruence) is definable by
means of formulas and the fact that the filters of the matrices in Mod∗L are
definable by means of equations. This general classification can be useful in the
study of new logics since, once a given logic is recognized to belong to a certain
level of the Leibniz hierarchy, several useful results about it can be directly
deduced from the general theory. For this reason we will briefly sketch the
definitions of some (but not all) classes of logics in the Leibniz hierarchy.
The first class of logics we will consider was introduced by Rawiowa [108]:
Definition 1.5. A logic L in a language L is implicative when there is a binary
term → in the language that satisfies the following conditions:
1. `L ϕ→ ϕ,
2. ϕ→ ψ,ψ → χ `L ϕ→ χ,
3. For each f ∈ L of arity n ≥ 1,
{ϕi → ψi, ψi → ϕi : i ≤ n} `L f(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)→ f(ψ1, . . . , ψn),
7For example, it is not difficult to see that the algebraic reducts of ModL coincide with the
class of all algebras of the type.
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4. ϕ,ϕ→ ψ `L ψ,
5. ϕ `L ψ → ϕ
It is not difficult to see that if L is an implicative logic, then for every algebra
A ∈ Alg∗L we have that a → a = b → b for every a, b ∈ A. In other words the
term 1 := x→ x defines a constant in Alg∗L.
Theorem 1.6. If L is implicative, then it is (strongly) complete with respect to
the following class of matrices
{〈A, {1}〉 : A ∈ Alg∗L}.
Moreover the above class coincides with Mod∗L.
Another class of logics that properly include the implicative ones, was intro-
duced by Blok and Pigozzi [15]:
Definition 1.7. A logic L is algebraizable when there is a class K of algebras, a
set of formulas ∆(x, y) in at most two variables (called congruence formulas),
and a set of equations E(x) in at most one variable (called defining equations)
such that for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL the following conditions hold:
• Γ `L ϕ if and only if E(Γ) |=K E(ϕ);
• x ≈ y |=K E(∆(x, y)) and E(∆(x, y)) |=K x ≈ y.
Here E(Γ) is an abbreviation for {α(γ) ≈ β(γ) : α ≈ β ∈ E(x) and γ ∈ Γ} for
every set of formulas Γ. If L and K are related as above, then GQK is called
equivalent algebraic semantics. It should be noticed that the definition of
equivalent algebraic semantics does not depend on the choice of K in the sense
that if two classes K and K′ are related to L as above, then GQK = GQK′. It
can be proven that this class of logics strictly contains the implicative ones. One
of the main achievements of the theory of algebraizable logics is the following
characterization result in terms of an isomorphism between logical filters and
relative congruences:
Theorem 1.8 (Isomorphism Theorem). Let L be a logic and K a generalized
quasi-variety. L is algebraizable with equivalent algebraic semantics K if and only
if, in every algebra A of the type, the Leibniz operator is an isomorphism between
the complete lattices FiLA and ConKA that, moreover, commutes with inverse
endomorphisms in the sense that ΩAσ−1F = σ−1ΩAF for every endomorphism
σ of A and filter F ∈ FiLA.
Relying on the above theorem, when L is an algebraizable logic with equiva-
lent algebraic semantics K we will simplify the notation by writing A/F instead
of A/ΩAF for every algebra A and F ∈ FiLA. The last class of logics in the
Leibniz hierarchy we will make use of is the following one.
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Definition 1.9. A logic L in a language L is equivalential when there is a set
of formulas ∆(x, y)8 in at most two variables for which the following equivalent
conditions hold:
1. The following deductions hold:
(R) `L ∆(ϕ,ϕ)
(MP) ϕ,∆(ϕ,ψ) `L y
(Re)
⋃
i≤n ∆(ϕi, ψi) `L ∆(f(ϕ1...ϕn), f(ψ1...ψn)) for each f ∈ L of arity
n ≥ 1
2. For all 〈A, F 〉 ∈ModL and a, b ∈ A
〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF ⇐⇒∆A(a, b) ⊆ F.
In case 1 (or, equivalently, 2) holds, we will say that ∆ is a set of congruence
formulas for L.
Remarkably, also equivalential logics can be characterized by a property of
the Leibniz operator restricted to logical filters. More precisely, we have the
following result.
Theorem 1.10. A logic L is equivalential if and only if, for every algebra A
of the type, the Leibniz operator ΩA is monotonic over FiLA and commutes
with inverse endomorphisms in the sense that ΩAσ−1F = σ−1ΩAF for every
endomorphism σ of A and filter F ∈ FiLA.
The Leibniz hierarchy comprehends other classes of logics, but these will be
all the ones that are referred to along this thesis dissertation.
8Do not confuse this ∆ binary function that provides a set of equations with the ∆ Baaz-




MTL logic arises as a generalization of a previously defined logic, BL, which is
in turn a way of bringing together historically studied many-valued logics that
share several characteristics.
Along this chapter we do a brief revision on these logics and their more
common axiomatic extensions, going from the more basic MTL to more specific
many-valued logics like Go¨del,  Lukasiewicz and Product logics. For a deeper
and complete study on many-valued logics, we refer the reader to [35].
2.1 MTL: the logic of left-continuous t-norms
One of the most studied many-valued systems are those corresponding to logical
calculi defined over the real interval [0, 1] and, in particular, the so-called t-norm
based fuzzy logics. These are logics defined over a language L = 〈&/2,→
/2,∧/2, 0/0〉, interpreted in [0, 1] respectively by a (left-continuous) t-norm ∗,
a residuated operation ⇒∗ for ∗, the minimum operation in [0, 1] and the 0
element.
A t-norm ∗ is a binary operation on [0, 1] that is commutative, non-
decreasing in both components, associative and 1 neutral element. It is a nat-
ural generalization of the notion of minimum from lattices. Moreover, if ∗ is a
left-continuous t-norm it has associated a unique residuum operation associated
(⇒∗), defined by
x⇒∗ y := max{z : z ∗ x ≤ y}.
For a left-continuous t-norm ∗, we let [0,1]∗ (and call it the standard ∗-
algebra) be the algebra of type L defined as 〈[0, 1], ∗,⇒∗,∧, 0〉 (where ∧ stands
for the minimum).
Each one of these algebras determines a unique logic over formulas in the
language L with a countable set of variables, by considering the logical matrix
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〈[0,1]∗, {1}〉.
We simply write Γ |=[0,1]∗ ϕ when ϕ follows from Γ in the above semantics,
i.e., when for any evaluation e in [0,1]∗, if e[Γ] = {1} then e(ϕ) = 1.
An axiomatization for the logic of all left-continuous t-norm based standard
algebras was proposed by Esteva and Godo in [49].
Definition 2.1. MTL (for monoidal t-norm logic) is the logic given by the
Hilbert style calculus with Modus Ponens (i.e., MP : p, p → q ` q) as its only
inference rule and the following axioms:
(MTL1) (p→ q)→ ((q → r)→ (p→ r))
(MTL2) (p& q)→ p
(MTL3) (p& q)→ (q & p)
(MTL4a) (p ∧ q)→ p
(MTL4b) (p ∧ q)→ (q ∧ p)
(MTL4c) (p& (p→ q))→ (p ∧ q)
(MTL5a) (p→ (q → χ))→ ((p& q)→ r)
(MTL5b) ((p& q)→ r)→ (p→ (q → r))
(MTL6) ((p→ q)→ r)→ (((q → p)→ χ)→ r)
(MTL7) 0→ p
Other connectives can be defined from &,∧ and → as follows.
1 := p→ p
¬p := p→ 0
p↔ q := (p→ q) & (q → p)
p ∨ q := ((p→ q)→ q) ∧ ((q → p)→ p)
The algebraic semantics of MTL is the class of the so-called MTL-algebras.
The class of MTL-algebras coincides with the variety of prelinear residuated
lattices (that is, residuated lattices where (x→ y)∨(y → x) = 1), understanding
residuated lattices as commutative, integral, bounded residuated monoids. The
algebras of this variety are subdirect products of the linearly ordered algebras of
the class. As expected, the operations of the MTL-algebras with universe [0, 1]
are given by left-continuous t-norms and their residua. Jenei and Montagna
proved in [84] that MTL is strongly complete with respect to the class of MTL-
algebras defined on the real unit interval, i.e,:
Theorem 2.2. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} be a set of formulas. Then
Γ `MTL ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ |=[0,1]∗ ϕ for all left-continuous t-norm ∗ .
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One common property of all axiomatic extensions of MTL is that they enjoy
a local form of the deduction theorem, namely, for any MTL axiomatic extension
L it holds that
Γ ∪ {ϕ} `L ψ ⇐⇒ there exists n ∈ N such that Γ `L ϕn → ψ,
where ϕn stands for ϕ& n. . . &ϕ. It is local in the sense that the value n depends
of the particular formulas involved Γ, ϕ and ψ.
2.2 BL: the logic of continuous t-norms
If we restrict to the semantics [0,1]∗ when ∗ is a continuous t-norm a new
axiomatic system can be defined. It is remarkable that the main difference
with respect to MTL lies on the divisibility property (algebraically the equality
x ∧ y := x ∗ (x ⇒∗ y)), which characterizes the continuity of the t-norm. This
means that the min-conjunction ∧, which was not definable in MTL can be
defined in this new logic from the & and → operations.
Ha´jek presented an axiomatic system in [71], later proven to coincide with
the logic (for what concerns validity) of the continuous t-norms. This axiomatic
system, named BL or Hajek’s Basic Logic, coincides with that of MTL except
for what concerns the already commented divisibility. BL has again MP as only
inference rule and the following axioms:1
(BL1) (p→ q)→ ((q → r)→ (p→ r))
(BL2) (p& q)→ p
(BL3) (p& q)→ (q & p)
(BL4) (p& (p→ q)→ (q&(q → p))
(BL5a) (p→ (q → r))→ ((p& q)→ r)
(BL5b) ((p& q)→ r)→ (p→ (q → r))
(BL6) ((p→ q)→ r)→ (((q → p)→ r)→ r)
(BL7) 0→ p
In this case, also the ∧ connective can be defined from & and → by letting
p ∧ q := p& (p→ q).
The class of BL-algebras, i.e., the variety generated by all standard algebras
based on a continuous t-norm, is formed by algebras of the form A = 〈A,/2,⇒
/2, 0/0〉, where the ∧ operation is defined by x ∧ y := x  (x ⇒ y) (and the ∨,
⇔ and 1 operations are defined from the other ones as in the MTL case) and
such that:
1These are the original set of axioms proposed by Ha´jek in [71]. Later Cintula showed in
[33] that (BL3) is redundant.
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(i) (A,∧,∨, 0, 1) is a lattice with the largest element 1 and the least element 0
(with respect to the lattice ordering ≤),
(ii) (A,, 1) is a commutative semigroup with the unit element 1, i.e.  is
commutative, associative and 1 x = x for all x,
(iii) the following conditions hold for all x,y,z:
(1) z ≤ (x⇒ y) iff x ∗ z ≤ y, (residuation)
(2) x ∧ y = x (x⇒ y), (divisibility)
(3) (x⇒ y) ∨ (y ⇒ x) = 1. (pre-linearity)
Thus, in other words, a BL-algebra is a bounded, integral commutative residu-
ated lattice further satisfying (2) and (3). It is known that each BL-algebra is a
subdirect product of linearly ordered BL-algebras, which has as a consequence
the strong completeness of BL with respect to the linearly ordered algebras of
this class. BL-algebras defined on the real unit interval [0, 1], called standard
BL-algebras, turn to be, as intended, the ones associated to continuous t-norms.
Ha´jek proved in [71] that the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Γ `BL ϕ,
(ii) for each BL-algebra A and any A-evaluation e such that e([Γ]) = {1A}
then e(ϕ) = 1
A
,
(iii) for each linearly ordered BL-algebra C and any C-evaluation e such that
e([Γ]) = {1C} then e(ϕ) = 1C.
Ha´jek’s conjecture was that BL captured the 1-tautologies (that is, the for-
mulas that are evaluated to 1 under any evaluation) common to all many-valued
calculi defined by a continuous t-norm. In fact this was proved to be the case
soon after, in [30]. That is to say, letting TAUT (A) denote the formulas ϕ such
that, for any evaluation e : Fm→ A it holds that e(ϕ) = 1, it holds that
ϕ is provable in BL ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈
⋂
{TAUT ([0,1]∗) : ∗ is a continuous t-norm}
More than that, a stronger completeness property holds: if Γ is a finite set of
formulas, then Γ `BL ϕ if and only if for each standard BL-algebra A (i.e.,
of the form [0,1]∗ for ∗ a continuous t-norm) and any evaluation e in A, if
e[Γ] = {1} then e(ϕ) = 1. This result is usually referred as finite strong standard
completeness of BL. However, this property does not hold for infinite sets of
formulas, i.e., BL is not strongly complete with respect to the class of standard
algebras based on a continuous t-norm.
Concerned with the problem of the axiomatization of the valid equations in
the standard algebra of a particular t-norm, in [52] it is addressed that problem
for continuous t-norms. The authors provide there a general method to get a
finite axiomatization L∗, extending BL, of the set of tautologies arising from a
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continuous t-norm, studying the subvarieties of the class of BL-algebras. For
each L∗ logic, one has that a formula ϕ is provable in L∗ if and only if it is a
tautology in [0,1]∗.
2.3 Notable extensions of BL and MTL
Three outstanding examples of continuous t-norms and thus, of standard BL
algebras are the following:
Go¨del: [0,1]G = 〈[0, 1], ∗G,⇒G,∧, 0〉 where
x ∗G y = min(x, y)
x⇒G y =
{
1, if x ≤ y
y, otherwise.
 Lukasiewicz: [0,1] L = 〈[0, 1], ∗ L,⇒ L,∧, 0〉 where
x ∗ L y = max(x+ y − 1, 0)
x⇒ L y =
{
1, if x ≤ y
1− x+ y, otherwise.
Product: [0,1]Π = 〈[0, 1], ∗Π,⇒Π,∧, 0〉 where
x ∗Π y = x · y (product of reals)
x⇒Π y =
{
1, if x ≤ y
y/x, otherwise.
For each one of the previous t-norms there is a corresponding formula that
allows to extend BL in such a way that the resulting logic corresponds finitarily
(that is, for what concerns deductions from a finite amount of premises) to
the one determined by the t-norm. Namely,  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and product
logics can be axiomatized as extensions of BL. Indeed, it is shown in [71] that
 Lukasiewicz logic is the extension of BL by the axiom
( L) ¬¬p→ p,
forcing the negation to be involutive and that Go¨del logic is the exten-
sion of BL by the axiom
(G) p→ (p&p).
forcing the conjunction to be idempotent. Finally, product logic is just
the extension of BL by the following two axioms:
32 Chapter 2. Many-valued logics: MTL and BL
(Π1) ¬¬r → (((p&r)→ (q&r))→ (p→ q)),
(Π2) p ∧ ¬p→ 0¯.
The first axiom indicates that if c 6= 0, the cancellation of c on both
sides of the inequality a · c ≤ b · c can be done, getting thus hence the strict
monotony of the conjunction on (0, 1]. The last axiom is due to the fact that
negation in product logic behaves such that ¬a = a→ 0 = 0 whenever a > 0.
It is known that  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product logic are finitely strong
standard complete. That is to say, for L being one of the previous logics and
[0,1]L its corresponding standard algebra and for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} a finite set of
formulas it holds that
Γ `L ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ `[0,1]L ϕ
The case of the Go¨del logic is a bit special: it is he only axiomatic extension
of BL that enjoys the strong standard completeness, because it is finitary in its
semantic definition (which is not the case for  L and Π logics, for instance). Not
only that: for any set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of formulas the following items are equivalent
• Γ `G ϕ,
• Γ0 `G ϕ for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ,
• Γ |=[0,1]G ϕ,
• Γ |=≤[0,1]G ϕ, i.e, for any evaluation e in [0,1]G, inf{e[Γ]} ≤ e(ϕ)
By defining ¬x := x ⇒ 0, it turns out that the algebraic semantics of
 Lukasiewicz logic, given by the class of MV-algebras (or Wajsberg algebras),
coincides with the subvariety of BL-algebras further satisfying ¬¬x = x. Simi-
larly, the class of Go¨del-algebras corresponds to the subvariety of BL-algebras
satisfying x ∗ x = x and the class of Product algebras, which characterize the
algebraic semantics for Product logic, coincides with the subvariety of BL
satisfying the equations
x ∧ ¬x ≈ 0
¬¬z → ((x ∗ z ↔ y ∗ z)→ (x↔ y)) ≈ 1
The importance of the Go¨del,  Lukasiewicz and Product t-norms (and thus, of
their corresponding logics) with respect to all the other continuous t-norms will
become clearer in the next section, where we present how any other continuous t-
norm can be obtained from these ones. Two of these logics correspond to many-
valued systems historically studied before fuzzy logics were developed. These
are the well-known  Lukasiewicz [89] and Go¨del [65] logics2 which are the logical
systems corresponding to the so-called  Lukasiewicz and minimum t-norms and
their residuated implications respectively. Later, already motivated by research
2Go¨del logic is also known as Dummett logic, referring to the scholar who axiomatized it.
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on fuzzy logic, in [75] the many-valued logic corresponding to Product t-norm
and its residuum was also axiomatized.
Clearly, not only  Lukasiewicz logic, Go¨del logic, Product logic and Ha´jek’s
BL logic—as well as the Classical Propositional Calculus3—can be presented
as axiomatic extensions of MTL. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 collect several important
axiom schemata and some of the most prominent axiomatic extensions of MTL.4
Notice that in extensions of MTL with the divisibility axiom (Div) the additive
conjunction ∧ is definable and therefore we could not consider it as a primitive
connective. However, for the sake of homogeneity we keep L = {&,→,∧, 0} as
the common language for all MTL extensions.
Axiom schema Name
¬¬p→ p Involution (Inv)
¬p ∨ ((p→ p& q)→ q) Cancellation (C)
¬(p& q) ∨ ((q → p& q)→ p) Weak Cancellation (WC)
p→ p& p Contraction (Con)
(p ∧ q)→ p& (p→ q) Divisibility (Div)
(p ∧ ¬p)→ 0 Pseudo-complementation (PC)
p ∨ ¬p Excluded Middle (EM)
(p& q → 0) ∨ (p ∧ q → p&q) Weak Nilpotent Minimum (WNM)
pn−1 → pn n-Contraction (Cn)
Table 2.1: Some usual axiom schemata in fuzzy logics.
We conclude this section placing the logics presented in this chapter within
the context of other studied logics. In the tradition of substructural logics,
both BL and MTL are logics without contraction. The weakest residuated logic
without contraction is Ho¨hle’s Monoidal Logic ML [82], equivalent to FLew (Full
Lambek calculus with exchange and weakening) introduced by Kowalski and
Ono [62] as well as to Adillon and Verdu´’s IPC∗\c (Intuitionistic Propositional
Calculus without contraction) [1], which is the logic corresponding to the variety
of bounded, integral and commutative residuated lattices. From this logic, MTL
can be obtained by adding the prelinearity axiom and from there, a hierarchy of
all t-norm-based fuzzy logics can be considered as different schematic extensions
[62]. Figure 2.1 shows a diagram of this hierarchy with the main logics presented.
2.4 Construction of continuous t-norms
It seems natural to wonder whether it is possible to give a way of constructing
continuous t-norms with a recursive procedure, in order to be able to simplify
3Indeed, Classical Propositional Calculus can be presented as the extension of MTL (and
of any of its axiomatic extensions) with the excluded-middle axiom (EM).
4Some of these logics were known well before MTL was introduced and our objective is just
that of presenting them here in a uniform way.
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NM (Inv) and (WNM) [49]
CnMTL (Cn) [28]
CnIMTL (Inv) and (Cn) [28]
BL (Div) [71]
SBL (Div) and (PC) [51]
 L (Div) and (Inv) [71]
Π (Div) and (C) [75]
G (Con) [71]
Table 2.2: Some axiomatic extensions of MTL obtained by adding the corre-
sponing axiom schemata and the references (from the fuzzy logics literatura)
where they were introduced.
the study of these operations (and thus, of the axiomatic extensions of BL).
The most common method for doing so is that of the ordinal sum operation:
it allows to build a t-norm from a family of t-norms, by shrinking them into
disjoint subintervals of the interval [0, 1].
It is based on the following well known result:
Lemma 2.3. Let {∗i}i∈I for I a be a set of continuous t-norms and {(bi, ti)}i∈I
a family of pairwise disjoint open intervals of [0, 1] such that
⋃
i∈I [bi, ti] = [0, 1].
Then, the function ∗ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] defined as
x ∗ y :=
{







if x, y ∈ [bi, ti]
min{x, y} otherwise
is a continuous t-norm.
The t-norm resulting from the previous construction is called the ordinal





When I is finite with cardinal n, we refer to it also by
∗ = 〈∗1, (b1, t1)〉 ⊕ ...⊕ 〈∗n, (bn, tn)〉
Intuitively, the construction of an ordinal sum is just “piling” different t-
norms and considering the structure order generated with this union.
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Framework of t-norm based fuzzy logics
Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of some substructural and many-valued logics [50]
In can be checked that the residuum of the previous construction also has a
nice characterization in terms of {〈∗i, (bi, ti)〉}i∈I . If ∗ =
⊕
i∈I〈∗i, (bi, ti)〉, its
residuum ⇒∗ is given by:
x⇒∗ y =

1 if x ≤ y







if bi ≤ y < x ≤ ti
y otherwise
To work with an arbitrary axiomatic extension of the BL logic, or, equiva-
lently, with an arbitrary standard BL-algebra (and thus, an arbitrary continuous
t-norm), we know, thanks to the following well known theorem, that it is enough
to deal with ordinal sums of the three particular ones commented before: ∗ L,
∗G and ∗Π.
Theorem 2.4. (Mostert and Shields [101], cf. [71]). Any continuous t-norm ∗
can be expressed as a countable ordinal sum of  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product
t-norms.
That is to say, there exists I with |I| ≤ ℵ0, {(bi, ai)}i∈I family of pairwise
disjoint (non-empty) subintervals of [0, 1] and {∗i}i∈I with ∗i ∈ {∗ L, ∗G, ∗Π} for
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It can be proven that the variety of BL-algebras coincides with the one gen-
erated by a particular continuous t-norm: the ordinal sum of infinitely many
 Lukasiewicz t-norms.
Theorem 2.5. ([2, 98])
The variety of BL-algebras is generated as a quasivariety by the class of all
algebras of the form
⊕
i∈I
[0,1] L for any finite I.






A corollary of this theorem is that BL is finite standard complete with respect
to the standard algebra arising from the previous continuous t-norm.
2.5 MTL expansions
In the literature of t-norm based logics, one can find not only a number of
axiomatic extensions of MTL but also expansions by means of introducing new
connectives in the language. We address here two particular cases that have been
previously studied in the literature and that play an important role along this
doctoral dissertation: the expansions with truth constants and the expansions
with the unary Monteiro-Baaz ∆ operation.
Logics with ∆
The ∆ unary connective, introduced in [9], has as intended semantics that of
capturing the crisp part within fuzzy propositions. This is done fixing the inter-
pretation of the ∆ operator in any standard MTL-algebra [0,1]∗ to
δx :=
{
1 if x = 1
0 otherwise
At the syntactical level, an axiomatization for ∆ in the context of MTL is
presented in [71].
Definition 2.6. Let L be an extension of MTL. The logic L∆ is the extension
of the L axiomatic system by the following axiom schemata and rules:
(∆1) ∆p ∨ ¬∆p,






[0,1] L to denote the algebras isomorphic to
⊕
i∈N
〈∗ L, ( ii+1 , i+1i+2 )〉.
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(∆5) ∆(p→ q)→ (∆p→ ∆q).
G∆ Generalization rule for ∆: p ` ∆p
The algebraic companion of L∆ is given by the class of L∆-algebras, i.e.
L-algebras expanded with a unary operator δ that satisfies the equations and
quasi-equations arising from L∆. That is to say, for each x, y in the algebra, the
following are valid equations and quasi-equations.
(∆1) δ(x) ∨ ¬δ(x) ≈ 1
(∆2) δ(x ∨ y) ≤ (δ(x) ∨ δ(y))
(∆3) δ(x) ≤ x
(∆4) δ(x) ≤ δ(δ(x))
(∆5) δ(x⇒ y) ≤ (δ(x)⇒ δ(y))
(∆6) δ(1) ≈ 1
Observe that in any linearly ordered L∆-algebra, the semantics of ∆ coincides
with the intended semantics over the standard L-algebra, i.e., δ(x) = 1 if x = 1,
and δ(x) = 0 otherwise.
It is proven that the logics L∆ are strongly complete with respect to linearly
ordered algebras of the algebraic companion. That is to say, for each set of
formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} the following are equivalent:
1. Γ `L∆ ϕ,
2. for each L∆-chain A and each A-evaluation such that e([Γ]) = {1A} it
holds that e(ϕ) = 1
A
,
3. for each L∆-algebra A and each A-evaluation such that e([Γ]) = {1A} it
holds that
Standard completeness results for L∆ logics have been proven in the litera-
ture whenever the logic L has been shown to be standard complete. In particular,
MTL∆ is strongly complete with respect to the class of left-continuous t-norm
standard algebras expanded with the ∆ operation, while BL∆ is finitely com-
plete with respect to the class of standard algebras based on continuous t-norms
with ∆. Moreover,  L∆, G∆ and Π∆ are finitely complete with respect to, corre-
spondingly, [0,1] L, [0,1]G and [0,1]Π expanded with the δ operation.
Logics with truth constants: Pavelka completeness
While the notion of deduction in t-norm based fuzzy logics is, in general, crisp
(in the sense that a formula follows from a set of premises if it preserves the
distinguished value 1), a more general notion of fuzzy deduction can be defined
and thus we can consider t-norm based fuzzy logics as logics of comparative
truth. The idea arises naturally from the fact that the residuum ⇒∗ of a (left-
continuous) t-norm ∗ satisfies the condition x⇒∗ y = 1 if and only if x ≤ y for
all x, y ∈ [0, 1]. This means that a formula ϕ → ψ is a logical consequence of a
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set Γ, i.e. Γ `L ϕ → ψ, if the truth degree of ϕ is at most as high as the truth
degree of ψ in any interpretation which is a model of Γ. Therefore, implications
naturally capture a notion of comparative truth. In some situations it might be
also interesting to explicitly represent and reason with partial degrees of truth.
For instance, in any logic L∗ of a left-continuous t-norm ∗, any truth-evaluation
e satisfying e(ϕ → ψ) ≥ α and e(ϕ) ≥ β, necessarily satisfies e(ψ) ≥ α ∗ β as
well.
One simple and elegant way to allow for an explicit treatment of degrees
of truth is by introducing truth-constants into the language. In fact, if one
adds to the language new constant symbols α for suitable values α ∈ [0, 1] and
stipulates that e(α) = α for all truth-evalutations, then a formula of the kind
α→ ϕ becomes 1-true under an evaluation e when α ≤ e(ϕ).
This approach was presented by Pavelka [105, 106, 107] who built a propo-
sitional many-valued logical system PL which turned out to be equivalent to
the expansion of  Lukasiewicz logic with a truth-constant c for each real number
r ∈ [0, 1], together with certain additional axioms. The semantics is the same
as  Lukasiewicz logic, just expanding the  Lukasiewicz standard algebra with this
set of constants and evaluating each of them by its value, i.e., expanding the
evaluations e of propositional variables in [0, 1] to truth-constants by requiring
e(c) = c for all c ∈ [0, 1]. Although the resulting logic is not strong standard
complete (SSC in the sense defined in Section 2.2) with respect to that intended
semantics, Pavelka proved that his logic enjoys a different kid of semantic com-
pleteness. Namely, he defined the truth degree of a formula ϕ in a theory Γ
as
‖ϕ‖Γ = inf{e(ϕ) | e is a PL-evaluation model of Γ},
and the provability degree of ϕ in T as
|ϕ|Γ = sup{r ∈ [0, 1] | Γ `PL r → ϕ}
and proved that these two degrees coincide. This kind of completeness is usually
known as Pavelka-style completeness and this case strongly relies on the
continuity of  Lukasiewicz operations. Observe that ‖ϕ‖Γ = 1 is not equivalent
to Γ `PL ϕ, but only to Γ `PL r → ϕ for all r < 1.
Later, Ha´jek [71] showed that Pavelka’s logic PL could be simplified
(while keeping the previous completeness result) limiting the expansion of the
 Lukasiewicz language to only a countable set of truth-constants, one for each
rational number in [0, 1] and the two following so-called book-keeping axioms:
(c& d)↔ c ∗ L d (c→ d)↔ c⇒ L d
for all c, d ∈ [0, 1]Q. He called this new system Rational Pavelka Logic, RPL for
short. Moreover, he proved that RPL is standard complete for finite theories.
Similar rational expansions for other t-norm based fuzzy logics can be anal-
ogously defined, but unfortunately Pavelka-style completeness cannot be proven
in general (for the logics extended by just the previous axioms).  Lukasiewicz
logic has continuous operations and an involutive negation that contribute to
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the Pavelka completeness, but those are not general characteristics of the con-
tinuous t-norms.
Nevertheless, expansions with truth-constants of fuzzy logics different from
 Lukasiewicz have been studied, mainly related to the other two outstanding
continuous t-norm based logics, namely Go¨del and Product logic. However,
the results are not so uniform as in the  Lukasiewicz case. In [71] it is studied
an expansion of G∆ (the expansion of Go¨del logic G with Baaz’s projection
connective ∆) with a finite number of rational truth-constants. In [51] the
authors define logical systems obtained by adding (rational) truth-constants to
Go¨del and Product logics with an additional involutive negation.
More in general, Cintula gives in [32] a definition of what he calls Pavelka-
style extension of a particular fuzzy logic. He considers the Pavelka-style
extensions of the some common continuous t-norms based fuzzy logics and for
these he defines an axiomatic system with infinitary rules to overcome the dis-
continuities of the operations. In particular, he presents an axiomatic system
with two infinitary rules Pavelka-complete with respect to the standard prod-
uct algebra with ∆. In a more recent work [34], the same author approaches
this problem in general for expansions of MTL. There, he proposes a method
for axiomatizing a logic Pavelka complete with respect to the standard algebra
of a left-continuous t-norm expanded with operations that shall follow certain
restrictions, extending the logic with book-keeping axioms and with an infini-
tary rule for each discontinuity point of the operations. This particular work is
further commented in Chapter 4, where we also present several results on this
topic.
On the other hand, a systematic approach based on traditional algebraic
semantics has been also considered to study completeness results (in the usual
sense) for expansions of t-norm based logics with truth-constants. Indeed, as
already mentioned, only the case of  Lukasiewicz logic was known according to
[71]. In [111] it was studied the addition of rational constants to Product logic
and an axiomatic system for the theorems of this logic was given. Moreover,
in [48], [53] and [54] it is addressed the problem of the addition of rational
constants to other BL logics. The main idea presented in these works is that
if L∗ is a logic based on a left-continuous t-norm and C = 〈C,,⇒,∧,∨0, 1〉 is
a countable subalgebra of the standard L∗-algebra [0,1]∗, then extending the
logic with the book-keeping axioms for the elements in C results in a logic LC∗
strongly complete with respect to linearly ordered LC∗ -algebras (the L∗ algebras
with an extended set of 0-ary operation symbols {c}c∈C that behave following
the book-keeping axioms). That is to say, for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} the
following are equivalent:
• Γ `LC∗ ϕ,
• for each LC∗ -chain A, e(ϕ) = 1
A
for all evaluation e in A which is a model
of Γ.
A LC∗ -chain defined over the real unit interval [0, 1] is called standard. Ob-
serve that, for a logic LC∗ , multiple standard chains can exist depending on the
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different ways of interpreting the truth-constants on [0, 1] (respecting the book-
keeping axioms). For instance, considering the expansion of the Go¨del logic
with constants from [0, 1]Q (i.e., the rational numbers from [0, 1]), the algebra
A = 〈[0, 1],∧,→, {cA}c∈[0,1]Q〉 where
cA =
{
1 if c ≥ α
0 otherwise
is a LC∗ -algebra with universe [0, 1] for any α > 0. Among the standard chains
there is one which reflects the intended semantics, the so-called canonical stan-
dard LC∗ -chain
[0,1]CL∗ = 〈[0, 1], ∗,⇒,∧,∨, {c : c ∈ C}〉,
i. e. the one where the truth-constants are interpreted by their names.6
Studying whether a logic LC∗ defined as above is complete with respect to the
class of standard LC∗ -chains or with respect to the canonical L
C
∗ -chain is also a
problem treated in the literature for some particular L∗ logics. In [71] it was
proven the canonical completeness of the expansion of  Lukasiewicz logic with
rational truth-constants for finite theories. On the other hand, the expansions
of Go¨del (and of some t-norm based logic related to the nilpotent minimum
t-norm) and of Product logic with countable sets of truth-constants have been
proved to be canonical complete for theorems in [53] and in [111] respectively.
One negative result for many of these logics (with the exception of
 Lukasiewicz logic) is that they are not (strongly nor finitely) complete with
respect to their corresponding canonical standard algebras for deductions from
non-empty theories (although they are finitely canonical complete if the lan-
guage is restricted to formulas of the c → ϕ). We will see in Chapter 4 how
it is possible to prove not only finite canonical completeness, but also its infini-
tary version, extending the previous logics with some infinitary rules and the ∆
operator from the previous section.
6For the sake of a simpler notation, in Part II and Part III of this dissertation, we will omit
the canonical term, and define the above kind of algebras as the standard ones. We will see
that, in our case, this is the only standard algebra.
Chapter 3
Modal Logics
Modal logic is a branch of mathematical logic that focuses on reasoning with
qualification of sentences. They have been studied from the 30’s and given its
versatility, it is one of the fields from mathematical logic that most has been
developed and applied. One of its more remarkable applications is done by
Go¨del, who interprets modalities in the context of proof theory and gives place
to the so-called provability logic. More recently, there has been a high number
on works concerning modal logics from a quite wide range of fields. For instance,
within the computer science context we can find dynamic logic [79, 80](that has
two modal operators for each process, the ”it is executable” and the ”after it
is executed” ones) and the temporal logic [109, 120] (that allows to address the
”always”, ”sometimes” and other temporal concepts). Moreover, linked with
cognitive sciences, modal logics have been used to model beliefs, trust and pref-
erences [118, 119, 96]..., and in this context the so-called description logics have
appeared. Within philosophy, modal logics have been used to study different
categories of necessity, contingency, causality and so on. Modal logics have also
been exploited in studies of proof theory, consistency and also complexity and
decidability.
The necessity and possibility-like modal operators of the previously com-
mented applications have a common core, around which we will center this
chapter. Moreover, the high versatility of modal logics is one of the principal
motivations behind the main topic of this doctoral dissertation. The addition
of fuzzy characteristics to modal logics appears to be filled with several possible
applications, allowing to study problems from the previously commented con-
texts without limiting the information to a classical setting. However, it is not
a research line fully developed and many related problems are still unsolved.
In this chapter, we will overview the topics of modal logic that are relevant to
the development of our work, in order to provide a solid framework over which
we base following parts of the thesis. For a deeper presentation of this topic, we
refer to some classical books on the matter, for instance [26, 27, 12]. We will
begin by presenting the definitions and results for classical modal logic, with the
two usual operators of necessity and possibility and then present an overview of
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the state of the art for what concerns modal expansions of fuzzy logics.
3.1 Classical modal logic
The main difference of modal logics with respect to the logics explained in the
previous chapters is that the natural semantics of the former is not the algebraic
one, but the so-called relational or Kripke semantics. Even though the historical
development of modal logics begins with the syntax of these logics and later the
semantics are discovered and studied we will present these ideas here the other
way around. We think this gives a more natural idea of the motivations and
behaviour of the modal logics and allows us to show the contents from the more
general ones to the more specific ones. We think this approach allows the reader
a clearer and more uniform comprehension on the topic.
The language of the modal logics considered in this work consists on a propo-
sitional language L that adds two particular unary operations, 2 and 3 called
modal operators, whose intuitive meaning is that of necessarily and possibly re-
spectively. In the classical setting, we will consider the modal language given by
LCM = 〈∨/2,¬/1,⊥ /0,2/1〉 with other usual propositional connectives defined
from these (> .= x∨¬x, x∧y .= ¬(¬x∨¬y), x→ y .= ¬x∨y) and, in particular,
3x
.
= ¬2¬x. As usual, we will denote by Var the set of propositional variables
(denumerable) used to build the set of formulas of the logic. As it is well known,
classical propositional logic is complete with respect to the Boolean algebra of
two elements. We will denote the (propositional) operations in this algebra by
their respective symbols in the language, since this is intensively done in the
literature and will clarify the notation.
Kripke semantics
Kripke semantics are developed in the 50s and allow to address formally the no-
tion of local truth. They are based on graph-like structures that are independent
from the language.
Definition 3.1. A Kripke or relational frame (usually called just Kripke
frame) is a pair F = 〈W,R〉 where W 6= ∅ is a set, whose elements are called
states of worlds of the frame and R is a binary relation on W called the
accessibility relation of the frame. For v, w ∈ W such that 〈v, w〉 ∈ R, we
write Rvw.
We will denote by KF the class of all Kripke frames. The use of the previous
notion as a structure over which we define a logic is done by assigning to each
state an evaluation that determines what propositions are true in it.
Definition 3.2. A Kripke model M is a triple 〈W,R, V 〉 such that 〈W,R〉 is
a Kripke frame F and V is a mapping from Var to W 1 called the evaluation
of the model. In this case, we say that M is a model based on F.
1Observe this is equivalent to say that V : Var ×W → {0, 1}, which gives a more natural
idea on how to generalize this notion to a many-valued context.
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We inductively (and uniquely) define the notion of a formula ϕ being satis-
fied or true in a Kripke model M at state w, in symbols M, w  ϕ, as follows:
M, w  p iff w ∈ V (p), for all x ∈ Var ,
M, w ⊥ iff never,
M, w  ¬ϕ iff not M, w  ϕ,
M, w  ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w  ϕ or M, w  ψ,
M, w  2ϕ iff M, v  ϕ, for all v ∈W such that Rwv
The class of all Kripke models will be denoted by KM.
For a set of formulas Γ and a state w of a model M, we write M, w  Γ
whenever M, w  γ for all γ ∈ Γ. Moreover, we say that a Kripke model M
satisfies a formula ϕ (or a set of formulas Γ) and write M  ϕ (resp. M  Γ)
whenever it does so at any of its states. We say that a class of models satisfies
a formula when each model in the class does so.
It is natural to see Kripke model as a frame and an evaluation with contingent
information. It is interesting to define the notion of truth independently of
this evaluation, as it is done in the algebraic setting and so focus on the more
fundamental level of the frames. This is done through the notion of validity in
a frame.
A formula ϕ is valid in a frame F and we write F  ϕ if ϕ is satisfied at
every model M = 〈F, V 〉.
The previous notion allows to semantically define two types of logical deduc-
tion. The natural idea of logical deduction implies that truth must be preserved
from the premises to the consequence and this can be interpreted in two differ-
ent ways. One is locally, that is, understanding truth is preserved at states of a
model or frame (or a class of these). On the other hand, it is also possible to
think of truth globally, being maintained in the whole model.
Formally, the two intuitive notions of deduction give rise to the following
consequence relations, defined semantically.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a class of models and Γ ∪ {ϕ} be a set of formulas.
Then we say that:
• ϕ is local consequence of Γ over C and write Γ C ϕ whenever for any
model M from C and for any state w in M, if M, w  Γ then M, w  ϕ.
• ϕ is global consequence of Γ over C and write Γ gC ϕ whenever for any
model M from C, if M  Γ then M  ϕ.
It is easy to see that these two consequence relations are different. Indeed,
consider the formulas ϕ and 2ϕ. Clearly, ϕ gKF 2ϕ, while this is not true
under the local consequence. This is in fact, the very essence behind the global
deduction. On the other hand, for any class of Kripke models C, the theorems of
the local and the global modal logics over C coincide. For this reason, sometimes
modal logics are defined as this common set of theorems, but we will stick to
the whole consequence relation definition for considering it more natural from a
general point of view.
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Syntactic level: the axiomatization problem
The previous notes comprehend the semantic approach to classical modal logics.
However, it exists an important syntactic dimension for what concerns these
logics, first from an historical point of view (modal logics arose in general in the
syntactic side) and also for what concerns their possible finitary characteriza-
tions. A natural question that appears when modal logics are studied is deter-
mining which classes of frames have a corresponding logic that can be finitely
axiomatizable, and the other way around, i.e., which axiomatic extensions have
a relational semantics based on a class of frames whose structure has a good
characterization.
We will refer to this problem as the axiomatization problem. It has been
deeply studied and we will present here only some results that will be useful later
on this thesis. Again, for a deeper study on this issues, we refer the interested
reader to [26, 27, 12].
A first approach is that of fixing the axioms that hold in all the Kripke frames
KF and the rules that are sound, respectively, in the local and global deductions
over KF. Logics containing these are called normal modal logics.
Definition 3.4.
• Let K be the logic defined by the extension of the classical propositional
calculus (CPC ) with the axiom K : 2(p → q) → (2p → 2q) and the
necessitation rule N2 : from ` ϕ infer ` 2ϕ for any formula ϕ.
• Let K g be the logic defined from K by substituting the necessitation rule
by Ng2 : p ` 2p.
We will call normal modal logics those extending K (and validating the
N2 rule) and normal global modal logics those extending K
g.
It is now of great interest to know how, given a normal modal logic N , to
characterize -if it exists- the class of frames with respect to which this logic is
complete.
Concerning K the usual approach is the definition of a special model MN ,
called the canonical model of N , with respect to which the completeness
always holds. In a certain sense, this model will play a similar role to that of
the Lindembaum-Tarki algebra defined in Chapter 1. However, this process does
not necessary provide a frame with the previous property.
The keystone that allows the use of the canonical model is the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.5. For any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}
Γ `K ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ ∪ Th(K ) `CPC ϕ
where it must be understood that the set of propositional variables used in the
right side is the extension of the one at the left with modal formulas that begin
by 2.
3.1. Classical modal logic 45
It is not hard to see how the previous result helps to prove completeness of
K with respect to the intended semantics. If Γ 6`K ϕ, it is enough to see if there
exists a classical evaluation (i.e., in {0, 1}), satisfying the modal theorems (and
the premises in Γ) but sending ϕ to 0.
For that, the canonical model has a very particular definition. It relies on the
notion of maximally consistent theories of a logic L, that is, the sets of formulas
that are L-consistent but such that any set of formulas properly containing it is
L-inconsistent.
Definition 3.6. Let N be a normal modal logic. Then, the canonical model
of N is the structure MN = 〈WN , RN , V N 〉 defined by:
• WN is the set of maximal theories of N ,
• For v, w ∈ WN , RN vw if and only if for any formula ϕ, if 2ϕ ∈ v then
ϕ ∈ w,
• For any p ∈ Var , V N (p) = {w ∈WN : p ∈ w}.
The so called Truth Lemma states that satisfaction at a state of this model
is equivalent to membership (not only for variables, bot for all formulas). That
is, for any formula ϕ and any w ∈WN , it holds that
MN , w  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ w.
From this result, it is not hard to prove that any normal modal logic is
complete with respect to its canonical model.
For the case of the logic K , since it is sound with respect to the whole class
of Kripke frames, it is easy ton conclude the completeness result: for any set of
formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ `K ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ KF ϕ
For other cases, completeness with respect to the canonical model gives a
semantical characterization of the logic (in terms of just one Kripke model),
but it is not immediate to know with respect to which class of frames is the
logic sound (so indirectly, how to characterize a class of frames with respect
to which the logic is complete). In fact, there exist normal modal logics that
are not complete with respect to any class of frames whatsoever. We will say
that formula ϕ is canonical for a frame property P whenever the canonical
model of any normal modal logic containing ϕ (in the sense that ϕ is a theorem
of the logic) has property P and ϕ is valid in any class of frames with property
P .
There are canonical modal formulas for some famous frame properties (see
Table 3.1 below for a list of the most common ones). However, the general
problem (i.e., given a particular class of frames C, generate the axioms that
extend K in such a way that the resulting logic is complete with respect to C)
is not always solvable.
There is, nevertheless, a partial solution to this problem that we will very
briefly comment here: formulas belonging to a particular class named Sahlqvist
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Name Axiom Frame property
D 2p→ 3p Seriality (D): ∀v∃w Rvw
T 2p→ p Reflexivity (T ): ∀v Rvv
B 32p→ p Symmetry (B): ∀v, w (Rvw ⇒ Rwv)
5 32p→ 2p Euclidean (5 ): ∀v, w, u (Rvw &Rvu ⇒ Rwu)
4 2p→ 22p Transitivity (4 ): ∀v, w, u (Rvw &Rwu ⇒ Rvu)
Table 3.1: Common modal axioms
have a corresponding frame property expressible by a first-order condition on
the states and relation, with respect to which they are canonical. The most well
known modal extensions of K are done with axioms belonging to this class. Table
3.1 provides a list of some of these and their corresponding frame condition.
An interesting property of the modal logics obtained with the axiom
schematas from table 3.1 is that they enjoy the finite model property : they
are complete with respect to classes of finite Kripke frames (that is, with finite
universes). This is a consequence of the fact that any Kripke model M from the
associated semantics is witnessed : for any formula ϕ and any world w ∈ W
such that M, w 6 2ϕ there is v ∈ W such that Rwv and M, v 6 ϕ. The finite
model property allows, among other things, to state that the decidability of the
satisfiability problem of K .
Algebraic semantics
Modal logics have also been studied from the algebraic semantics point of view
(see for instance [93, 63, 83],...), and the relations obtained between the so called
modal algebras and the relational semantics presented in this chapter has been
called duality theory. Modal algebras arise as the algebraic semantics associ-
ated to the modal logics syntactically defined as extensions of the logic K . They
turn out to be Boolean algebras endowed with an extra unary operation τ (which
is the interpretation of 2 in the algebra) that satisfies the modal axioms of the
logic. In particular, for the minimum modal logic K , the operation τ just must
enjoy two particular properties: it preserves the top element (i.e., τ1 = 1) and it
distributes over the minimum (i.e., τ(a∧ b) = τa∧ τb). It has been proved using
Boolean algebrasIn particular using finite Boolean algebras, whose calculus can
be done ad-hoc. that the local modal logic K is not algebraizable in the sense
of Blok and Pigozzi, but nevertheless a characterization of the reduced matrices
of the logic is given by Malinowski in [92].
Another algebraic study of modal logics that has been proved very fruitful is
the relation existing between Kripke frames and some modal algebras. From a
modal algebra A, it is possible to build a Kripke frame A+, called the ultrafilter
frame of A, whose universe is the set of ultrafilters of A and where two states
v, w are related if and only if for any a ∈ A, if τa ∈ v then a ∈ w.
On the other hand, it is also possible to study the algebraic semantics starting
not from a syntactically defined modal logic, but from the class of frames that
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define the logic semantically. Given a Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉, we call the
complex algebra of F to the algebra F+ with universe P(W ) and operations ∪
(interpreting ∨), the complement operation for subsets of W c (i.e., Xc = W \X,
that interprets the ¬ operation of the language), W as the top element and the
unary operation τ , that interprets the 2 symbol, defined by
τX = {y ∈W : ∀x, if xRy then y ∈ X}
It is proven that these algebras are modal algebras in the sense that they
belong to the algebraic semantics of K and not only that: the ultrafilter frame
and the complex algebra constructions preserve several properties from one side
to the other. Moreover, strong results can be obtained using classical theorems
like the Stone Representation Theorem (that states that the variety of Boolean
algebras is generated by 2) or the Stone duality. The Jo´nsson-Tarski Theorem
states that any modal algebra A can be embedded within the complex algebra
(A+)
+ (the complex algebra built from the ultrafilter frame of A). On the other
hand, it is possible to check that given a Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉, the ultrafilter
frame built from its complex algebra, that is to say, (F+)+, coincides with the
ultrafilter extension of F, i.e., the filter whose universe is the set of ultrafiters of
W and where the relation is such that Rvw if and only if the union of the sets of
states accessible (under R) from each state (from W ) belonging to v is a subset
of w.
All this machinery has been largely studied and exploited, also paying at-
tention to the similarities of these structure with certain topological spaces. An
important result is the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem [69], which states that a
class of Kripke frames closed under ultrafilter extensions is modally definable if
and only if it reflects ultrafilter extensions and is closed under generated sub-
frames, homomorphic images and disjoint unions. Thanks to these kind of equiv-
alence results, the axiomatization problem has undergone important advances
and other topics on modal logic have also gained tools that simplify their study.
It was proven by Goldblatt that there is a duality2 between modal algebras
and Kripke frames and these has allowed to prove very important theorems of
modal logic, some concerning the axiomatization problem (that is, of under-
standing which classes of frames give place to axiomatizable modal logics) and
others referring to more abstract questions out of the scope of this work but of
great importance to the development of modal logics.
3.2 Fuzzy modal logics
Researchers coming both from modal logic, algebraic logic and many-valued log-
ics fields have studied the possibilities of expanding many-valued logics with
modal-like operators (or endowing modal logics with many-valued characteris-
tics). There exist several works on this matter, considering different kind of
2It is not on the scope of this work enter in discussion of this issues, but we just want to
remark on this paragraph the great importance of the relations between the modal algebras
and the Kripke Frames. For the interested reader we refer to [67, 68, 61].
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modal operators and many-valued frames and models. Some approaches that
do not fit the work presented in this dissertation are for instance [97] and [29],
where the interpretation of the modalities or the underlying logics are out of our
considerations.
The seminal works by Fitting [57, 58] are the first ones to interpret many-
valued modal logics as logics arising from Kripke frames where the propositions
and the accesibility relation are evaluated over many-valued algebras and the
modal operators are a generalization of the classical ones.
Following this interpretation, we will focus here on the modal extensions of
the MTL logics. For what concerns modal expansions of MTL-logics, the usual
approach has been first understanding the semantic structures and from this
knowledge, try to provide nice axiomatic systems for the corresponding logics.
The Kripke semantics built over fuzzy structures aims to be a natural gen-
eralization of the classical Kripke models presented in the previous section. The
most general definitions at this respect, in the sense that they cope with MTL-
algebras (even though only up to finite cardinality) were presented in [18], defin-
ing Kripke frames and models over bounded commutative residuated lattices.
However, in that work the authors consider a language (the usual language of
bounded residuated lattices) with a constant for each element of the algebra,
expanded only by the modal 2 operator. One could think that this is enough
to address the whole set of modal notions (of necessity and possiblity), as it was
in the classical case. However, we will see that in the many-valued context, in
general, the two modal operators are no longer inter-definable. For this reason,
since our objective is presenting the most general possible structures, we will
consider the language expanded with both modal operators, as it is done for
instance in [23].
The language of the many-valued modal logic that we will be using in the
rest of this chapter is given by
〈&/2,→ /2,∧/2,2/1,3/1, 0/0〉.
Some extra (usual) operations are defined from these ones as usual (namely
1
.
= ϕ → ϕ, ¬ϕ .= ϕ → 0 and ϕ ∨ ψ .= ((ϕ → ψ) → ψ) ∧ ((ψ → ϕ) → ϕ)). Fm
denotes the set of formulas constructed using this language.
MTL-based Kripke semantics
The natural intuition, after studying the semantics of the classical modal logics,
is that both the relation and the evaluations of (classical) Kripke models are de-
fined in terms of subsets because of reasons coming from a version of the Stone
representation theorem for Boolean algebras: every Boolean algebra is isomor-
phic to a field of sets. This leads to thinking that in fact, the general definition
of Kripke models is based on interpreting accesibility relations and evaluations
into Boolean algebras, even though is equivalent to the one we defined in the
previous section because of such theorem.
This seems a good enough motivation to generalize the notion of Kripke
structures to the following ones.
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Definition 3.7. Let A be a MTL-algebra. An A-Kripke frame (and in gen-
eral, called many-valued Kripke frame) is a pair F = 〈W,R〉 where W 6= ∅ is
a set whose elements are called states of the frame and R is a binary relation on
W evaluated in A, that is, R : W ×W → A, called the accessibility relation.
We denote by KF(A) the class of A-Kripke frames.
If R[W × W ] ⊆ {0, 1}, the frame is said to be crisp. If R[W × W ] ⊆
Idp(A) := {a ∈ A : a a = a}, the frame is said to be idempotent. We denote
these two classes respectively by KFC(A) and KFI(A).
The last considerations from the previous definition allow us to address more
clearly different properties of these kind of frames. We denote by KF(C) the class
of frames based on a class of MTL-algebras C and respectively by KFC(C) and
KFI(C) to the crisp and idempotent frames based on the algebras from C. When
C is the whole class of MTL-algebras, we refer to this class simply as KF. It is
clear that, for an arbitrary class of MTL-algebras C, KFC(C) ⊆ KFI(C) ⊆ KF(C)
and that these three cases differ when there is at least one algebra A ∈ C where
{0, 1}  {a ∈ A : a a = a}  A.
The meaning of endowing a many-valued Kripke frame with an evaluation,
that is, defining a many-valued Kripke model arises intuitively as a generalization
of the classical Kripke-models.The only consideration to take into account is
to choose the same algebra to evaluate both the accessibility relation and the
formulas at each world.
Definition 3.8. Let A be a MTL-algebra. An A-Kripke model (and in gen-
eral, called many-valued Kripke model) is a triple 〈W,R, e〉 such that 〈W,R〉
is a A-Kripke frame F and e is a mapping from W ×Var to A called the eval-
uation of the model. In this case, we say that M is a model based on F.
In the classical case it makes sense to talk about satisfiability of a formula in
a world. Now, this notion must be adapted to the many-valued setting and so
what is natural is to consider the degree of truth taken by a formula in a world
in a model. A natural way to do this is to inductively extend the evaluation e,
whose universe is just the set of variables, to a mapping e′ : W ×Fm→ A. The
inductive steps for what concerns the non-modal operators arise naturally, but
the modal ones could be defined in different ways.
The definition we give here has been generally accepted by the community,
mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, it is clearly a generalization of the
classical case: it coincides with the usual classical definitions when the frame
is crisp and the algebra of evaluation is 2. On the other hand, it behaves as
a restriction of the most usual definitions of the predicate models of first order
many-valued logics. We will not give details concerning this relation, but it is
well known that modal logics can be seen as a fragment of predicate logics and
this is not an exception in the many-valued logics case. For this reason, defining
modal logics according to the generally-accepted first order definitions seems the
natural way to proceed.
Then, let A be a MTL-algebra, M a A-Kripke model and w a state from M.
We inductively define e(w,ϕ), the truth-degree of a formula ϕ in M at state w
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as follows:
e(w, p) = e(w, p), for all p ∈ Var
e(w, 0) = 0
A
e(w,ϕ ? ψ) = e(w,ϕ) ?A e(w,ψ), for ? being &,→ and ∧
e(w,2ϕ) =
{




supv∈W {Rwv  e(v, ϕ)} if this value exists in A
undefined otherwise
This definition of truth-degree is in some sense disturbing: there exist models
where the evaluation of certain formulas at some worlds is left undefined. This is
a well-known problem coming from the predicate fuzzy logics and the usual (but
not for this reason any more elegant) method to fix it is to consider only the so
called safe models: those for which all the truth values for all the formulas at all
the worlds are defined. Clearly, complete algebras (that is, those for which the
infimum and the supremum of any subset of its universe always exist) generate
safe models, but it is not clear how to characterize other safe models, making this
concept uncomfortable to work with. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge,
this approach is the only one that has been followed up to now and it does not
seem clear how to avoid the reference to safe models.
Thus, if we do not specify the contrary, whenever we talk about a many-
valued Kripke model it shall be assumed it is a safe model. Given a MTL-algebra
A, we denote by KM(A) the class of safe A-Kripke models. Similarly, for a class
C of MTL-algebras KM(C) denotes the union of all the KM(A) classes for each
A ∈ C and if this class consists of all the MTL-algebras, we will simply write
KM.
For what concerns the notions of (top) satisfiability, validity and deduction,
the definitions coincide with those from the classical modal logic setting, only
taking into account that the considered models must be safe.
The notion of (top) satisfiability at a state is naturally inherited from the
degree of truth at that state. We write M, w  ϕ if and only if e(w,ϕ) = 1A
and for a set of formulas Γ, M, w  Γ if and only if M, w  γ for each γ ∈ Γ.
Similarly, the notion of validity in frames is very similar to the classical one. A
formula ϕ is valid at state w in a many-valued Kripke frame F, and we
write F, w  ϕ, when ϕ is true at state w in any (safe) Kripke model based on
F. A formula ϕ is valid in a frame F (F  ϕ) if it is valid at every state of F.
Finally, a formula ϕ is valid in a class of frames F and we write F  ϕ if it is
valid in very frame of the class.
We define the notion of logical consequence for a modal logic arising from a
class of models in a very similar way to the one presented in the previous section.
Definition 3.9. Let C be a class of many-valued models and Γ ∪ ϕ be a set of
formulas. Then we say that:
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• ϕ is local consequence of Γ over C and write Γ C ϕ whenever for all
model M from C and for all state w in M, if M, w  Γ then M, w  ϕ.
• ϕ is global consequence of Γ over C and write Γ gC ϕ whenever for all
models M from C, if M  Γ then M  ϕ.
Remarkable differences with the classical modal logic
The logics with deduction relations C and gC for a class C of many-valued
Kripke models have important differences with respect to their classical coun-
terparts, that is, when C is a class of classical Kripke models. We proceed to
detail the most remarkable ones, illustrating in some sense why the study of
many-valued modal logics shall be done, in many cases, very differently to the
one done in the classical modal logic case. Later, we present a list with some
formulas and deductions that are (are not) valid in the logics arising respectively
from the crisp, idempotent and the whole class of many-valued Kripke frames,
namely KFC(MTL), KFI(MTL) and KF(MTL).
The fist observation, which we already remarked when defining the language
of the many-valued modal logics, is that the 3 and 2 operators are no longer
interdefinable with the same relation we had in the classical case. Indeed, it
suffices to think in a MTL-algebra with a non-involutive negation, for instance,
the Go¨del standard algebra [0,1]G defined in the previous chapter.
It is not hard to define a [0,1]G-Kripke model
where, at some world v, e(v,3ϕ) 6= e(v,¬2¬ϕ)
(and similarly for what concerns 2ϕ and
¬3¬ϕ). Observe that in the model from the
right side, where W = {v, w} and R = {〈v, w〉},
and e(w, p) = 0.5. Then, e(v,3p) = 0.5, but
clearly e(v,¬2¬p) = 1.
• w : p = 0.5
• v : p = 0
OO
There exist some cases where still the 2 and the3 operator are interdefinable,
for instance, the modal expansions of logics with an involutive negation (an
example of which is the  Lukasiewicz logic), but as we have remarked above, this
is not true in general. Even if some of the differences between many-valued modal
logics and classical ones seem to be inherent to the fuzziness of the accessibility
relation, the interdefinability of 3 and 2 keeps non being valid over the restricted
class of many-valued models build over Kripke frames with crisp accessibility
relation. A consequence of this is that modal expansions of many-valued logics
comprehend now, at least three logics that do not necessarily coincide: the 2
expansion, the 3 expansion and the expansion with both 2 and 3 operations
at the same time.
Another notable difference is that the well known axiom K : 2(p → q) →
(2p→ 2q) is no longer valid in the whole class of many-valued frames, that is,
in the minimum many-valued modal logic.
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As an example consider the Kripke model from
the right, defined over an arbitrary standard
MTL-algebra (i.e., with [0, 1] as universe), where
the universe is W = {v, w}, the accessibil-
ity relation is given by R(v, w) = 0.5 and
R(v, v) = R(w,w) = R(w, v) = 0 and eval-
uated with e(w, p) = 0.2 and e(w, q) = 0.15
(and e(v, p) = e(v, q) = 0). In this model,
e(v,2(p → q)) = 1, but e(v,2p) = 0.4 and
e(w,2q) = 0.3 (so clearly, e(v,2p→ 2q) < 1).
• w : p = 0.2, q = 0.1
• v : p = 0, q = 0
0
OO
The K validity is directly linked to the kind of frames that defines the logic:
it was proven in [18] that for a class C of idempotent Kripke structures (that
is, where each accessibility relation is evaluated on the idempotent elements of
the respective algebra), K is a valid formula. For what concerns non idempotent
frames, a result that still holds in the local deduction (and also in the global
one) is that if ϕ → ψ is a theorem then so is 2ϕ → 2ψ. In the global logic, it
is easy to see that ϕ→ ψ gC 2ϕ→ 2ψ.
The third point we want to turn our attention to is the fact that the logics
arising from KF and gKF do no enjoy in general the finite model property.
Indeed, it is seen already in [17] that 2¬¬ϕ → ¬¬2ϕ is valid in any many-
valued structure with a finite universe evaluated over the over the standard
Go¨del algebra, while it is easy to check that it is not a theorem of the modal
expansion of the Go¨del logic. For instance, let M be the [0,1]Π-Kripke model
with universe N and R = {〈0, n〉 : n ≥ 1}, and with evaluation e(n+1, p) = 1n+1 .
Clearly e(0,¬2p) = 1 (because e(0,2p) = 0), but since for all n ≥ 1 it holds that
e(n, p) > 0, then e(n,¬p) = 0 and so e(0,3¬x) = 0 (and then e(0,¬¬3¬p) = 0
too). Observe that this model belongs in fact to the class of crisp Kripke models,
so as a consequence we immediately know that the finite model property does
not hold either for the modal logics based on the classes KFC and KFI . This
makes difficult knowing whether many-valued modal logics are decidable or not.
In what follows we will see some results on this issue that have been developed
in the recent literature, but the general problem remains open.
The previous differences between classical and many-valued modal logics wit-
ness the deep structural and even philosophical changes when adding many-
valuedness to modal logics. As it is expected, many other characteristics of the
two families of logics also differ. We now present some formulas and deductions
that are valid in the many-valued modal logics, some of them maintained from
the classical modal logic and others which are clearly restrictions of more gen-
eral characteristics from the classical setting. We will include here some results
that use a language expanded with constant symbols, denoted by c, d, . . . , since
our main research work is done over this kind of extended language too. The
interpretation of these symbols on a A-Kripke model for A a MTL-algebra with
constant operations is the natural one: e(v, c) = cA for all v ∈ W and each
constant symbol considered.
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All the following assertions are proved in [18].
• The following formula schemata are valid in all the many-valued structures:
– 2(p ∧ q)↔ (2p ∧2q),
– ¬¬2p→ 2¬¬p,
– 2(c→ p)↔ (c→ 2p),
• The following formula schemata are valid in all idempotent structures:
– K : 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q),
– (2p&2q)→ 2(p& q),
• The following formula schemata are valid in all crisp structures:
– 20 ∨ ¬20,
– 20 ∨ (2c↔ c).
• The following deductions are valid for C being all the many-valued struc-
tures :
– N : If ϕ is a theorem of C, then so is 2ϕ,
– Ng : p gC 2p,
– If ϕ→ ψ is a theorem of C, then so is 2ϕ→ 2ψ,
– ϕ→ ψ gC 2ϕ→ 2ψ,
– If p → Γ C p → ϕ for p propositional variable not appearing in
Γ ∪ {ϕ} then 2Γ C 2ϕ,
• The following deductions are valid for C being the class of crisp structures:
– Γ C ϕ implies that 2Γ C 2ϕ,
– Γ gC ϕ implies that 2Γ 
g
C 2ϕ,
State of the art
We will recall here the most important studies and results obtained in the field of
modal expansions of MTL-logics. The sketch on the state of the art is presented
mainly following the thematic development, in order to give an idea of the results
that have been obtained the different lines of work concerning modal expansions
of MTL logics.
Along this chapter, we are not going to detail the methods used in each one
of the presented works to prove the completeness results we are listing for the
sake of brevity. Nevertheless, we will remark that in the works we are about
to comment, the approach followed for proving completeness of their respective
axiomatizations with respect to the corresponding modal logics follows, in more
or less direct ways, the canonical model construction. Clearly each case has its
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own particularities and techniques (some of which we will remark in order to
show the common points and the differences of the work we present in Chapter
6), but some ideas can be seen in common and, in fact, as generalizations of
points commented in the proof of completeness of the classical modal logic. In
the first place, corresponding versions of the Lemma 3.5 are valid in the new
contexts, considering the many-valued propositional logic that is being modally
expanded instead of the classical propositional calculus. This allows to use
the canonical model notion, taking into account that the states are now the
evaluations in this new algebra (or class of algebras), instead that the original
maximal theories (that can be seen as evaluations in {0, 1}). The core of the
problem is turned to prove the truth lemma for the new canonical model where
the different techniques, corresponding to each particular logic, are exploited.
For what concerns each one of the particular cases studied, we present below
a list with the main results found in the literature.
 Lukasiewicz Logics
The main theoretical results concerning modal expansion of  Lukasiewicz log-
ics have been done by Hansoul and Teheux ([116, 117, 78]), and focus on the
study of the logic arising from crisp Kripke frames evaluated over both finite sub-
algebras of [0,1] L and the standard  Lukasiewicz algebra itself. It is remarkable
that this is the first case where infinitely-valued algebras are considered. They
study the 2 fragment, but given that the  Lukasiewicz negation is involutive, the
three modal expansions of  Ln and  L logics, that is, the expansions with 2 or 3
separatedly, or with both, are mutually definable.
Apart from studying the usual axiomatization problem they also present a
new kind of Kripke models, based on the interpretation over a finite subalgebra
of [0,1] L, but also allowing the limitation of the evaluations on each world to
possibly different subalgebras of the original one. Moreover, they perform a deep
study concerning the duality relation between the complex algebras (those aris-
ing from the Kripke models evaluated over finite MV-chains) and the canonical
models, obtained applying the canonical-model construction to the Lindembau-
Tarski algebras of formulas. This is done aiming at solving the axiomatization
problem (that of deciding which classes of frames have a corresponding axiomatic
system) and in their works the authors present a version of the Sahlqvist results
in the  Lukasiewicz context.
Some of the results presented in Hansoul and Teheux works, studying the
duality relation between  Lukasiewicz Kripke models and modal algebras, are
out of the scope of this dissertation so we will not detail them here. Concerning
the topics related to our research, the main results from their works are the
axiomatizations of the local modal logics built over crisp Kripke frames evaluated
over the finite subalgebras of [0,1] L and also the local modal logic of the same
frames evaluated over [0,1] L.
It is remarkable that in the standard  Lukasiewicz algebra, for each q ∈ [0, 1]Q
there exists a propositional formula in one variable τq that characterizes the
interval [q, 1], i.e., such that τq(a) = 1 if a ∈ [q, 1] and τq(a) < 1 otherwise (see
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for instance [104]). Moreover, if the algebra has a finite universe, this formula
strongly characterizes the interval, i.e., it holds that the formula τq(a) ∨ ¬τq(a)
is valid for each a in A. This fact is one of the keystones used by the authors
to prove their results concerning the modal expansions  Lukasiewicz logics. It is
remarkable that, whereas the case of Kripke models evaluated over finite algebras
relies on the fact that the logics  Ln are semantically finitary (and so naturally
strongly standard complete), in the the infinite-valued case an infinitary rule is
added in order to get strong completeness at propositional level. The authors
also present a class of algebras named many-valued modal algebras, that are MV-
algebras expanded with one unary operator that satisfies the equations coming
from the axiomatic system.
The axiomatic systems presented in the previously commented works are the
following ones.
In [117, 78], the authors study also the local modal expansions, considering a
crisp accesibility relation, of the  Lukasiewicz logics. Let  Ln be the usual Hilbert
style calculus of the n-valued  Lukasiewciz logic and  Ln its corresponding algebra.
Define M  Ln by extending  Ln with
K : 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)
axioms: 2(p⊕ p)↔ (2p⊕2p)
2(p p)↔ (2p2p)
2(p⊕ pm)↔ (2p⊕ (2p)m) for each positive integer m
N2 : for all formulaϕ, from ` ϕ infer ` 2ϕ
Then, for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ `M  Ln ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ KFC( L n) ϕ
On the other hand, the axiomatization of the local modal logic arising from
the class of crisp Kripke frames evaluated over the standard  Lukasiewicz algebra
[0,1] L is given by the extension of the Hilbert style calculus of the  Lukasiewciz
logic,  L, with the same modal axioms and rules used in the finite case plus the
infinitary rule
p⊕ pm for all m possitive integer
p
Logics based on finite bounded commutative RLs with canonical constants
In [18], the authors study the problem of finding a Hilbert-style axiomatiza-
tion for the global and local modal logics with only 2 that arise, respectively,
from the classes of crisp, idempotent and unrestricted A-Kripke frames, for A
being a finite bounded commutative residuated lattice endowed with a canonical
constants (i.e., a constant symbol for each element of the universe interpreted
by its value, that is for each a ∈ A there is a in the language with aA = a). The
finite MTL-algebras with canonical constants fall in this class. In this article,
finite algebras are used mainly because this ensures that the non-modal propo-
sitional logic is finitary, which plays an important role. Moreover, this allows to
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have canonical constant symbols without resorting to a non-denumerable lan-
guage, which can bring complications for what respects some classical and often
used results that are only proved for denumerable languages. Moreover, the use
of these constants is said to be difficult to overcome and are shown several results
illustrating the expressive power of this expanded language.
The main results from this publication are the successful axiomatizations of
the local logics arising, respectively, from KFI(A) and KF(A), for A residuated
lattice as above. For some particular algebras (those that have a unique coatom),
they also present an axiomatization for the global and local logics arising from
KFC(A). Their approach is based on translating the deductions into theorems,
and then prove completeness of this set with respect to the theorems in the
semantic counterpart. On the other hand, the authors also present an axiom-
atization for both the local and global modal logics arising from the classes of
frames KFC(A) and KF(A) for A being a finite MV-chain, in this case without
considering constants in the language.
A remarkable observation concerning constants is shown in Proposition
4.3 from [18]. It states that given a residuated lattice A as above (with
canonical constants!) it is possible to prove that for two A-Kripke models
M = 〈W,R, e〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, e′〉 and two states w ∈ W,w′ ∈ W ′, the
mappings e(w) : Fm → A and e′(w′) : Fm → A (i.e., e(w)(ϕ) = e(w,ϕ) and
the same for e′) coincide (that is, e(w)(ϕ) = e′(w′)(ϕ) for each formula ϕ) if
and only if they evaluate to 1
A
exactly the same formulas. It is very interesting
that the previous statement holds without using the canonical constants if A is a
subalgebra of the standard  Lukasiewicz algebra, as we remarked in the previous
point, which allows to study the modal expansions of these logic without adding
truth constants.
In Table 3.2 we present the axiomatic systems and the corresponding rela-
tional semantics definition of the logics studied in [18] (recall that the language
it that of the bounded commutative residuated lattices with the 2 operator).
We let H cA denote an axiomatic calculus (that is, axiom schematas plus deduc-
tion rules) for the non-modal logic defined over the finite bounded commutative
residuated lattice Ac with canonical constants.
For what concerns finite MV-chains, let  Ln be the usual Hilbert style calculus
of the n-valued  Lukasiewciz logic,  Ln its corresponding algebra and Ra, for each
a > 0 in  Ln (that is,
i
n−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) the following rule:
Ra :
(τa2b(p2) ∧ · · · ∧ τanb(pn))→ τab(p) for each b ∈  Ln, b > ¬a
(τa2(2p2) ∧ · · · ∧ τan(2pn))→ τa(2p)
where ai =
i−1
n−1 (and τa denotes the characteristic formula of [a, 1]). Then, the
results obtained about axiomatizations of the modal expansions of Ln are shown
in Table 3.3.
Go¨del Logic
Works studying the modal expansions of Go¨del logoc are mainly done by
Caicedo and Rodriguez. In [24] the authors address the axiomatization of the
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H cA axiomatic calculus plus: Complete with respect to:
21
(2p ∧2q)→ 2(p ∧ q)
2(a→ p)↔ (a→ 2p)
from ` ϕ→ ψ infer ` 2ϕ→ 2ψ
local modal logic arising
from Ac-Kripke models
21
(2p ∧2q)→ 2(p ∧ q)
2(a→ p)↔ (a→ 2p)
from ` ϕ→ psi infer ` 2ϕ→ 2ψ
(2p&2p)→ 2(p& p)
local modal logic arising
from Ac-Kripke models
with an involutive accessibility relation
21
(2p ∧2q)→ 2(p ∧ q)
2(a→ p)↔ (a→ 2p)
2(k ∨ p)→ k ∨2p (k the coatom in A)
from ` ϕ→ ψ infer ` 2ϕ→ 2ψ
local modal logic arising
from Ac-Kripke models
with a crisp accessibility relation
21
(2p ∧2q)→ 2(p ∧ q)
2(a→ p)↔ (a→ 2p
2(k ∨ p)→ k ∨2p (k is the coatom in A)
p→ q ` 2p→ 2q
global modal logic arising
from Ac-Kripke models
with a crisp accessibility relation
Table 3.2: Finite bounded commutative RL modal expansions ([18])
 Ln axiomatic calculus plus: Complete with respect to:
21
(2p ∧2q)→ 2(p ∧ q)
from ϕ→ ψ infer ` 2ϕ→ 2ψ
Ra for each a > 0 in  Ln
local modal logic arising
from  Ln-Kripke models
21
(2p ∧2q)→ 2(p ∧ q)
from ` ϕ→ ψ infer ` 2ϕ→ 2ψ
Ra for each a ∈  Ln \ {0}
τa(2p)→ 2τa(p) for each a ∈  Ln \ {0}
local modal logic arising
from  Ln-Kripke models
with a crisp accessibility relation
21
(2p ∧2q)→ 2(p ∧ q)
p→ q ` 2p→ 2q
Ra for each a ∈  Ln \ {0}
τa(2p)→ 2τa(p) for each a ∈  Ln \ {0}
global modal logic arising
from  Ln-Kripke models
with a crisp accessibility relation
Table 3.3: Finite MV-chains modal expansions ([18])
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logics arising from the class of Kripke frames where both propositions at each
world and the accessibility relation of the models are infinitely valued in the
standard Go¨del algebra [0,1]G. They propose strongly complete axiomatiza-
tions for the 2-fragment and the 3-fragment of the resulting minimal logic,
proving also that the 2-fragment arising from the classes of crisp, idempotent
and unrestricted [0,1]G-valued Kripke models coincides. On the other hand,
they prove that the 2-fragment does not enjoy the finite model property, while
the 3-fragment does so.
Their studies show a common point that seems to appear along the differ-
ent works concerning completeness proofs for the modal expansions of other
many-valued logics. This is the strong standard completeness of the under-
ling propositional logic. The approach for proving completeness passes, up to
now,through the use of many-valued versions of the Lemma 3.5. Then, if the
propositional logic is not strongly complete, it is no possible to go further after
using this kind of lemma. In the particular case of the Go¨del logic, not only
the logic is strongly complete with respect to the standard algebra, but it also
preserves the order relation (in the sense that Γ `G ϕ if and only if Γ |=≤[0,1]G ϕ),
and this fact is intensively used in the completeness proof. In particular, in the
proof of the Truth Lemma of the corresponding canonical model, it is possible
to present a constructive solution thanks to the order preserving character of
the logic and to the nice behaviour of the endomorphisms in the standard Go¨del
algebra. That is, resorting to those tools, for each state and each modal formula
Mϕ evaluated to a value α and each  > 0 the authors construct a a successor
state in the canonical model that sends ϕ to a distance below  from α. Sadly,
it seems unlikely this reasoning can work for other logics, that in general do not
enjoy any of these two properties.
The axiomatic systems commented are shown in the Table 3.4.
On the other hand, in [23], the same authors study the expansion of Go¨del
logic with the two modal operators 2 and 3 at the same time, and prove that
this logic is equivalent to the Fischer-Servi intuitionistic modal logic plus the
prelinearity axiom (that comes from the axiomatic system of Go¨del logic). They
also briefly develop the relation between modal algebras arising from the so-
called bi-modal Go¨del Kripke models and the canonical models coming from the
Lindembaum-Tarski algebras. Once again, the main ideas used in the complete-
ness proof resort to the methods used in the “mono”-modal expansions of Go¨del
logic presented in [24], which are hardly translatable to other frameworks. The
axiomatic system presented in [95] is shown in Table 3.4.
A more recent work concerning the modal expansion of the Go¨del logic has
been done by again Caicedo and Rodriguez in collaboration with Metcalfe and
Roggers, see [21] and [95]. The main contribution of this paper is to establish the
decidability of validity (and this means deciding whether a certain formula is or
is not a theorem of the logic) on in the class of Kripke models evaluated over the
standard Go¨del algebra (with also fuzzy relations) and in the crisp models from
the previous class. For doing so they provide an alternative Kripke semantics for
these logics that have the same valid formulas as the original semantics, but also
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G Hilbert style calculus plus: Complete with respect to:
K : 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)
Z2 : ¬¬2p→ 2¬¬p
N2 : from ` ϕ infer ` 2ϕ
(on the 2-language)








D3 : 3(p ∨ q)→ (3p ∨3q)
Z3 : 3¬¬p→ ¬¬p
F3 : ¬30
N3 : from ` ϕ→ ψ infer ` 3ϕ→ 3ψ
(on the 3-language)
local modal logic arising
from [0,1]G-Kripke
models
K : 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)
D3 : 3(p ∨ q)→ (3p ∨3q)
F3 : ¬30
FS1 : 3(p→ q)→ (2p→ 3q)
FS2 : (3p→ 2q)→ 2(p→ q)
N2 : from ` ϕ infer ` 2ϕ
N3 : from ` ϕ→ ψ infer ` 3ϕ→ 3ψ
(on the language with 2
and 3)
local modal logic arising
from [0,1]G-Kripke
models
Table 3.4: Go¨del modal expansions ([24] and [95])
admit some kind of finite model property. The key idea of the new semantics is
to restrict evaluations of modal formulas at a given world to a particular finite
set of truth values.
Even though it does not seem clear if the ideas appearing at these papers
can be translated to other many-valued logics (once again, the nice behaviour
of Go¨del endomorphisms is used), the importance of the results presented in
[21] and [95] and the idea of working with an alternative semantics to approach
the problem of decidability seems to us very interesting. It is the main article
concerning decidability on some many-valued modal logic (the modal expansion
of Go¨del logic), together with some few works concerning decidability on some
particular expansions 3 and approaches the problem with new methods that
could bring some light to the more general context.
3For instance, in [25] it is proven the decidability of the problem of positive-satisfiability or
1-validity in a description product logic and in [74] it is studied the problem of decidability of










The main theoretical objective of this doctoral dissertation is to study and ax-
iomatize the minimum modal expansions of logics arising from a left-continuous
t-norm. In doing so we have realized it was important to solve first some issues
concerning the non-modal (propositional) axiomatic system. A very desirable
property of the underlying non-modal axiomatic system is that it enjoys strong
completeness with respect to an standard algebra that, moreover, has a set of
truth constants interpreted densely.
Within this chapter, we focus on presenting and studying, given a left-
continuous t-norm ∗, an axiomatic system that enjoys strong completeness with
respect to the standard algebra of ∗ with rational truth constants and the ∆ op-
erator. We begin by doing a brief review of the state of the art. We present the
main existing results about strong completeness of MTL logics and the studies
on the expansion of these logics with rational constants (for a deeper explana-
tion of these issues, see Chapter 2) and justify why the solutions found in the
literature do not satisfactorily fulfil our needs. To solve the problem, we propose
in Section 4.2 a first axiomatic calculus for each left-continuous t-norm, and we
show some general results concerning it. We then prove that adding a particular
infinitary inference rule (the density rule) to this systems results in a calculus
strongly complete with respect to the standard algebra of the t-norm, expanded
with ∆ and dense constants.
The last section of this chapter comprehends a study on how to extend the
previous system in order to axiomatize the standard algebra of a left-continuous
t-norm expanded with additional operations that satisfy certain regularity con-
ditions. A general result that follows from this is the proof of the so-called prime
theory extension property for a large family of logics that use up to a countable
set of infinitary inference rules.
Before continuing, we want to point out that during this chapter ∗ stands
for an arbitrary left-continuous t-norm.
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4.1 Why a new approach towards a logic of
[0, 1]∗?
As we remarked before, we are interested in an axiomatic system with certain
characteristics. First, taking into account we need constant symbols interpreted
canonically in the standard algebra, it is natural that our objective is axiomatiz-
ing the logics arising from only one left-continuous t-norm (since otherwise, the
behaviour of the constant symbols cannot be fixed). Thus, we are interested in
the axiomatization of the logic arising from one t-norm expanded with constant
symbols. Another desired characteristic is the strong standard completeness of
the axiomatic system, so it is natural to look at the existing results dealing with
this matter, in order to search for useful results and/or methods.
Within the existing works, we could not find the particular results we needed
to study later the modal expansion of logics arising from a left-continuous t-
norm. We do here a brief review of these works, remarking what they lack for
being applicable for our purposes.
In [52] it is shown that the variety of BL-algebras generated by a single
BL-chain on [0, 1] is finitely axiomatizable and an algorithm to obtain this ax-
iomatization is given. Unfortunately, since our aim is to work with a logic that
enjoys strong standard completeness, we cannot resort to many of the results
and methods presented in these works. The proof of finite completeness of the
axiomatic system presented with respect to the variety generated by the cor-
responding standard algebra exploits the fact that for each continuous t-norm
there exists a continuous t-norm with a certain structure that generates the same
variety as the original one. These particular t-norms determine the axiomatiza-
tion of the logic arising from the variety. In our case, however, this is not strong
enough: the fact that two t-norms generate the same variety does not imply that
their generated generalized quasi-varieties coincide. Thus we cannot assume the
logic (in the sense of all valid deductions) over these two standard algebras is
the same.
On the other hand, there exist several works concerned with BL and MTL
logics expanded with truth constants, but they still lack some desirable results
that we aim to get. On the one hand, Esteva et. al. present in [48] results con-
cerning the expansion of the logic of a continuous t-norm with constant symbols
forming a set isomorphic to the rational numbers in [0, 1]. The axiomatic sys-
tems studied there are the ones resulting from adding the book-keeping axioms
to the underlying axiomatic systems of certain BL-logics, which in general are
not complete with respect to the corresponding standard algebra with constants
interpreted as intended (i.e., by its name). The completeness results presented
in [48] are with respect to all standard algebras: that is to say, not only those
where the constants are “properly” interpreted, but also non-isomorphic ones,
where the constants have different behaviours (which is, for our purposes, not
functional). Moreover, except for the Go¨del case (where it is proven strong com-
pleteness with respect to the class of standard algebras), no strong completeness
results are presented.
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On the other hand, a study more adapted to our needs has been done by
Cintula in [32] and [34], following the Pavelka-style completeness approach. He
remarks the need of including infinitary inference rules in an axiomatic system
in order to be able to prove it is Pavelka-complete whenever there is some non-
continuous operation in the algebra (see [34, Prop. 17]). He specifies a family
of infinitary rules for each discontinuity point of each operation that serve as
candidates to axiomatize Pavelka-complete MTL logics. Concerning only the
t-norm and the residuum operation, these families of rules are the following
ones:
For each 〈x1, x2〉 discontinuity point of the ∗ operation, the set of rules
{r1 → p, r2 → q : r1 ∈ [0, x1)Q, r2 ∈ [0, x2)Q}
r → (p& q) for each rational r ≤ x1 ∗ x2
(4.1)
For each 〈x1, x2〉 discontinuity point of the ⇒∗ operation, the set of rules
{p→ r1, r2 → q : r1 ∈ (x1, 1]Q, r2 ∈ [0, x2)Q}
r → (p→ q) for each rational r ≤ x1 ⇒∗ x2
(4.2)
A remarkable result is [34, Cor. 23]: it states that given a left-continuous
t-norm ∗ and an axiomatic system AS such that
• AS extends the finitary logic of the standard algebra of ∗,
• AS validates all book-keeping axioms and the rule r ` 0 for all r < 1,
• AS validates all the above infinitary rules,
• AS validates the infinitary rule
{c→ p : c ∈ [0, 1)Q} ` p
• AS is semilinear (i.e., strongly complete with respect to the linearly ordered
algebras of the algebraic companion),
then AS is Pavelka-complete.
Some cases like Product and  Lukasiewicz logics with ∆ have a finite amount
of discontinuity points which are, moreover, over rational elements over [0, 1],
so it is only necessary to consider a finite quantity of the previous infinitary
inference rules. The addition of these finite sets of infinitary inference rules
(and the book-keeping axioms) to the usual Hilbert calculus of  Lukasiewicz and
Product logics with ∆ 1 allows to prove Pavelka style completeness of these
logics. However, this construction does not work in general. It is not proven
if the system resulting of the addition of all the infinitary rules associated to
the discontinuity points of the operations to the (finitary) calculus of the t-
norm results in a semilinear logic. In particular, for cases like the Go¨del logic
1The ∆ operator is used to prove semilinearity of the axiomatic system.
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and t-norms arising from ordinal sums (that have a non-countable amount of
discontinuity points in the diagonal of the residuum), an axiomatization does
not directly follow from [34] since there it is not proven the semilinearity of
these systems.
Concerning strong completeness of BL logics, a remarkable work is the one
presented by Montagna in [99]. Instead using ∆, he resorts in his work the stor-
age operator ◦, i.e., an unary operator that determines the greatest idempotent
element below the attribute. He defines an infinitary rule that added to the
axiomatic system of BL with ◦ makes it strongly complete with respect to the
class of standard BL algebras with ◦:
{p ∨ (q → rn) : for all n ∈ ω}
p ∨ (q → r◦)
Moreover, this rule also works particularly well for the cases of Product and
 Lukasiewicz logics, where the storage operator coincides with the ∆ operator.
That is to say, adding the previous infinitary rule to the Π∆ and  L∆ axiomatic
systems results into axiomatic systems that are strongly complete with respect
to [0,1]Π∆ and [0,1] L∆ correspondingly. Even though we are in a different
context (MTL algebras with constant symbols and ∆) some of the ideas and
methods developed along [99] have been source of great inspiration to us.
Our aim is that of filling the open issues left in the literature reviewed above
and providing axiomatizations that are strongly complete with respect to the
logics of the left-continuous t-norms with rational constants and for reasons
that will become clearer below, with the Monteiro-Baaz ∆ operator. In Section
4.4, we will also pay some attention to the generalization of this study to the
case of the logics arising from standard left-continuous t-norms algebras with
rational constant symbols expanded with arbitrary operations from [0, 1] that
respect some regularity conditions, complementing in some senses the studies
from [34].
4.2 Axiomatizations with the density rule
For the motivations explained above, instead of trying to extend the axiomati-
zations from [52] or [48], we follow a different approach. The intuition is that,
having (at least) rational constants, and knowing that the operations are either
left or right continuous, it should be possible to determine the exact behaviour
of the operations on an arbitrary algebra of the class knowing the values taken
in the constant symbols. We detail how to proceed with this reasoning.
The language of the logics we will define and study within this chapter is in-
herited from the MTL one, extended with the Monteiro-Baaz ∆ unary operator.
Moreover, for each left-continuous t-norm ∗, we consider a set of countable con-
stants C∗ given by the countable subalgebra of [0,1]∗ generated by the rationals
on [0, 1]. This consideration implies that the set of constants considered is closed
under the algebra operations, a characteristic necessary in order write down the
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book-keeping axioms. Formally, we let the language along this one and the next
chapters to be
L = 〈&/2,→ /2,∧/2,∆/1, {c/0}c∈C∗〉.
Towards a definition of a logic of ∗, we will begin by specifying the semantics
we aim to axiomatize. Since in all our work the algebras used are extended
with at least the rational constant symbols and the ∆ operation, we will abuse
notation for the sake of readability when naming the main algebras and logics.
Definition 4.1. We call (expanded) standard algebra of ∗ to the algebra
[0,1]Q∗ := 〈[0, 1], ∗,⇒∗,∧, δ, {c}c∈C∗〉
where ⇒∗ is the residuum of the t-norm, for each constant symbol c of the




1 if x = 1
0 otherwise
Observe that the universe of [0,1]Q∗ is the real unit interval, and the Q stands
for the expansion with constants containing the rational elements from [0, 1].
An initial calculus, that will be later extended in order to truly become a
logic for ∗ is the following one. MTLQ∗ is the expansion of MTL (Definition 2.1)
in the language L using the following axioms and rules:
• ∆ axioms and (G∆) rule (see Definition 2.6),
• Book-keping axioms (see [71]), i.e.:
(C1) (c& d)↔ c ∗ d for each c, d ∈ C∗
(C2) (c→ d)↔ c⇒∗ d for each c, d ∈ C∗
(C3) ¬∆c for each c ∈ C∗ \ {1}.
The notion of proof and of provable formula in MTLQ∗ are the usual (finitary)
ones, which allow us to use without any problem all the finite deductions existing
in the MTL logic with ∆. The following is a list with some theorems and
(finitary) valid deduction of MTL∆ (and so of MTLQ∗ too) that will be of use
later.
Remark 4.2. The following formulas and deductions schemata are valid in
MTLQ∗ .
1. p↔ p ∨ p
2. p ∨ (q → r) ` ((¬∆p ∧ q)→ r),
p ∨ (q → r) ` (q → (∆p ∨ r))
3. (p ∧ q)→ r ` (p→ r) ∨ (q → r),
p→ (q ∨ r) ` (p→ q) ∨ (p→ r)
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4. ¬∆p→ q ` p ∨ q
5. p→ ∆q ` ¬p ∨ q
6. ¬p ` p→ q
7. (p→ q) ∧ (r → s) ` (p& r)→ (q & s)
8. (p→ q) ∧ (r → s) ` (q → r)→ (p→ s)
9. ∆(p→ ∆(q → r))→ ∆((q ∧ ¬∆¬p)→ r),
∆(p→ ∆(q → r))→ ∆(q → (r ∨∆¬p))
10. (∆(p→ q) ∨∆¬r)→ ∆(r → (p→ q))
11. (∆p→ q)↔ (¬∆p ∨ q)
Our aim is to extend the previous system MTLQ∗ to obtain an axiomatic
system strongly complete with respect to [0,1]Q∗ .
A remarkable result from [34] (see Prop.17) states that it is not possible to
get such an axiomatic system without adding infinitary inference rules whenever
there is some non-continuous operation in [0,1]Q∗ . Therefore the use of inference
rules with an infinite set of premises is unavoidable. On the other hand, even
though what we intuitively get from the previous result is that the problems arise
from the discontinuity points of the operations, we considered that the solution
could pass not through addressing each one of these points separately, but rather
by finding a way to treat all the discontinuity points at the same time.
We were inspired by the behaviour of the deduction rule
(A→ p) ∨ (p→ B) ∨ C
(A→ B) ∨ C
where p is a propositional variable not occurring in A,B or C.
This is well known from the area of first-order non-classical logics, firstly
presented by Takeuti and Titani in [115] to axiomatize the Intuitionistic pred-
icate logic. It exploits the concept of free variable from first order logics and
its validity in a given algebra forces its universe to be dense (in the sense that
between two different elements there is always a third one in between).
In our framework, it is possible to propose a similar rule with an infinite
number of premises (that depend on a “free” constant symbol) in order to enforce
the density of the constants within the elements of the algebra.
Definition 4.3. L∞∗ is the extension of MTL
Q
∗ with the density rule
D∞ :
{(p→ c) ∨ (c→ q)}c∈C∗
p→ q
Recall that the notion of deduction within L∞∗ is the one given in Definition
1.3.
It is easy to prove the soundness of L∞∗ with respect to [0,1]
Q
∗ .
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Lemma 4.4. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ∈ Fm. Then Γ `L∞∗ ϕ implies that Γ |=[0,1]Q∗ ϕ.
Proof. It is just needed to prove the soundness of the new infinitary rule. We
can prove it by contraposition. Since C∗ is dense in [0, 1], it is clear that for any
a, b ∈ [0, 1] such that b < a there exists c0 ∈ C∗ such that b < c0 < a. Thus,
(a⇒∗ c0) ∨ (c0 ⇒∗ b) = 1A does not hold, proving the soundness of D∞. 
We know that any extension of MTLQ∗ by inference rules is Rasiowa-
implicative and so in particular L∞∗ is implicative too and so, algebraizable. The
characterization of the algebraic companion of L∞∗ is given by the class L
∞
∗ of
L∞∗ -algebras. These are algebras of the form A = 〈A,,⇒,∧, δA, {cA}c∈C∗〉
where 〈A,,⇒,∧, δA〉 is a MTL∆-algebra, A validates the equations arising




[(x→ c) ∨ (c→ y) ≈ 1] =⇒ [x→ y ≈ 1]
At this point, it is a natural question whether this class is a proper generalized
quasi-variety. It can be proven to be not a quasi-variety by means of an example.
Example 4.5. Clearly, [0,1]Q∗ belongs to L∞∗ . We can construct an ultrapower
of [0,1]Q∗ for which the generalized quasi-equation Q does not hold, and so L∞∗
is not a quasi-variety, since it is not closed under ultraproducts.
Let S be the Fre´chet filter, that is, the set of cofinite subsets of N. From








equivalence relation ∼U is given by a ∼U b⇔ {n ∈ N : a[n] = b[n]} ∈ U .
Let p be the element in
∏
n∈N
[0,1]Q∗ defined component-wise by p[n] = 2
n−1
2n
for each n ∈ N. It is clear that for each c ∈ C∗ there is some s ∈ N such that
p[s] ≥ c (pick s ≥ log2 11−c , so naturally p[s] ≥ c).
Denote by cN the element such that cN[n] = c for each n ∈ N. Then for all
c ∈ C∗ it holds that (cN ⇒ p)[i] = 1 for all i ≥ s and thus since U extends S
and {n ∈ N : cN ⇒ p)[i] = 1} ∈ S, it holds that cN ⇒ p ∼U 1. Given that the
interpretation of the constants in this ultraproduct is by definition (inherited
from [0,1]Q∗ ) the equivalence classes of cN for each c ∈ C∗, we are verifying the
antecedent of the generalized quasi-equations Q.
However, p[n] < 1 for each n ∈ N and thus it is not true that p ∼U 1, i.e.,
p 6= 1 in ∏
n∈ω
[0,1]Q∗ /U .
With this we have build an example where the premises of Q hold but not
its consequence. This implies that
∏
n∈ω
[0,1]Q∗ /U is not an element of the class
L∞∗ , which concludes the example. 
Towards the proof of strong standard completeness of L∞∗ , we begin by check-
ing that this logic is strong complete with respect to the linearly ordered algebras
from its corresponding algebraic companions.
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We first prove the some technical results concerning the syntactical behaviour
of L∞∗ . It is in the following results where the importance of the ∆ operator is
remarked: if not using ∆, it is unclear whether similar theorems can be proved,
up to not knowing whether if the the same axiomatic system without ∆ is
strongly complete with respect to linearly ordered algebras.
Lemma 4.6. The following is a derived rule in L∞∗ ,
{r ∨ (p→ c) ∨ (c→ q)}c∈C∗
r ∨ (p→ q) .
Proof. We can check r∨(p→ c)∨(c→ q) `L∞∗ ((p∧(¬∆r))→ c)∨(c→ (q∨∆r).
It follows from the fact that finitary deductions of L∞∗ coincide with those of
MTLQ∗ and using 2. of Remark 4.2. Since this is true for each c, we can apply
the infinitary inference rule D∞ and so get (p∧ (¬∆r))→ (q ∨∆r). Using 3. of
Remark 4.2, we have that (p→ q) ∨ (p→ ∆r) ∨ ((¬∆r)→ q) ∨ ((¬∆r)→ ∆r).
From here, since p→ ∆r `MTLQ∗ ∆r ∨ ¬p, ¬∆r → q `MTLQ∗ ∆r ∨ q and ¬∆r →
∆r `MTLQ∗ ∆r we can conclude that (p→ q) ∨∆r. 
From this, the ∆ Deduction theorem is a direct consequence.
Lemma 4.7 (Deduction theorem). For any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ,ψ},
Γ, ϕ `L∞∗ ψ ⇐⇒ Γ `L∞∗ ∆ϕ→ ψ.
Proof. Working by induction on the proof, it is enough to see it holds for any
possible last rule.
The only non-direct case is D∞, for which we proceed as follows.
For the left-to-right direction, assume that ψ is χ → δ and that Γ, ϕ `L∞∗
(χ→ c)∨ (c→ δ) for eah c ∈ C∗. By Induction hypothesis, Γ `L∞∗ ∆ϕ→ ((χ→
c) ∨ (c → δ)). From 11. of Remark 4.2 it follows that Γ `L∞∗ ¬∆ϕ ∨ (χ →
c) ∨ (c→ δ). Since this happens for each c ∈ C∗ and using the previous lemma,
we have that Γ `L∞∗ ¬∆ϕ ∨ (χ → δ). From the same theorem of MTLQ∗ used
above we can deduce that Γ `L∞∗ ∆ϕ→ (χ→ δ), which concludes the proof.
The other direction is more direct. For ψ, χ and δ as above, assume Γ `L∞∗
∆ϕ → ((χ → c) ∨ (c → δ)) for each c ∈ C∗. By Induction hypothesis, Γ, ϕ `L∞∗
(χ→ c) ∨ (c→ δ). Thus, using rule D∞ we have Γ, ϕ `L∞∗ χ→ δ. 
With these two results, is now easy to check syntactically a notion that
naturally arises from the semantics.
Lemma 4.8. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ,ψ, α} be a set of formulas such that
• Γ 6`L∞∗ α and
• Γ, ϕ→ ψ `L∞∗ α.
Then there is c ∈ C∗ such that Γ,¬∆((ϕ→ c) ∨ (c→ ψ)) 6`L∞∗ α.
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Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that for all c ∈ C∗, it holds that
Γ,¬∆((ϕ→ c) ∨ (c→ ψ)) `L∞∗ α.
By the Deduction Theorem (and knowing that ¬¬∆ϕ↔ ∆ϕ is a theorem of
the logic), this is equivalent to have that Γ `L∞∗ ¬∆((ϕ → c) ∨ (c → ψ)) → α
Then, from 11. of Remark 4.2 this implies that Γ `L∞∗ ¬¬∆((ϕ → c) ∨ (c →
ψ)) ∨ α. Since a double negation over a ∆x element is the identity function
and given that ∆ϕ → ϕ is an axiom of the logic it follows that Γ `L∞∗ (ϕ →
c) ∨ (c → ψ) ∨ α From Lemma 4.6, we have that we can apply rule D∞ and
thus obtain Γ `L∞∗ (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ α. Applying 11. of Remark 4.2 again we get that
Γ `L∞∗ ¬∆(ϕ→ ψ)→ α
From second assumption of the lemma, we know that Γ `L∞∗ ∆(ϕ→ ψ)→ α,
so the both deductions together lead to Γ `L∞∗ (∆(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ ¬∆(ϕ→ ψ))→ α.
However, we know that Γ `L∞∗ ∆(ϕ → ψ) ∨ ¬∆(ϕ → ψ), since this formula is
an axiom of MTL. Then, by MP, we have that Γ `L∞∗ α, which contradicts the
first assumption of the lemma. 
With these tools it is now not difficult to check the so called prime theory
extension property for L∞∗ . Recall that prime theory stands for a theory such
that for each pair of formulas ϕ,ψ, either ϕ→ ψ or ψ → ϕ belongs to it.
Theorem 4.9. Let Γ∪{α} be a set of formulas such that Γ 6`L∞∗ α. Then, there
is a prime theory Γ′ expanding Γ such that Γ′ 6`L∞∗ α.
Proof. As Montagna noticed in [99], it is interesting to observe that by the
presence of infinitary rules, many standard constructions do not work. For
instance, one might be tempted to use Zorn’s lemma to obtain a maximal theory
closer under D∞, Γ′ extending Γ such that ϕ 6∈ Γ′. But in this case Zorn’s lemma
does not apply, as the union of a chain of L∞∗ -theories may fail to be a theory
closer under D∞. Thus we shall proceed in a slightly different way.
Along the following prove, we abuse notation and for a set of formulas T
we write Cn(T ) to denote the set of formulas derivable from T in L∞∗ , i.e.,
Cn(T ) = {ϕ ∈ Fm : T `L∞∗ ϕ}.
Let 〈ϕn, ψn〉 be an enumeration of all pairs of formulas from Fm. We can
build a chain Γ ⊆ Γ0 ⊆ ... ⊆ Γn ⊆ ... such that for each n ∈ ω,
• Γn 6` α and
• either ϕn → ψn or ψn → ϕn belong to Γ2n+1 and
• if ϕn → ψn 6∈ Γ2n+1 (resp. if ψn → ϕn 6∈ Γ2n+1) there is c ∈ C∗ such that
¬∆((ϕn → c) ∨ (c → ψn)) ∈ Γ2n+2 (resp. ¬∆((ψn → c) ∨ (c → ϕn)) ∈
Γ2n+2.
• step 0: Put T0 = Cn(Γ).
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• step 2n+1: If α 6∈ Cn(Γ2n, ϕn → ψn)) put Γ2n+1 = Cn(Γ2n, ϕn → ψn)).
Otherwise, put Γ2n+1 = Cn(Γ2n, ψn → ϕn)). Observe that in any case,
α 6∈ Γ2n+1: if both α ∈ Cn(Γ2n, ϕn → ψn)) and α ∈ Cn(Γ2n, ψn → ϕn)),
by the deduction theorem and the semilinearity axiom of MTL, we would
have that Γ2n ` α, which is not possible.
• step 2n+2: Suppose Γ2n+1 = Cn(Γ2n, ϕn → ψn)) (the case where
Γ2n+1 = Cn(Γ2n, ψn → ϕn)) is proved analogously).
If α 6∈ Cn(Γ2n+1, ψn → ϕn) then put Γ2n+2 = Cn(Γ2n+1, ψn → ϕn).
Otherwise, observe that we have that Γ2n+1 6`L∞∗ α and also that
Γ2n+1, ψn → ϕn `L∞∗ α. Then, from Lemma 4.8 there is c such that α 6∈
Cn(Γ2n+1,¬∆((ϕ→ c) ∨ (c→ ψ))), so put Γ2n+2 = Cn(Γ2n+1,¬∆((ϕ→
c) ∨ (c→ ψ))).
It is easy to check that each one of the Γn from before holds all the char-
acteristics we aimed to. Let then Γ′ =
⋃
i∈N Γi. We can prove that Γ
′ is
a L∞∗ -theory by seeing it is closed under the derivation rules. The only
non-direct case is the infinitary rule D∞ (Γ′ is closed under all the finitary
rules since this happens for each Γn).
Suppose towards a contradiction that (ϕ → c) ∨ (c → ψ) ∈ Γ′ for each
c ∈ C∗ and that ϕ→ ψ 6∈ Γ′.
The formula ψ → ϕ was added at step 2k + 1 for some k, so con-
sider then step 2k + 2. Since ϕ → ψ was not added, necessarily
Γ2k+2 = Cn(Γ2k+1,¬∆((ϕ → c0) ∨ (c0 → ψ))) for some c0 ∈ C∗. But
then, since (ϕ → c) ∨ (c → ψ) ∈ Γ′ for each c ∈ C∗, in particular
(ϕ → c0) ∨ (c0 → ψ) ∈ Γr for some r ∈ N. Then, taking the max-
imum of this two indexes, i.e., m = max{r, 2k + 2}, it turns out that
ϕ → c0) ∨ (c0 → ψ) ∈ Γm and ¬∆((ϕ → c0) ∨ (c0 → ψ)) ∈ Γm. Then,
⊥∈ Γm, which is a contradiction (since we know that Γm 6`L∞∗ α).
It is then easy to conclude that Γ′ 6`L∞∗ α. Otherwise, since Γ′ is closed
under derivations, α ∈ Γ′ = ⋃i∈N Γi and so α ∈ Γi for some i, which is
not true. 
A corollary of the previous result will be of use later on.
Corollary 4.10. Let A be a countable L∞∗ -algebra and F a L
∞
∗ -filter on it.
Then F coincides with the intersection of all prime filters of A containing F .
Proof. Being A countable, it is direct that A is isomorphic to Fm/ΩΓ for some
set of formulas Γ. We let i : A→ Fm/ΩΓ denote this isomorphism. Moreover,
a filter F on it is isomorphic (using i) to g−1(1) where g ∈ Hom(Fm,Fm/ΩΣ)
for some L∞∗ -theory Σ with Γ ⊆ Σ. Having an element a from A not in F is now
equivalent to say, for i(a) = ϕ/ΩΓ, that ϕ/ΩΓ with ϕ 6∈ Σ (so g(ϕ/ΩΓ) < 1).
Then, we have that Σ 6`L∞∗ ϕ and so from the previous Theorem we have that
there is Σ′ prime theory extending Σ with Σ′ 6`L∞∗ ϕ.
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Since Γ ⊆ Σ ⊆ Σ′ and given that the logic is equivalential (it is algebraiz-
able) we know that ΩΓ ⊆ ΩΣ ⊆ ΩΣ′. Let then h = h1 ◦ g, where h1 is the
natural projection from Fm/ΩΣ to Fm/ΩΣ′ and g is the natural projection
from Fm/ΩΓ to Fm/ΩΣ. Let P = h−1(1). Then we can prove the following
list of characteristics.
• i−1(P ) is a L∞∗ -filter on A. Follows from the fact that h−1(1) is a filter
of the logic in Fm/ΩΓ and this is isomorphic via i−1 to A.
• i−1(F ) ⊆ i−1(P ). It is immediate from the fact that g−1(1) ⊆ h−1(1).
• i−1(P ) is prime. We know that for any ϕ,ψ, either ϕ → ψ ∈ Σ′ or
ψ → ϕ ∈ Σ′, so h((ϕ → ψ)/ΩΓ) = 1 or h((ψ → ϕ)/ΩΓ) = 1. Then for
every ϕ/ΩΓ, ψ/ΩΓ, either ϕ/ΩΓ⇒ ψ/ΩΓ ∈ h−1(1) or ψ/ΩΓ⇒ ϕ/ΩΓ ∈
h−1(1). Then, since i is an isomorphism, we can conclude that i−1(P ) is
prime too.
• a 6∈ i−1(P ). It is equivalent to see that i(a) = ϕ/ΩΓ 6∈ P . This is
immediate since ϕ 6∈ Σ′, so h(ϕ/ΩΓ) < 1.
It is not difficult to prove now that F =
⋂{P : P prime L∞∗ -filter on A},
as we proceed to do. The ⊆ direction is easy: for any element x ∈ F and any
filter P extending F , then x ∈ P too. Concerning the ⊇ direction, let a 6∈ F .
From the reasoning above, we know there is some prime filter P extending F
with a 6∈ P . Then, clearly a 6∈ ⋂{P : P prime L∞∗ -filter on A} either, which
concludes the proof. 
Relying either on Theorem 4.9 or in this last Corollary, it is not difficult to
see that L∞∗ is strongly complete with respect to the linearly ordered algebras
from its algebraic companion.
Theorem 4.11. Let Γ ∪ ϕ ⊆ Fm. Then the following are equivalent.
1. Γ `L∞∗ ϕ
2. Γ |=C ϕ for all C ∈ L∞∗ such that C is linearly ordered.
Proof. We just need to check 2.⇒ 1., since the other direction follows from the
definition of the class of L∞∗ -algebras.
The general completeness result states that Γ 6`L∞∗ ϕ implies that there
exists A ∈ L∞∗ , F ∈ FiL∞∗ A and h ∈ Hom(Fm,A) such that h([Γ]) ⊆ F and
h(ϕ) 6∈ F . We can restrict ourselves to a countable subalgebra of A with universe
A′ = h([Fm]) and the corresponding L∞∗ filter on A
′ given by F ′ = F ∩A′. By
the previous lemma, there is a prime L∞∗ -filter P of A
′ that contains F ′ and such
that h([Γ]) ⊆ P and h(ϕ) 6∈ P . It is an exercise to see that A′/P (i.e., A′/ΩAP )
is a linearly ordered algebra from L∞∗ .
2 To conclude, recall that h = piP ◦ h is
an homomorphism from Fm to A′/P , where piP : A′ → A′/P is the projection
2 First, it is clear that A′/ΩA
′
P belongs to L∞∗ , since ΩA
′
P is a congruence of A′ relative
to the class L∞∗ (and so by definition, A′/ΩA
′
P ∈ L∞∗ ). To check that it is linearly ordered,
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on the quotient algebra. Since for any ψ ∈ P it holds that piP (ψ) = 1A
′/P
and
for any ψ 6∈ P we have that piP (ψ) < 1A
′/P





For future reference, it is worth to introduce here a notion concerning the
second point of the previous lemma. We say that a logic L that is strongly
complete with respect to the linearly ordered algebras of its class in the above
sense is semilinear.
In order to conclude that L∞∗ is strongly complete with respect to [0,1]
Q
∗
we resort here to a natural method. We define a mapping from any (countable)
linearly ordered L∞∗ -algebra into [0,1]
Q
∗ and check this mapping is an embedding.
Having this in mind, the reason behind the addition of the rule D∞ is now clearer:
we can check that, over the linearly ordered L∞∗ -algebras, the constants are dense
with respect to the the elements of the algebra, which is of great use for proving
the embedding property of our mapping.
Lemma 4.12. Let A ∈ L∞∗ be linearly ordered, and a < b in A. Then there is
c ∈ C∗ such that a < cA < b.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is no such c. Then, since A
is linearly ordered we have that for all c ∈ C∗, either b ≤ cA or cA ≤ a. Then
we have that, for all c ∈ C∗, [(b ⇒ cA) ∨ (cA ⇒ a)] = 1, which means that the
premises of the generalized quasiequation Q are true and thus it can be applied.
The consequence of this instantiation of Q is that b ≤ a, which contradicts the
assumptions of the lemma. 
With this, a natural natural mapping from any numerable linearly ordered
L∞∗ -algebra into [0,1]
Q
∗ can be defined. In order to express this map it in the
clearest possible way, let us previously define the following sets.
Given a linearly ordered L∞∗ -algebra A and an element a ∈ A, we consider
the following subsets of [0, 1]:
C+a := {c ∈ C∗ : a ≤A cA}
C−a := {c ∈ C∗ : cA ≤A a}
Clearly, for each a ∈ A, C−a is downward closed and C+a is upward closed.
Moreover, it also holds that sup C−a = inf C+a for any a ∈ A. Indeed, these two
values cannot be different, since if that was the case the previous Lemma would
imply the existence of a constant d between them (i.e., d ∈ C∗ such that d 6∈ C−a




A ≤ a, which contradicts the previous statement.
given that L∞∗ is implicative, its set of congruence formulas can be defined by ∆(ϕ,ψ) = {ϕ→
ψ,ψ → ϕ}. From the definition of equivalential logic 1.9 this leads to have that if a ∈ P , then
〈a, 1A
′




P . Since the projection is an homomorphism, for




P (so a ≤ b in
A′/P ) and otherwise, since P is prime, b/ΩA
′





(so b ≤ a in A′/P ).
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Lemma 4.13. Let A be a L∞∗ -chain. Then, the function ρ : A → [0, 1] such
that ρ(a) = sup C−a = inf C+a is an embedding from A into [0,1]Q∗ .









For what concerns the operations, we can resort to the density of the con-
stants in A and in [0,1]Q∗ . This means that in order to check that two elements
a, b ∈ [0, 1] coincide, it is enough to check that for each constant c, if a < c then
b ≤ c and that if c < a then c ≤ b.
We can prove the homomorphism conditions just for the , ⇒,∧ and δA
operations, since the rest are definable from these ones.
• First of all, the case of δ is trivial, since δAx = 1 if and only if x = 1 in the
algebra. Then ρ(δAa) = inf C+δa = 1 if and only if δAa = 1 in A, i.e., if and
only if a = 1 in A (by the definition of ∆ over a chain). Then, this happens
if and only if δρ(a) = 1. On the other hand, if a < 1 in A then δAa = 0
and thus, ρ(δAa) = 0. Since a < 1, there is c such that a < cA < 1, so
ρ(a) < 1 and thus, δρ(a) = 0 too.
• Concerning , observe that for any a, b ∈ A, since  is an increasing func-
tion in both components (4.2[(7.)]) it holds that c ∈ C−a and d ∈ C−b implies
that c∗d ∈ C−ab, and similarly, c ∈ C+a and d ∈ C+b implies that c∗d ∈ C+ab.
Let c ∈ C∗ be such that c < ρ(a) ∗ ρ(b) = sup C−a ∗ sup C−b . Using that ∗
has a residuum that coincides with the order operation in the algebra it
follows that there exist d1 ∈ C−a and d2 ∈ C−b such that c < d1 ∗ d2. 3
Then, from the previous remark and given that C−ab is downward closed,
c ∈ C−ab too and thus, c ≤ sup C−ab = ρ(a b).
For the other direction, we firs prove an auxiliary claim:
CLAIM: Let A ∈ L∞∗ be linearly ordered. Then
a b = sup{c ∗ dA : cA ≤ a, dA ≤ b}
First we check that a  b ≥ sup{c ∗ dA : cA ≤ a, dA ≤ b}.
For any rA ≤ sup{c ∗ dA : cA ≤ a, dA ≤ b}, by definition there
exist c, d with cA ≤ a, dA ≤ b such that rA ≤ c ∗ dA. By the
monotonicity of , cA  dA ≤ a b and from the book-keeping
axioms, rA ≤ a b.
To see that ab ≤ sup{c ∗ dA : cA ≤ a, dA ≤ b} observe that
for any rA ≥ sup{c ∗ dA : cA ≤ a, dA ≤ b}, by definition it holds
3If for all two constants like above d1 ∗ 2. ≤ c, applying residuation d1 ≤ d2 → c and so
the supremum can be taken in the left side. Similarly, we get that sup C−a ∗ sup C−b ≤ c which
contradicts the assumptions.
76 Chapter 4. Strongly standard complete systems
that rA ≥ c ∗ dA for any c, d like in the formula. Then, by the
book-keeping axioms, rA ≥ cAdA for such c, d. Applying that
 is a residuated operation we have that cA ≤ dA ⇒ rA. We can
now take the supremum at the left side, so a = sup{cA : cA ≤
a} ≤ dA ⇒A rA. Proceeding similarly for the other component,
we get that a ∗A b = sup{cA : cA ≤ a}  sup{dA : dA ≤ b},
concluding the proof of the claim.
Now, let c ∈ C∗ be such that c ≤ ρ(a  b). By definition, cA ≤ a  b and
by the previous claim,
cA ≤ sup{c ∗ dA : cA ≤ a, dA ≤ b}. Then, there exist c0, c1 ∈ C∗ with
c0
A ≤ a and c1A ≤ b such that cA ≤ c0 ∗ c1A = c0A  c1A. Then,
c ≤ c0 ∗ c1. Given that c0 ∈ C−a and c1 ∈ C−b , then from the first remark
we have that c0 ∗ c1 ∈ C−ab and given that this set is downwards closed,
c ∈ C−ab too, concluding the proof.
• The reasoning for ∧ is exactly the same done for , since it is also true
that ∧ is an increasing function in both components, which moreover, is
continuous.
• The approach to the ⇒ connective can be simplified using that it is the
residuum of . Indeed, first consider c ∈ C∗ such that c ≤ e(a)→ e(b). By
residuation (on [0, 1]), c∗e(a) ≤ e(b). By definition of e over the constants,
this is the same that e(cA) ∗ e(a) ≤ e(b). Then, from the previous point
of the proof, e(cA  a) ≤ e(b). Given that from he definition of e it is
immediate that it is order-preserving, we have that cA  a ≤ b. Applying
now residuation of , cA ≤ a ⇒ b. Then, again by the definition of e,
c = e(cA) ≤ e(a⇒ b).
For the other direction, let c ∈ C∗ such that c ≤ e(a ⇒ b). By definition,
cA ≤ a⇒ b. By residuation ofit follows that cA ≤ b. Then, e(cAa) ≤
e(b) and from the previous point of the proof, c ∗ e(a) = e(cA) ∗ e(a)) =
e(cA  a) ≤ e(b). By residuation of ∗ in [0, 1], c ≤ e(a)→ e(b), concluding
the proof.




1 if b < a
0 if a ≤ b
From here, it is immediate to see that any homomorphism between two differ-
ent L∞∗ -chains A and A
′ is injective. Indeed, if b < a in A, then under an
homomorphism h we have that h(¬δA(a ⇒ b)) = 1 and thus, being an homo-
morphism, that ¬δA′(h(a)⇒′ h(b)) = 1, so h(b) < h(a) in A′.4 This concludes
the proof. 
4This can be also seen as a direct consequence of the fact that all L∞∗ -chains are relatively
simple.
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An immediate corollary of the previous result is the following characterization
of the L∞∗ -algebras.
Corollary 4.14. Any L∞∗ -algebra is a subalgebra of a direct product of [0,1]
Q
∗ .
Strong standard completeness of L∞∗ follows now easily.
Theorem 4.15 (Strong Standard Completeness of L∞∗ ). Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm.
Then the following are equivalent:
1. Γ `L∞∗ ϕ
2. Γ |=[0,1]Q∗ ϕ.
Proof. 1. implies 2. comes from the soundness of L∞∗ . For what respects the other
implication, suppose that Γ 6`L∞∗ ϕ. Then, by Lemma 4.11 there is a linearly
ordered L∞∗ -algebra A and an homomorphism h : Fm → A such that h([Γ]) ⊆
{1} and h(ϕ) < 1. It is immediate that h([Fm]) is a countable subalgebra of A
(thus linearly ordered) and so it can be embedded into [0,1]Q∗ by the embedding
e built in the previous lemma. Then, it is clear that e ◦ h : Fm → [0,1]Q∗ is an
homomorphism such that e ◦ h(Γ) ⊆ {1} and e ◦ h(ϕ) < 1. 
In other words, we have proved that the density rule is always enough to
provide a strongly complete axiomatization for the standard algebra of a left-
continuous t-norm.
4.3 A general result on semilineary
The section is mainly motivated by the wish of knowing when does an infini-
tary logic expanding MTL∆ enjoy strong completeness with respect to linearly
ordered algebras of its algebraic counterpart. When developing the results previ-
ously presented and in particular, Theorem 4.9, we realized the main ideas used
there did not depend on the particular logic we were studying. In fact, we can
prove a more general version of that theorem, that is of use in the next section
and also in Chapter 5.
This is a quite interesting result concerning the semilinearity on extensions
of MTL∆ with infinitary inference rules. It is also of great importance for the
development of this dissertation, since we will resort to it along the next section,
and, more importantly, in the next Chapter (see Lemmas 5.11 and 5.11).
Theorem 4.16. Let L be an expansion of MTL∆ such that
• L is implicative for →,
• L is axiomatized by a countable amount of inference deduction rules, each
one closed under ∨ and with a finite number of variables.
Let Γ∪{α} ⊆ Fm be such that Γ 6`L α. Then there is a prime theory Γ′ extending
Γ such that Γ′ 6`L α.
78 Chapter 4. Strongly standard complete systems
Proof. First, it is easy to check that the Deduction Lemma with ∆ keeps holding,
by the same reasoning that in Lemma 4.7. Moreover, for each rules R denote
by prem(R) the premises of rule and by con(R) its consequence. We can first
prove that the result analogous to Lemma 4.8 holds also here naturally.
CLAIM: If T 6`L α and T `L σ(con(Ri)) → α for some rule Ri
and some substitution σ, then there is ρi ∈ σ([prem(Ri)]) such that
T,¬∆ρi 6`L α.
Suppose that T,¬∆ρi `L α for all ρi ∈ σ([prem(Ri)]). Then, by
the Deduction theorem, T `L ∆¬∆ρi → α. Using the ∆¬∆ϕ ↔
¬∆ϕ is a theorem of the logic and point 11. from Remark 4.2 we get
that T `L ¬¬∆ρi∨α for all ρi ∈ σ([prem(Ri)]). Since ¬¬∆ϕ↔ ∆ϕ
is a theorem of the logic this is equivalent to have T `L ∆ρi ∨ α for
all ρi ∈ σ([prem(Ri)]). Now, given that the inference rules are closed
under ∨, we can apply Ri and get that T `L σ(con(Ri))∨α. By rule
G∆, point 11. from Remark 4.2 it follows that T `L σ(con(Ri))¬∆→
α. Finally, since ∆ϕ ∨ ¬∆ϕ is a theorem of the logic, this implies
that T `L α, which is a contradiction.
For this reason, if the number of rules is finite, the proof can be done exactly
as the one from Theorem 4.9 (instead of splitting in even and odd steps, we can
simply split in mod(k + 1) steps for k being the number of rules).
Consider the case where there are infinite deduction rules, R = ⋃i∈NRi. Let
〈ϕn, ψn〉 be an enumeration of all formulas in the language and as in Theorem
4.9, let Cn(T ) stand for the consequences of T in the logic L.
Initialize a variable CL = ∅ (where CL stands for Conditions List); CL must
be understood as a set that will store the changes that are stored in order to
be done at each step. Intuitively, the idea behind this proof is ordering the
deduction rules and manage, for each pair of formulas, all the rules indexed
below the current step at one time (which is a finite set) and the rest of the
rules, when the step corresponding to its index arrives. Consider the following
construction of theories:
• step 0 Γ0 = Cn(Γ),
• step 2n+1
1. If α 6∈ Cn(Γ2n, ϕn → ψn) put Γ02n+1 = Cn(Γ2n, ϕn → ψn). Other-
wise, put Γ02n+1 = Cn(Γ2n, ψn → ϕn)
2. For each χ→ δ in CL (a finite amount so we consider them indexed
by i going from 0 to s), consider all substitutions σk, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K,5
such that σ(con(Rn)) = χ → δ, or if χ = 1, the substitutions such
that σ(con(Rn)) = δ and let Sk = σk[prem(Rn)].
5There are at most a finite amount of such substitutions because of the restriction on the
variables of the rules.
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From the observation from the beginning of this proof, we know
there is ρ1 ∈ S1 such that Γi−12n+1 6`L ¬∆ρ1 → α. Simi-
larly, then there is ρ2 ∈ S2 such that Γi−12n+1,¬∆ρ1 6`L ¬∆ρ2 →
α and this for all numbers below K. Thus, there are ρ1 ∈
S1, ..., ρK ∈ SK such that Γi−12n+1,¬∆ρ1, ...,¬∆ρK 6`L α. Put Γi2n+1 =
Cn(Γi−12n+1,¬∆ρ1, ...,¬∆ρK). Repeat this process for 1 ≤ i ≤ |CL|.
Then, let Γ2n+1 = Γ
i
2n+1 for i = |CL|.
• step 2n+2 Suppose Γ02n+1 = Cn(Γ2n, ψn → ϕn). If α 6∈ Cn(Γ2n+1, ϕn →
ψn) then let Γ2n+2 = Cn(Γ2n+1, ϕn → ψn). Otherwise, add ϕn → ψn to
CL and do the following process.
Put Γ02n+2 = Γ2n+1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, consider all substitutions σk (with
1 ≤ k ≤ K) such that σk(con(Ri)) = ϕn → ψn or, if ϕn = 1, the substi-
tutions such that σk(con(Ri)) = ψn and also the sets Sk = σk[prem(Ri)].
As before, there is ρ1 ∈ S1 such that Γi−12n+2 6`L ¬∆ρ1 → α. Similarly,
then there is ρ2 ∈ S2 such that Γi−12n+2,¬∆ρ1 6`L ¬∆ρ2 → α and this for
all numbers below K. Thus, there are ρ1 ∈ S1, ..., ρK ∈ SK such that
Γi−12n+2,¬∆ρ1, ...,¬∆ρK 6`L α. Put Γi2n+2 = Cn(Γi−12n+1,¬∆ρ1, ...,¬∆ρK).
Then, let Γ2n+2 = Γ
n
2n+2.
It is easy to see that for each i, Γi ⊆ Γi+1 and that Γi 6`L α. To check that Γ′ =⋃
i∈N Γi is closed under deduction rules, consider some rule Rn and suppose that
there is a substitution σ such that ϕ = σ(con(Rn)) 6∈ Γ′ and σ(prem(Rn)) ⊆ Γ′.
Then, assume the pair of formulas 〈1, ϕ〉 is indexed by k. If n ≤ k, then we
have that ¬∆ρi ∈ Γn2k+2 for some ρi ∈ σ(prem(Rn)) (recall that all possible
substitutions where considered). Then ¬∆ρi ∈ Γ2k+2. Otherwise, we have
that ¬∆ρi ∈ Γs2n+1 (where s is some finite number below n) for some ρi ∈
σ(prem(Rn)), so ¬∆ρi ∈ Γ2n+2.
Since σ(prem(Rn)) ⊆ Γ′, then in particular ρi ⊆ Γ′ and thus, there is some
k0 where ρi ∈ Γk. Let m = max{k0, 2k + 2, 2n+ 2}.
Clearly, ¬∆ρi ∈ Γm, since either ¬∆ρi ∈ Γ2k+2 or ¬∆ρi ∈ Γ2n+2 and Γs ⊆
Γm for s ≤ m.
On the other hand, ρi ∈ Γm too, so Γm `L⊥, which is a contradiction since
Γm 6`L α by construction. 
The following is the remarkable corollary that can be proven following the
same reasoning that in Theorem 4.11.
Corollary 4.17. As a corollary, we have that any logic L like in the Theorem,
i.e., an expansion of MTL∆ such that
• L is implicative for →,
• L is axiomatized by a countable amount of inference deduction rules, each
one closed under ∨ and with a finite number of variables.
is strongly complete with respect to the linearly ordered algebras from its algebraic
counterpart.
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The previous one is an interesting result that opens the door to a systematic
and uniform study of some infinitary logics. Moreover, it is as strong as it can
be, in the sense that we will later see that there exist axiomatic systems fulfilling
all the premises of the theorem but the limited cardinality on the set of inference
rules which are not semilinear (Lemma 5.8).
4.4 Expansions by operations from [0, 1]
As a side effect of studying the possible axiomatizations of [0,1]Q∗ we realized the
results obtained were applicable not only for the logic of this particular algebra.
It is clear that we can use the D∞ as the “main” infinitary rule of Hilbert-style
axiomatizations not only for the logic of [0,1]Q∗ , but also for the more general
case of the logics arising from the standard algebra of a left-continuous t-norm
expanded with ∆ and an arbitrary set of operations defined in [0, 1] that respect
some -but not so strict- regularity conditions and the subalgebra generated by all
the operations from the rationals in [0, 1]. This work complements in some sense
the one presented by Cintula in [34], showing an alternative way of axiomatizing
logics Pavelka-complete.
The general problem: representable operations
In [34], Cintula studies the extensions of the standard MTL algebras with ratio-
nal constants by argument-wise monotonic operations (i.e. those which, fixed all
variables except one result in a (unary) increasing or decreasing operation). Our
approach allows us to partially generalize those results, working with a family of
operations with different restrictions. We rely on the density rule to approach
the values on the new operations added to the system, so it is reasonable to re-
strict our studies to operations for which this can be done: those whose images
can be reached as limits of the values taken at the constants. These turn to be
operations with a domain that can be decomposed in argument-wise monotonic
and directionally (i.e., left or right) continuous regions that can be determined
in the language of the logic. However, in our approach we lose the capacity to
work with some operations that are considered in [34]: for instance, the ones that
have jump-type discontinuity points for which, for some argument, the value of
the function does not coincide with with the left nor with the right limit. This
is natural, since it is not clear how to deal with functions whose limit points
cannot be reached through the rationals using the density rule presented before.
In order to unify the notation, given a n-ary function ? that is component-








L if ? is left-continuous in U i
R otherwise (right-continuous)
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and we introduce the following notation:
impl(s, ϕ, ψ) =
{
ϕ→ ψ if s = + or s = L
ψ → ϕ if s = − or s = R
A family of operations that can be axiomatized using the density rule is the
following one.
Definition 4.18. We say a n-ary function ? is logically representable if there
exists I ⊆ ω and {Ui}i∈I , called a simplified universe (and we refer to the
Ui’s as regions of this simplified universe) of ? such that
1.
⋃
i∈I Ui = [0, 1]
n and for each i ∈ I, Ui = U1i × · · · × Uni with U ji being a
closed interval of [0, 1],7
2. For each i ∈ I, ? is component-wise left or right continuous in Ui and
component-wise monotonic in the interior of Ui;
3. For each (x1, ..., xn) ∈ [0, 1]n, either it is a tuple of rational numbers or
there exists Uj such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi ∈ U ij and inf U ij < xi if
δ
?Uj
i = L and supU
i
j > xi otherwise.
8
We call these operations logically representable because of two logic-oriented
characteristics. First, it is clear that splitting the universe on intervals we can
write, in the syntax (using the rational constants), a set of formulas that repre-
sents logically the idea of a certain point belonging in that part. For instance,
the truth of formulas like (0.4 → ϕ)&(ϕ → 0.7) expresses that the value of ϕ
belongs to the interval [0.4, 0.7]. For simplicity, we use the symbol ∈ in the logic
to write these kind of formulas. In the previous example, the formula would be
equivalently expressed as “ϕ ∈ [0.4, 0.7]”. Similarly, an expression “(ϕ,ψ) ∈ U”,
where U = [a, b] × [c, d] is used as a shorthand for “ϕ ∈ [a, b] ∧ ψ ∈ [c, d]”.
Second, the regularity of the function in the regions of its simplified universe is
characterizable with rules, as we will see in the following section. This allows to
propose an axiomatic system whose associated linearly ordered algebras inter-
pret the new operations in a way that the monotonicity conditions is satisfied.
We conjecture that logically representable operations are not the only ones that
can be treated using the density rule approach. Determining the regions using
intervals is an elegant and clean approach, but other kind of definitions can be
expressed syntactically. For instance, it would also be possible to address a bi-
nary function f(x, y) with two regions determined by x ≤ y and y < x (since
these can be expressed in the syntax by x → y and ¬∆(x → y). The full char-
acterization of these operations is ongoing work and not complete, and for this
7For simplicity we assume the extreme points of the interval to be rational numbers, but
this is not necessary. In other case, some deduction rules that will be defined later would have
an infinite set of premises and some small modifications must be done in the axiomatic system,
but the methodology is the same that in the studied case.
8This last condition implies that xi does not coincide with the edge point that is not covered
by the continuity direction.
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reason we will stick along this work with the logically representable operations
defined here, that are nevertheless enough to understand how can the density
rule be used for other operations.
Figure 4.1 gives an intuitive idea of somelogically representable operations.
On the other hand, functions that do not belong to this class are, for instance,
those that have a discontinuity jump in a non-rational point.
Figure 4.1: Examples of representable operations
Given a set OP of logically representable operations, we consider a new
language L(OP ), given by 9
〈&/2,→ /2,∧/2,∆/1, {?/Λ(?)}?∈OP , {c/0}c∈C∗(OP )〉
where C∗(OP ) is the subalgebra generated by the rational numbers in [0, 1] using
the operations ∗,⇒∗, δ and ? for each ? ∈ OP . Accordingly we let [0,1]∗(OP)
to be the algebra 〈[0, 1], ∗,⇒∗,∧, δ, {?}?∈OP , {c}c∈C∗(OP )〉.
We shall now study which inference rules are needed in order to axiomatize
a set of representable operations OP . In the first place, since we are working
over propositional expansions of MTL (in the sense that the new operations are
functions over the standard ∗-algebra), it is natural to require that an axiomatic
system for the logic induced by [0,1]Q∗ (OP) to be an implicative logic in the sense
of Rasiowa. To ensure this, we have to add to our axiomatic system, for each
new connective of the logic ?, the following congruence rule (from the definition
of Rasiowa implicative logic):
(∨CONG?) r ∨ {p1 ↔ q1, ..., pn ↔ qn}
r ∨ (?(p1, ..., pn)→ ?(q1, ..., qn))
Besides this, we need two new families of rules in order to control the be-
haviour of the operation on the ”non-rational” elements of the algebra (i.e.
elements that do not coincide with the interpretation of any rational truth-
constant). One type of rules copes with the monotonicity of the functions and
9recall that Λ(?) stands for the arity of the ? operation.
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the other refers to the continuity. While the intuition behind them is quite natu-
ral, the formal rules finally defined could seem a bit unclear due to the necessity
of addressing the different regions and components of each function. For this
reason, along the following definitions, we propose a simple example to allow the
reader to interpret more easily the regularity rules.
We let > to be a binary representable operation whose simplified universe
has the following form:
U1 ∪ U2 where {U1 = [0, 1]× [0, b], U2 = [0, 1]× [b, 1]} and with{
δ?U11 = L, η
?U1
1 = +





δ?U21 = L, η
?U2
1 = −
δ?U22 = R, η
?U2
2 = −
The rules concerning the monotonicity are finitary rules, since their meaning
is that of fixing, point wise, and order relation. Their formal version is a bit
more complex than that, in order to keep under control the extreme points of the
regions from the simplified universe, since there exists the possibility of one of the
extreme points behaving non-monotonically (if the function is non-continuous in
it).
Formally, the rules that characterize the monotonicity of a n-ary operation
? are of the following form: for each region U from its simplified universe and
each coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n we consider the following rule
(∨M?Ui ) :
r ∨ {(p1, ..., pi, ...., pn) ∈ U, s ∈ U i,
impl(η?Ui , s, q), impl(η
?U
i , q, pi)}
r ∨ χ(s) ∨ (?(p1, ..., q, ..., pn)→ ?(p1, ..., pi, ..., pn))
where χ(s) = s↔ extr, and
extr =
{
inf U i if δ?Ui = L
supU i if δ?Ui = R
Observe that the meaning of the formula χ(s) is just to check if s coincides
with the edge of the region – opposite to that covered by the continuity of the
operation in that component.
In terms of the > operation, this results in the consideration of the following
four rules (one for each pair region-component):
r ∨ {(p2 → b, s→ q, q → p1)}
r ∨ ¬s ∨ (>(q, p2)→ >(p1, p2))
r ∨ {(p2 → b, s→ b, q → s, p2 → q)}
r ∨ ¬s ∨ (>(p1, q)→ >(p1, p2))
r ∨ {(b→ p2, q → s, p1 → q)}
r ∨ ¬s ∨ (>(q, p2)→ >(p1, p2))
r ∨ {(b→ p2, b→ s, q → s, p2 → q)}
r ∨ s ∨ (>(p1, q)→ >(p1, p2))
On the other hand, we also need rules that determine the continuity of
the function in the regions of the simplified universe. That can be done by
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translating some of the information about the operation to the axiomatic
system, in terms of fixing the behaviour of limit points. For this reason, we
need to resort to infinitary rules, given that limits are a naturally infinitary
concept. In particular, the intuitive meaning of the two rules below capture the
fact that, for a given point in a continuity fragment of a function, if the value
of the function is smaller/greater than a certain value in all rationals from that
(continuity) fragment, then so is the image of that point. Figure 4.2 shows the
intuition behind the elements in the following rules. Formally, for each region
U of the simplified universe of ? and each component 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we consider
the following two rules: (with χ is as above):
• If ? is left-continuous and increasing in U i (δ?Ui = L, η?Ui = +) or right-




r ∨ {(p1, ..., pn) ∈ U, q → ?(p1, ..., pn),
{χ(d) ∨ impl(δ?Ui , pi, d) ∨
?(p1, ..., d, ..., pn)→ q}d∈Ui∩C∗}
r ∨ (?(p1, ..., pn)→ q)
• If ? is left-continuous and decreasing in U i (δ?Ui = L, η?Ui = −) or right-




r ∨ {(p1, ..., pn) ∈ U, ?(p1, ..., pn)→ q,
{χ(d) ∨ impl(δ?Ui , pi, d) ∨
q → ?(p1, ..., d, ..., pn)}d∈Ui∩C∗}
r ∨ (c→ ?(p1, ..., pn))
Continuing with the example of operation >, this results in the consideration
of the following four rules (one for each pair region-component):
r ∨ {p2 → b, q → >(p1, p2), {¬e ∨ p1 → e) ∨>(e, p2)→ q}e∈C∗}
r ∨ (>(p1, p2)→ q)
r ∨ {p2 → b,>(p1, p2)→ q, {¬e ∨ p2 → e) ∨ q → >(p1, e)}e∈[0,b]Q}
r ∨ (>(p1, p2)→ q)
r ∨ {b→ p2,>(p1, p2)→ q, {¬e ∨ p1 → e) ∨ q → >(e, p2)}e∈C∗}
r ∨ (>(p1, p2)→ q)
r ∨ {b→ p2, q → >(p1, p2), {(e↔ b) ∨ p2 → e) ∨>(p1, e)→ q}e∈C∗}
r ∨ (>(p1, p2)→ q)
These rules enforce that the value of a function in a point can be approached
through the values on rational constants near it (in the direction in which the
function is continuous).
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Strong standard completeness
In the previous section we have defined the necessary rules to provide a formal
definition of an axiomatic system that is complete with respect to [0,1]Q∗ (OP),
for a set OP of representable operations.
Definition 4.19. Let ∗ be a left continuos t-norm and let OP a set of logically
representable operations. Then the axiomatic system L∞∗ (OP) is defined on the
language L(OP ) adding to MTLQ∗ the following axioms and rules:
• book-kepping axioms (Book-?), for each ? ∈ OP and constants in C∗(OP ),
• density rule (D∞)
• congruence rule (∨CONG?), for each ? ∈ OP
• monotonicity rules (∨M?Ui ), for each ? ∈ OP and region U of its universe
• continuity rules (∨C?Ui ), for each ? ∈ OP and region U of its universe
First, it is an exercise to check that all the regularity rules are sound. Indeed,
the only case that could be somewhat not obvious is the last family of formu-
las, but observe that they hold in the standard algebra with the corresponding
operations [0,1]Q∗ (OP): if c < ?(x1, ..., xn), there is ci, with ci ≤ xi if δ?Ui = +
or with xi ≤ ci if δ?Ui = −, such that c < ?(x1, ..., ci, ..., xn). Figure 4.2 shows
some examples of this.
In order to prove completeness of L∞∗ (OP), we begin by proving they are
strongly complete with respect to the linearly ordered algebras from the algebraic
companion. For this, we just need to check that the rules added to MTL∆ fulfil
the requirements of Theorem 4.16.
Observe that we have added a rule for each new operation in order to get
an implicative logic (thus, finite congruence rules), and since the definition of
representable universe is limited to a countable amount of regions, so there
is a countable amount of inference rules concerning the regularity conditions.
Moreover, all the rules are closed under the ∨ operation (by definition) and
satisfy the restriction over the variables. As a corollary of the previous theorem,
we obtain the completeness with respect to linearly ordered algebras of the class,
reasoning as in Theorem 4.11.
Theorem 4.20. For any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, the following are
equivalent:
1. Γ `L∞∗ (OP) ϕ
2. Γ |=C ϕ for all L∞∗ (OP )-chain C.
What remains is then to study the relationship of the linearly ordered
L∞∗ (OP)-algebras with respect to the one defined over the real unit interval,
i.e., [0,1]Q∗ (OP).




























































Figure 4.2: Examples for the rule C?Ui .
To show that, for an arbitrary set OP of logically representable operations,
L∞∗ (OP) enjoys the strong standard completeness we can resort again to the
same method as in the case of L∞∗ : it is possible again to embed any linearly
ordered L∞∗ (OP) into [0,1]
Q
∗ (OP).
Having the density rule, the natural approach is to consider again the map-
ping defined in 4.13 and study whether it is an embedding in the new algebraic
setting (with the new operations from OP ).
In order to show this, we first observe that the regularity conditions of the
operations from OP (as defined in [0, 1]) are properly translated to their corre-
spondent operation symbols in the logic.
Lemma 4.21. Let OP be a set of logically representable operations in [0, 1] and
let A be a linearly ordered L∞∗ (OP )-algebra. Let ? ∈ OP be a n-ary opera-
tion with simplified universe U =
⋃
i∈I Ui ⊆ [0, 1]n, and for some k ∈ I, let
x1, ..., xn ∈ Uk in the sense of point 3 from the definition of simplifiable universe
and such that for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi 6= cA for any c ∈ C∗(OP ). 10
Then
10The fully rational points can have an irregular behaviour, in the sense that they are
completely determined by the book-keeping axioms.
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?A(x1, ..., xn) =




sup if η?Uki = +, δ
?Uk
i = L




{a ∈ U ik ∩ C∗(OP ) : aA ≤ xi} if δ?Ui = L
{a ∈ U ik ∩ C∗(OP ) : aA ≥ xi} otherwise
Proof. For the sake of readability, we write the proof assuming ? is the > oper-
ation used as an example along this section, and studying one of its components
(the first one). Other cases are proven analogously.
The statement of the lemma (for k = 1) can be written in this case as
?A(x1, x2) = sup{inf{?A(c1A, c2A) : c2 ∈ (0, b]Q, c2A ≤ x2} : c1 ∈
(0, 1]Q, c1
A ≤ x1}.
First, assume towards a contradiction, that there is x ∈ A such that
?A(x1, x2) < x < sup{inf{?A(c1A, c2A) : c2 ∈ (0, b]Q, c2A ≤ x2} : c1 ∈
(0, 1]Q, c1
A ≤ x1}.
From ?A(x1, x2) < x we know that the rule (∨C?U12 ) cannot be applied and thus,
its premises shall be false. This implies that it exists d2 ∈ [0, b]Q such that
d2 > 0, d2
A




On the other hand, x < sup{inf{?A(c1A, c2A) : c2 ∈ (0, b]Q, c2A ≤ x2} :
c1 ∈ (0, 1]Q, c1A ≤ x1} implies, by definition, that there is d1 ∈ (0, 1]Q such
that d1
A˚ ≤ x1 and x < inf{?A(d1A, c2A) : c2 ∈ (0, b]Q, c2A ≤ x2}. By def-




A). Applying the monotonicity rule for this region on the first
component (the function was increasing) and since d1




A) ≤ ?A(x1, c2A) which contradicts [Condition 1].
Analogously, assume that there is x ∈ A such that sup{inf{?A(c1A, c2A) :
c2 ∈ (0, b]Q, c2A ≤ x2} : c1 ∈ (0, 1]Q, c1A ≤ x1} < x < ?A(x1, x2)
From x < ?A(x1, x2), we know that the rule (∨C?U11 ) cannot be applied and
thus, it exists d1 ∈ C∗ such that
d1 > 0, d1
A
< x1 and x < ?
A(d1
A
, x2) [Condition 2].
On the other hand, sup{inf{?A(c1A, c2A) : c2 ∈ (0, b]Q, c2A ≤ x2} : c1 ∈
(0, 1]Q, c1
A ≤ x1} < x implies that for all c ∈ (0, 1]Q with cA ≤ x1 it holds
that inf{?A(cA, c2A) : c2 ∈ (0, b]Q, c2A ≤ x2} < x. In particular, this also





) < x. Applying the monotonicity rule for this region on the second
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component (decreasing), we have that ?A(d1
A
, x2) ≤ ?A(d1A, d2A) < x, which
contradicts [Condition 2]. 
From this result we can easily prove that the map θ : A→ [0, 1] defined by
θ(a) = inf{c ∈ C∗ : cA ≥ a} =
sup{c ∈ C∗ : cA ≤ a}
is an embedding from a linearly ordered L∞∗ (OP)-algebra A into [0,1]
Q
∗ (OP).
Lemma 4.22. Let A be a L∞∗ (OP ) chain. Then, the function θ defined above
is an embedding from A into [0,1]Q∗ (OP).
Proof. First note that for any constant d, d = min{c ∈ C∗ : cA ≥ dA} =
max{c ∈ C∗ : cA ≤ dA} and so θ(dA) = d = d[0,1]
Q
∗ (OP). On the other hand, it
is immediate to see that it is strictly order preserving: if a < b ∈ A, there exists
c ∈ C∗ such that a < cA < b and thus, θ(a) < c < θ(b). This shows that θ is
one-to-one.
Regarding the homomorphic conditions for the operations, we exploit the
density of the constants in A and in [0,1]Q∗ (OP). Observe that the left-
continuous t-norm and its residuum are, by definition, logically representable
operations, so the proof can be done in general for any logically representable
operation ?.11
As for the ≤ direction, let c ∈ C∗ such that c < θ(?A(x1, ..., xn)). By defini-
tion and given that θ preserves the order, cA ≤ ?A(x1, ..., xn). By the previous
lemma, it follows that cA ≤ Σ1{...Σn{?A(c1A, ..., cnA) : cn ∈ Cn}...x1 ∈ C1}.
Then, cA ≤ ?A(c1A, ..., cnA) for some ci ∈ Ci if Σi = sup and for all ci ∈
Ci if Σi = inf (for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
We can use now the book-keeping axioms to get that c ≤ ?(c1, ..., cn) for ci as
above. Now, we can use the properties of ? in [0, 1] (monotonicity and left-right
continuity), take limits and conclude that c ≤ ?(θx1, ..., θxn).
In order to prove the ≥ inequality, let c ∈ C∗ be such that ?(θx1, ..., θxn) < c.
Then, as before (since [0,1]Q∗ (OP) is linearly ordered), from the previous lemma
we get Σ1{...{Σn{?(c1, ..., cn) : cn ∈ Cn}...} : x1 ∈ C1} < c. Then, ?(c1, ..., cn) <
c for the families of ci as above.
From the book-keeping axioms we have that ?A(c1
A, ..., cn
A) < cA
for ci as above. We can now clearly take suprema and infima to get
Σ1{...Σn{?A(c1A, ..., cnA) : cn ∈ Cn}...x1 ∈ C1} ≤ cA. Again from the pre-
vious lemma, it follows that ?Ax1, ..., xn ≤ cA. Since θ is order preserving, we
finally have θ(?Ax1, ..., xn) ≤ θ(cA) = c. 
Strong standard completeness of L∞∗ (OP) follows straightforwardly.
11Nevertheless, the case of the left-continuous t-norm operation has a more direct approach,
that does not need any of the ∨CONG?, ∨M?Ui nor ∨C?Ui rules and that relies on the MTL-
axiomatization of a residuated operation.
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Theorem 4.23 (Strong Standard Completeness of L∞∗ (OP)). For any set of
formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} the following are equivalent:
1. Γ `L∞∗ (OP) ϕ
2. Γ |=[0,1]Q∗ (OP) ϕ.
Proof. One direction (from 1 to 2) is soundness, that is easy to prove. As for the
other implication, suppose that Γ 6`L∞∗ (OP) ϕ. Then, by Theorem 4.11 there is a
linearly ordered L∞∗ (OP)-algebra A and a A-evaluation h such that h([Γ]) ⊆ {1}
and h(ϕ) < 1. It is immediate that h([Fm]) is a countable subalgebra of A
(thus linearly ordered) and so it can be embedded into the standard algebra
[0,1]Q∗ (OP) by the embedding θ from the previous lemma. Then, it is clear that
θ ◦h is a [0,1]Q∗ (OP)-evaluation such that θ ◦h(Γ) ⊆ {1} and θ ◦h(ϕ) < 1. This





The density rule presented in the previous chapter is not very comfortable to
use when we expand the L∞∗ axiomatic system with modalities. This is mainly
due to its disjunctive form, that does not commute with the 2 operator in any
way, so it is not clear if it is possible to prove it is closed under the 2. This
turns to be quite problematic when facing the completeness proof of the modal
expansion.
For this reason, we have searched for axiomatizations equivalent to L∞∗ that
instead of the density rule use inference rules that are modally well behaved
in the sense that they can be proven to be closed under the 2 operator (see
Theorem 6.9). It turns out that a family of rules presented in [34] is modally
well behaved in the previous sense, but it is only possible to use them to get
systems equivalent to L∞∗ for a particular family of left-continuous t-norms. We
characterize this class, and give some examples of t-norms belonging to it.
5.1 Conjunctive inference rules
The main characteristic obtained from the density rule was the density of the
constants on the linearly ordered algebras of the class. We can approach the
problem of finding alternative axiomatizations for L∞∗ studying different charac-
terizations of this property on these algebras, and seeing whether these charac-
terizations can be used in order to axiomatize a logic that is semilinear.
From [34] we can select a family of infinitary inference rules that are, from
the point of view of the modal expansion, well behaved. They are inspired on
the rules presented in the equations 4.2 and 4.1 from the previous chapter, but
correspond only to the implication operation over all the points of the diagonal.
Definition 5.1. We call conjunctive inference rules to the set of infinitary
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rules given by
R∞x :
{(p→ c) ∧ (d→ q)}d∈[0,x)Q,c∈(x,1]Q
p→ q
for each x ∈ [0, 1].
We will see that, for what concerns MTL∆, these rules have the same effect
that the whole family given in 4.2, 4.1, in the sense that an axiomatic system
that satisfies the conjunctive inference rules and which is, moreover, semilinear
(and includes the book-keeping axioms) is strongly standard canonical complete.
We can first check that these rules are weaker than the density rule.
Lemma 5.2. For each x ∈ [0, 1], the rule R∞x can be derived in L∞∗ .
Proof. Let Γ∪{ϕ,ψ} ⊆ Fm and x ∈ [0, 1] such that Γ `L∞∗ (ϕ→ c)∧(d→ ψ) for
all c ∈ (x, 1]∩C∗, d ∈ [0, x)∩C∗. It follows that Γ `L∞∗ ϕ→ c for all c ∈ (x, 1]∩C∗
and Γ `L∞∗ d→ ψ for all d ∈ [0, x) ∩ C∗.
Consider first the case when x ∈ C∗, i.e., x is an element of the language.
Then, Γ `L∞∗ ϕ→ c for all c ∈ (x, 1] ∩ C∗ implies that Γ `L∞∗ (ϕ→ c) ∨ (c→ x)
for all c ∈ C∗. Similarly, we also get that Γ `L∞∗ (x → c) ∨ (c → ψ) for all
c ∈ C∗. Applying the density rule, D∞ on each case, we get Γ `L∞∗ ϕ → x and
Γ `L∞∗ x→ ψ. By transitivity we conclude that Γ `L∞∗ ϕ→ ψ.
On the other hand, suppose that x 6∈ C∗, then clearly any c ∈ C∗ is either
smaller or greater than x. Then, for each c ∈ C∗, Γ `L∞∗ ϕ→ c or Γ `L∞∗ c→ ψ.
Then, Γ `L∞∗ (ϕ→ c)∨ (c→ ψ) for each c ∈ C∗. Applying the density rule now,
we get that Γ `L∞∗ ϕ→ ψ. 
Our aim is to determine whether the conjunctive inference rules are equiv-
alent to D∞. We can first show that any chain satisfying all the conjunctive
inference rules has the constants densely distributed.
Lemma 5.3. Let us assume that A is a MTLQ∆-chain. Then, the following
conditions are equivalent:




[(x→ c) ∨ (c→ y) ≈ 1] =⇒ [(x→ y) ≈ 1]
2. A validates all generalized quasi-equations arising from the conjunctive




[(x→ c) ≈ 1] ∧
∧
c∈[0,x)∩C∗
[(c→ y) ≈ 1] =⇒ [(x→ y) ≈ 1]
3. For each a < b ∈ A there is c ∈ C∗ such that a < cA < b.
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Proof. (1 ⇔ 3): while 3 ⇒ 1 is trivial by definition, the other direction was
proven in Lemma 4.12.
(1⇔ 2): By 5.2 it is enough to show that (2⇒ 1). Let us assume that A 6|= Q,
and let us prove that A 6|= Qx for some x ∈ [0, 1].
Since A 6|= Q there is a, b ∈ A such that a > b (recall that A was a chain) but
for each c ∈ C∗ either a ≤ cA or cA ≤ b. This implies that inf{c ∈ C∗ : a ≤ cA} =
sup{c ∈ C∗ : cA ≤ b}. Let x be this value, and observe that for each c ∈ (x, 1]∩C∗,
(i.e., with c > x = inf{c ∈ C∗ : a ≤ cA}) it holds that a ≤ cA, so a⇒ cA ≈ 1A.
Similarly, for each d ∈ [0, x) ∩ C∗ (i.e., with d < x = sup{c ∈ C∗ : cA ≤ b}) it
holds that d
A ⇒ b ≈ 1A. Therefore, A 6|= Qx. 
This makes of the conjunctive inference rules good candidates for getting an
alternative axiomatization of L∞∗ . In fact, as an immediate corollary we can
state a result similar to [34, Cor. 23]:
Corollary 5.4. Let ∗ be a left-continuous t-norm, and AS an axiomatic system
in L extending MTL∆ such that
• AS derives all book-keeping axioms,
• AS derives all the conjunctive inference rules,
• AS is semilinear,
Then AS is strongly complete with respect to [0,1]Q∗ .
The semilinearity condition is, as it might be expected, a problematic one.
We cannot simply extend MTLQ∗ with the conjunctive inference rules, since the
resulting system may not be semilinear. In Theorem 4.16 we proved semilinearity
of some logics with up to a denumerable set of inference rules, so this could seem
a promising starting point to approach the semilinearity of the axiomatic systems
as above, but we will see that it is not enough.
On the one hand, it is not hard to see that the conjunctive inference rules
are closed under the ∨ operation.
Lemma 5.5. Let R be a set of conjunctive inference rules, and MTLQ∗ (R) be the
extension of MTLQ∗ with the rules in R. Then, for all x ∈ [0, 1] such that Rx ∈ R
the rule
R′x :
{r ∨ ((p→ c) ∧ (d→ q))}c∈(x,1]∩C∗,d∈[0,x)∩C∗
r ∨ (p→ q)
can be derived.
Proof. In MTL∆, from r∨ ((p→ c)∧ (d→ q)) it can be deduced (((p∧¬∆r)→
c)∧ (d→ (q∨∆r)). Applying the corresponding infinitary rule, this implies that
(p ∧ ¬∆q)→ (q ∨∆r), and from here it follows that r ∨ (p→ q). 
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However, this was not the only premise of Lemma 4.16. There we proved
that using a countable set of rules like the above ones, the resulting system is
semilinear, but that is not necessarily true for non-countable sets of rules, as we
will see in the next section.
A natural idea is that of seeing whether a denumerable subset of conjunctive
inference rules is enough to prove this density property. Sadly, in general, this
does not hold, as we can show a case where all the conjunctive inference rules
are valid except for one but the constants are no longer dense.
Lemma 5.6. For every x ∈ [0, 1] it holds that there is a Go¨del chain A such
that:
• A does not model Qx,
• A models Qs for all s ∈ [0, 1] \ {x},
• A does not model Q.
Proof. Let us distinguish three cases.
Case x ∈ [0, 1] \ [0, 1]Q : Consider the Go¨del chain given by the universe [0, 1]Q
expanded with two points {x−, x+} which play the role of the irrational
x, and x− < x+. In particular, [0, x) < x− < x+ < (x, 1], and so,
[0, x)Q < x− < x+ < (x, 1]Q.
Consider first s ∈ [0, 1] \ {x}. Observe than by construction, sup{d ∈
[0, s)Q} = inf{c ∈ (s, 1]Q}. Then, let a, b be elements of the algebra
such that a ≤ c for all c ∈ (s, 1]Q, and d ≤ b for all d ∈ [0, s)Q. By
definition of infimum and supremum, it follows that a ≤ inf{c ∈ (s, 1]Q}
and sup{d ∈ [0, s)Q} ≤ b. But by the previous observation this implies
that a ≤ inf{c ∈ (s, 1]Q} = sup{d ∈ [0, s)Q} ≤ b, so the generalised
quasi-equation Qs is valid.
On the other hand, we have that by construction x+ ≤ c for all c ∈ (x, 1]Q,
and also d ≤ x− for all d ∈ [0, x)Q. However, we defined the algebra so
x− < x+, so the generalised quasi-equation Qx does not hold. Similarly,
for any c ∈ C∗, either x+ ≤ c or c ≤ x− (since there is no constant in
between them), so the generalised quasi-equation arising from the density
rule, i.e., Q does not hold either.
Case x ∈ C∗, x < 1 : Consider the Go¨del chain given by the universe C∗ ex-
panded with one point {x+} which separates the sets [0, x] and (x, 1]. It
follows that [0, x]Q < x+ < (x, 1]Q.
We can prove as in the previous case that Qs holds for any s 6= x. To
see that the algebra does not model Qx nor Q it is enough to consider the
points x and x+. For the first one observe that x+ ≤ c for all c ∈ (x, 1]Q
and d ≤ x for all d ∈ [0, x)Q, but x < x+ by definition. Concerning Q, it
is clear that for any c ∈ C∗, x+ ≤ c or c ≤ x, but again, the consequence
of the quasi-equation does not hold.
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Case x = 1 : Consider the Go¨del chain given by the universe C∗ expanded with
a new element 1− which separates the sets [0, 1) and {1}. As before,
[0, 1)Q < 1− < 1.
The proof is again analogous to the previous cases, considering now 1 and
1−. 
This last lemma implies that if there is derivation of the density rule using
conjunctive inference rules such derivation must be really long: it cannot be
countably long1 because it has to take into account the conjunctive inference
rules for all real numbers in [0, 1]. Nevertheless, we will see in the next section
that there is no such derivation.
5.2 Algebraic models of the density rule
In what follows we show that, in general, the logic axiomatized using all the
conjunctive inference rules is not semilinear, i.e., it does not coincide with the
one axiomatized using the density rule. Before providing a counterexample let
us notice a case where, also for arbitrary algebras, the system resulting from
the addition of D∞ is equivalent to the one obtained using all the conjunctive
inference rules. Some conditions characterized here will guide us later in order
to find a counterexample to the equivalence between D∞ and {R∞x }x∈[0,1].
Lemma 5.7. Let A be a MTLQ∗ -algebra (not necessarily a chain), and let us
assume that A has a subdirect representation A ⊆∏i∈I Ai (with Ai subdirectly
irreducible, and thus, chain) such that for every i ∈ I, the element ~ei given by
~ei[j] =
{
0 if j 6= i
1 otherwise
belongs to A. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
1. A validates Q
2. For all x ∈ [0, 1], A validates Qx.
Proof. It is enough to prove that (2⇒ 1). Assume that A 6|= Q. Then, there is
some i ∈ I such that Ai 6|= Q, because the class of algebras is a generalised quasi-
variety and the generalized quasi-equations are preserved under direct products
and subalgebras. By linearity and Lemma 5.5 if Ai 6|= Q then Ai 6|= Qx for some
x ∈ [0, 1] (we have see that, over the linearly ordered algebras, these two sets of
rules are interderivable). Then, since Ai 6|= Qx and ~ei ∈ A, then it is clear that
there exists a substitution σ such that ~ei → σ(γ) = 1 for each γ in the premises
of Rx, while ~ei → σ(δ) for δ being the consequence of the same rule. But this
means that A |= (¬δA~ei ∨ σ(γ)) ≈ 1A, but A 6|= (¬¬δA~ei ∨ σ(δ)) ≈ 1A, having
that Qx does not hold in A. 
1But it is well-founded.
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Now we are ready to provide the counterexample to the equivalence between
D∞ and {R∞x }x∈[0,1]. As expected, such counterexample will not satisfy the as-
sumptions in 5.7. Indeed, the construction we do is inspired by the construction
of the unique, up to isomorphism, countable atomless Boolean algebra (see for
instance [64, Chapter 16]).
Lemma 5.8. Let ∗ be the Go¨del t-norm. Then, there is a MTLQ∗ -algebra A
such that A |= Qx for all x ∈ [0, 1]∗ while A 6|= Q.
Proof. Let I be the interval [0, 1)Q. For every q ∈ I we consider the Go¨del-chain
Aq defined by:
2
• the universe is [0, 1]Q enlarged with a new element q˜.
• the universe is linearly-ordered with the expansion of the linear order
among rational numbers such that q˜ is strictly between the elements in
[0, q]Q and (q, 1]Q. In other words, q˜ is the sucessor (next element) of q.
We emphasize that we do not consider q˜ as a rational element.
• the operations of the ∆-Go¨del chain Aq are the ones determined by the
linear order in the previous item.
• for every c ∈ [0, 1]Q, the interpretation of the constant c¯ in Aq is the
rational number c.
It is worth noticing that all chains Aq (with q ∈ I) satisfy that
• for every x ∈ [0, 1]R \ {q}, there are no elements a, b ∈ Aq which simulta-
neously satisfy 1) a ≤ c for every c ∈ (x, 1]Q and 2) c ≤ b for all c ∈ [0, x)Q
and 3) b < a. In other words, for every x ∈ [0, 1] \ C∗, it holds that
Aq |= Qx.
• Aq 6|= Qq. Indeed, there is only one pair of elements a, b ∈ Aq which
simultaneosly satisfy 1) a ≤ c for every c ∈ (x, 1]Q and 2) c ≤ b for all
c ∈ [0, x)Q and 3) b < a; such a pair is the one given by x := q˜ and y := q.
By 5.7 it is obvious that the direct product B :=
∏
q∈I Aq is not an algebra such
that B |= Qx for all x ∈ [0, 1] and B 6|= Q.
Next we define A as the subalgebra of B whose universe is given by the
elements f ∈ B (seen as maps from I) such that there is a finite sequence
q0 < q1 < q2 < · · · < qn+1 of rational numbers with
• q0 := 0 and qn+1 := 1 (and n ∈ N),
• for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, f  [qi, qi+1) is either a constant function given by a rational
number or the function given by fq) = q˜ or the function given by f(q) = q.
2 These chains were previously considered inside the proof of 5.6.
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It is quite simple3 to verify that such set A is closed under all operations, and
so A is the support of a MTL∆-chain A.
It is worth noticing here that such A has the subdirect product representation
given by A ⊆∏q∈I Aq (i.e., all projections are surjective), and that for every q ∈
I the element ei considered in 5.7 does not belong to A. Thus, the assumptions
in 5.7 do not hold for this particular algebra A.
Next we check the following claims.
• A is not a model of Q. To show this let us consider the elements s, t ∈ A
defined by s := (q˜)q∈I and t := (q)q∈I . It is obvious that s ⇒ t = t 6= 1.




1 if q ∈ [0, c)Q
c if q ∈ [c, 1)Q
and
(c¯A ⇒ t)(q) :=
{
q if q ∈ [0, c)Q
1 if q ∈ [c, 1)Q
Therefore, for every c ∈ [0, 1]Q it holds that (s ⇒ c¯A) ∨ (c¯A ⇒ t) = 1A.
Thus, A 6|= Q under the interpretation sending ϕ to the element s and ψ
to the element t.
• for every x ∈ [0, 1] \ [0, 1]Q, it holds that A |= Qx. This is trivial because
all algebras in {Aq : q ∈ I} validate such generalized quasiequation Qx.
• for every r ∈ [0, 1]Q, it holds that A |= Qr. We can equivalently (an more








[(c→ x) ≈ 1] =⇒ [(r → x) ≈ 1]
It is clear that from these two, if A |= ((x → c) ∧ (d → y)) ≈ 1 for all
c ∈ (r, 1]Q and all d ∈ [0, r)Q, they both follow that A |= (x→ r) ≈ 1 and
A |= (r → y) ≈ 1, so A |= (x→ y) ≈ 1.
We will prove that A |= Q1r and A |= Q2r. Let us fix a rational number in
[0, 1] r.
3 For the reader interested to check the details we suggest to start considering the following




)q∈[0,1)Q and t2 := (q˜)q∈[0,1)Q and t3 := (q)q∈[0,1)Q
and checking that all possible combinations of these three elements under ∧,∨,→,∆ are also
elements in our universe A. Indeed, all difficulties to provide a general proof that A is closed
under the operations are illustrated in the previous particular case.
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Case x ∈ A such that x ≤ r ↑ : We need to show that A |= Q1r, i.e.,
that x ≤ r¯. We will check this showing that for each one of the
rational intervals [qi, qi+1) determined by the element x ∈ A, it holds
that x  [qi, qi+1) is less or equal than r¯  [qi, qi+1). The fact that
x ≤ r ↑ tells us that in each one of the intervals [qi, qi+1) one of the
following conditions hold:
– x  [qi, qi+1) is a rational constant which is ≤ r,
– x  [qi, qi+1) is a function given by q 7→ q˜, and moreover qi+1 ≤ r
– x  [qi, qi+1) is a function given by q 7→ q, and moreover qi+1 ≤ r.
In all three cases, using that qi+1 is not an element of the interval
[qi, qi+1), it follows that x  [qi, qi+1) is less or equal than r¯  [qi, qi+1).
Case x ∈ A such that r ↓≤ x : We need to show that A |= Q2r, that is
to say, that r¯ ≤ x. We will do this showing that for each one of the
rational intervals [qi, qi+1) determined by the element x ∈ A, it holds
that r¯  [qi, qi+1) is less or equal than x  [qi, qi+1). The fact that
r ↓≤ x tells us that in each one of the intervals [qi, qi+1) one of the
following conditions hold:
– x  [qi, qi+1) is a rational constant which is ≥ r,
– x  [qi, qi+1) is a function given by q 7→ q˜, and moreover qi ≥ r
– x  [qi, qi+1) is a function given by q 7→ q, and moreover qi ≥ r.
In all three cases it holds that x  [qi, qi+1) is greater or equal than
r¯  [qi, qi+1).
This finishes the proof that A |= Qr for the case that r is rational.
Therefore, we have just seen that A 6|= Q while A |= Qx for all x ∈ [0, 1]. 
With this we know that extending MTLQ∗ with the conjunctive inference rules
does not provide in general an axiomatic system strongly complete with respect
to the rational standard algebra of ∗.
5.3 T-norms accepting a conjunctive axiomati-
zation
We can prove, nevertheless, some results over classes of left-continuous t-norms
that still admit an axiomatization using conjunctive inference rules.
Definition 5.9. We say that a left-continuous t-norm ∗ accepts a conjunctive
axiomatization if there exists an axiomatic system AS such that
• AS is strongly complete with respect to [0,1]Q∗ ,
• AS extends MTLQ∗ ,
• The only inference rules added to MTLQ∗ are conjunctive inference rules.
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If a left-continuous t-norm ∗ accepts a conjunctive axiomatization, we denote it
by L∞∗ .
It is worth remarking that the first and third points from the above definition
are equivalents when all the conjunctive rules are considered (but then, as we
have proven, the logic may not be semilinear).
Observe that, for a left-continuous t-norm accepting a conjunctive axiomati-
zation, for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} the following are equivalent:
• Γ `L∞∗ ϕ,
• Γ `L∞∗ ϕ,
• Γ |=[0,1]Q∗ ϕ,
It is of course of great interest understand what kind of t-norms fall within
the previous class. We can characterize some classes of t-norms that accept a
conjunctive axiomatization.
First, we can prove that for an arbitrary left-continuous t-norm, the conjunc-
tive inference rules corresponding to values x such that 〈x, x〉 is a discontinuity
points of the diagonal of ⇒∗ are enough to prove the whole set of conjunctive
inferece rules on any linearly ordered algebra of the class. Recall that we write
Qx to denote the generalized quasi-equation associated to Rx.
Lemma 5.10. Let ∗ be a left-continuous t-norm, and A a linearly ordered
MTLQ∗ -algebra. Then if A |= Qx for all x such that 〈x, x〉 is a discontinuity
point of ⇒∗, then A |= Qy for all y ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Observe first that ϕ → ψ, χ → δ `MTL (ψ → χ) → (ϕ → ψ), so it is
also true in L∞∗ and thus in all the algebras of the class. Let u ∈ (0, 1] and
take a, b ∈ A such that a ⇒ cA) = 1A for all c > u and (dA ⇒ b) = 1A in
A for all d < u. If u was a discontinuity point for ⇒∗ the rule was satisfied
by assumption. Otherwise, from the previous observation we have that ((cA ⇒
d
A
) ⇒ (a ⇒ b)) = 1A. But then, since u was not a discontinuity point of ⇒∗,
and given that (u ⇒∗ u) = 1, then it holds that sup{c ⇒∗ d : c > u > d} = 1.
That is to say, for each r < 1, there are c > u > d such that r < c⇒∗ d. Using
the book-keeping axioms, we get that (rA ⇒ (a⇒ b)) = 1A for all r < 1. Then,
using R1, we have that (a⇒ b) = 1A.
If u = 0, and 〈0, 0〉 is not a discontinuity point. Take a ∈ A such that a⇒ cA =
1
A
for all c ∈ C∗ \{0}. From the previous observation, and using that 0→ 0 is a
theorem, we have that ((cA ⇒ 0A)⇒ (a⇒ 0A)) = 1A for all c ∈ C∗ \{0}. Since
0 is not a discontinuity point we know that sup{c ⇒∗ 0 : c ∈ C∗ \ {0}} = 1A.
Then, we have that (rA ⇒ (a ⇒ 0A)) = 1A for all r < 1, and again by rule R1
we can conclude that ¬a = 1A. 
The previous lemma gives as immediate corollary the following result.
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Corollary 5.11. Any left-continuous t-norm with a countable amount of dis-
continuity points on the diagonal of its residuum accept a conjunctive axiomati-
zation.
While the only two continuous t-norms that belong to the previous class
are the  Lukasiewicz and the Product t-norms, we do not know if there are left-
continuous (non-continuous) t-norms that verify the previous statement.
A different class of left-continuous t-norms that accept a conjunctive ax-
iomatization, that for what concerns the continuous t-norms is bigger than the
previous one, is formed by all the ordinal sums of Product and  Lukasiewicz
components.
Lemma 5.12. Any ordinal sum of  Lukasiewicz an Product t-norms accepts a
countable conjunctive axiomatization.
Proof. Let ∗ = ⊕i∈I〈∗i, (bi, ti)〉 be an ordinal sum of  Lukasiewicz and Product
components, and let C∗ be the countable subalgebra generated by the rationals
in [0, 1] and the idempotent elements of ∗, i.e., ⋃i∈I{bi, ti} (the idempotents).
We can consider the axiomatic system given by the extension of MTLQ∗ over the
set of constants C∗ by the following axiom and rules:
• (∆(b→ (p→ q)) ∧∆(p→ b))→ (p→ q) for each b ∈ ⋃i∈I{bi, ti},
• For each b ∈ ⋃i∈I{bi, ti}, the rule Rb, i.e.
{(p→ c) ∧ (d→ q)}c∈(b,1]∩C∗,d∈[0,b)∩C∗
p→ q
We know the set I is countable by the definition of ordinal sum, so using Theo-
rem 4.16 we get that the previous axiomatic systems are strongly complete with
respect to the linearly ordered algebras of their corresponding algebraic compan-
ion. On the other hand, we can prove that any of these linearly ordered algebras
validates all the conjunctive inference rules.
Let A be a linearly ordered MTLQ∗ -algebra that satisfies the previous axiom
and rules schemata, and let a, b ∈ A, x ∈ [0, 1] such that ((a ⇒ cA) ∧ (dA ⇒
b)) = 1
A
for all c ∈ (x, 1] ∩ C∗, d ∈ [0, x) ∩ C∗. By construction, we know that
x belongs to some component i. Moreover, we are only interested in the case
when x belongs to the interior of this component (because otherwise, x = bi or
x = ti, and the corresponding infinitary rule holds trivially by definition of the
axiomatic system. Let then bi < x < ti.
From ((a⇒ cA)∧ (dA ⇒ b)) = 1A it follows that ((cA ⇒ dA)⇒ (a⇒ b)) =
1
A
. From the behaviour of the residuum in an ordinal sum of  Lukasiewicz and
Product components, we know that, on the standard algebra it holds that
lim
{c∈(x,1]∩C∗,d∈[0,x)∩C∗}
{c⇒∗ d} = ti.
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Then, from the book-keeping axioms, we get that (rA ⇒ (a ⇒ b)) = 1A for
all r ∈ [0, ti) ∩ C∗. Applying the generalised quasi-equation arising from the
inference rule Rti we get that (ti
A ⇒ (a⇒ b)) = 1A.
On the other hand, since x < ti and (a ⇒ cA) = 1A for all c > x, in
particular (a ⇒ tiA) = 1A. Then, applying MP and the axiom we originally
added to the system, we get that (a⇒ b) = 1A. 

Part III






In this chapter we will focus on the study of the local and global modal logics
associated to certain many-valued Kripke frames. We consider Kripke models
with a crips accesibility relation. Moreover, the evaluation of formulas in these
Kripke models is done over algebras belonging to the generalized quasi-variety
generated by [0,1]Q∗ for ∗ being a left continuous t-norm that accepts a con-
junctive axiomatization (see Definition 5.9). The main reason for restricting the
class of studied t-norms is that, while we know how to syntactically prove certain
characteristics for the conjunctive inference rules of L∞∗ (in particular, Theorem
6.9), we have not been able to do the same for the density rule. In this and
the following chapter, ∗ stands for a left-continuous t-norm accepting a
conjunctive axiomatization. Recall that we know cases like ordinal sums of
 Lukasiewicz and Product t-norms fall within this class (Lemma 5.12) We will
remark thisfact in the more relevant results in order to avoid confusion.
In this dissertation, we understand a modal logic as a consequence operator.
For this reason the definitions are not based on the set of theorems but on
the deduction relation itself. It is possible to move from the notion of logic as
sets of theorems to the notion of consequence operator if considering finitary
deductions only (see for instance [78] or [18], where the logics are defined as sets
of formulas). However, we think this approach gives a new intuition on what the
derivation relation of these logics mean and it is also more uniform with respect
to the works on abstract algebraic logic.
The main result we present here is the definition of axiomatic systems that
are (respectively) strongly complete with respect to the intended semantics de-
fined in Section 6.1, arising from the Kripke models with a crisp accesibility
relation evaluated over L∞∗ -algebras. We begin by defining these modal logics in
semantic terms, following the usual definitions presented at this respect in the
previous literature (see Section 3.2 at Chapter 3) and in Section 6.2 we propose
two equivalent axiomatizations for them. We prove this logic enjoys strong com-
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pleteness with respect to the semantic characterizations of the modal logics. In
Section 6.3 we present several results concerning the behaviour and character-
istics of the many-valued modal logics presented and we conclude this chapter
proposing a method to axiomatize the possibilistic logics over L∞∗ -algebras (for
left-continuous t-norms accepting a conjunctive axiomatization).
6.1 The semantics: crisp local and global modal
logics over [0, 1]Q∗
First, as usual we let the modal language L2,3 be the expansion of the non-
modal language L defined in the previous chapter with two unary operators,
2 and 3. From now on, unless specified otherwise Fm will denote the the
algebra of formulas built from a countable set of variables Var and the truth
constants generated from the rationals {c}c∈C∗ using the non-modal and the
modal connectives of L2,3.
Within this dissertation, the semantics of the modal logic built over the L∞∗ -
algebras and in particular over [0,1]Q∗ , is given following most of the previous
works on many-valued modal logics. We will deal with the problem where the
accessibility relation of the model is crisp and the fuzziness is given though the
evaluation of the formulas within the worlds. For this reason, the frames over
which the logic is defined do in fact coincide with the ones from the classical case:
pairs of non-empty sets of worlds W and crisp accessibility relations between
them, R ⊆ W × W . For simplicity, we will write Rvw for 〈v, w〉 ∈ R. The
definition of a (crisp) many-valued Kripke model is as follows.
Definition 6.1. Let A = 〈A,,⇒,∧, δA, {cA}c∈C∗〉 be a L∞∗ -algebra.1 An
(crisp) A-Kripke model M (and in general, a many-valued Kripke model)
is a triplet 〈W,R,w〉 where W is a non-empty set of worlds called the universe
of the model, R ⊆W×W and it is called the accessibility relation and e is an
evaluation of propositional variables in A for each world, i.e., e : W ×Var → A.
e is extended to non-modal formulas by the corresponding operation in A,
e(w, c) := cA
e(w,ϕ ∧ ψ) := e(w,ϕ) ∧ e(w,ψ)
e(w,ϕ& ψ) := e(w,ϕ) e(w,ψ)
e(w,ϕ→ ψ) := e(w,ϕ)⇒ e(w,ψ)
e(w,∆ϕ) := δAe(w,ϕ)
and to modal formulas by
e(w,2ϕ) := inf{e(v, ϕ) : Rwv}
e(w,3ϕ) := sup{e(v, ϕ) : Rwv}
1 The generalized quasi-variety generated by [0,1]Q∗ .
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whenever these values exist and left undefined otherwise.
A many-valued Kripke model M is called safe whenever the evaluation of
2ϕ and 3ϕ is defined over any world for any ϕ ∈ Fm. We will say that a model
M is based on a frame F whenever the underlying frame of M coincides with F.
For simplicity, the class of safe A-Kripke models for A ranging over all the
algebras in GQ([0,1]Q∗ ) is called the class of ∗-Kripke models (and its ele-
ments, ∗-Kripke models).2
Over the previously defined models, different notions of truth arise, as it
happened in the classical case: Given M a ∗-Kripke model and w ∈ W , for
any formula ϕ we write (M, w)  ϕ and say that ϕ is valid in M at state
w whenever e(w,ϕ) = 1. On the other hand, we write M  ϕ and say that
ϕ is valid in M whenever M, w  ϕ for all w ∈ W . This notion is naturally
extended to classes of formulas Γ, by saying that M, w  Γ whenever M, w  γ
for each γ ∈ Γ.
It is also possible to extend the notion of validity to frames, as in the classical
case. Given an Kripke frame F we say that a formula ϕ is valid in F and write
F  ϕ whenever M  ϕ for all safe models M with F as frame.
Given a class of ∗-Kripke models, a local and a global deduction over it can
be defined in an analogous way to the definitions of the classical local and global
modal logics.
Definition 6.2. Let C be a class of ∗-Kripke models and Γ ∪ ϕ be a set of
formulas. Then we say that:
• ϕ is local consequence of Γ over C and write Γ C ϕ whenever for all
model M from C and for all state w in M, if M, w  Γ then M, w  ϕ.
• ϕ is global consequence of Γ over C and write Γ gC ϕ whenever for all
model M from C, if M  Γ then M  ϕ.
Notice that the local deduction is strictly weaker than the global one, since
Γ KF∗ ϕ implies that Γ gKF∗ ϕ, but not the contrary. It is also remarkable that
the set of theorems (i.e., deductions from the empty set) under the local and the
global deduction coincide.
We study both these logics. We begin by the local one because from the
results obtained in its study, the completeness results concerning the global
modal logic follow quite naturally. Our aim is to provide an axiomatization
for these logics, which will also result in a characterization of their algebraic
semantics and so will allow us to treat these logics with different tools.
6.2 Axiomatization and completeness
In the previous chapters, we have developed two equivalent axiomatic systems
strongly standard complete with respect to the corresponding rational standard
2Note that this are all safe models, even though we do not stress it in the name of the class.
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algebra of a left-continuous t-norm. This has been done for the left-continuous
t-norms that accepted a conjunctive axiomatization, which are the ones we are
studying along this and the next chapters. It is now natural to expand these
axiomatic systems in order to axiomatize the modal logics defined from the ∗-
Kripke structures. Our first objective is to get two equivalent axiomatic systems,
expanding respectively L∞∗ and L∞∗ . Then, we will focus on proving completeness
of the logic determined by these systems with respect to the intended semantics,
using for this the axiomatization based on conjunctive inference rules.
Working over crisp frames, a natural intuition is that of including the K
axiom schemata in the system. Moreover, with a language expanded with ratio-
nal constant symbols, some interesting formulas relating modal operators and
constants are valid and highly expressive, so they are also good candidates to
consider in the axiomatic system. We have also realized that some axiom relat-
ing the ∆ operator and the modal operators is necessary and finally, one of the
two well-known Fisher-Servi axioms [56], formulas coming from the intuitionistic
modal logic case, is also of remarkable importance for our axiomatic system.
Definition 6.3. We letM to be the following set of axiom schemata and rules
over the modal language:
(K) 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)
(21) 2(c→ p)↔ (c→ 2p) for all c ∈ C∗
(22) ∆2p→ 2∆p
(31) 2(p→ c)↔ (3p→ c) for all c ∈ C∗
(FS1) (3p→ 2q)→ 2(p→ q)
(N2) For any formula ϕ, from ∅ ` ϕ infer ∅ ` 2ϕ,
Mg is the set resulting from M by just replacing the local necessitation rule
(N2) by the more general rule:
(Ng2) From p derive 2p
We can now add the previous axioms and rules to the logical systems L∞∗
(Definition 4.3) and L∞∗ (Definition 5.9).
Lemma 6.4. For any set Γ∪{ϕ} of modal formulas, the following are equivalent:
• Γ derives ϕ in the axiomatic system obtained from adding M to L∞∗ ,
• Γ derives ϕ in the axiomatic system obtained from adding M to L∞∗
Proof. It is a trivial observation: from a proof of ϕ from Γ in any of the previous
axiomatic systems, we can easily get a proof in the other one. For each rule
applied in the proof, we leave it as such it is common to both systems (i.e., it
is not the density rule or a conjunctive rule). Otherwise, since L∞∗ and L∞∗ are
both the logic of [0,1]Q∗ , we know that any inference rule from one logic has a
derivation in the other system. Then, we include at that step the corresponding
derivation of the applied rule in the new proof. 
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Then we can consider the previous logic and indistinctly use one or the other
axiomatic systems.
Definition 6.5. The previous logic is denoted by K∗.
We can proceed analogously using Mg (i.e., consider the logic given equiva-
lently by the axomatic system obtained from L∞∗ plusMg or from L∞∗ plusMg)
in order to get the logic we will name K g∗ .
As it happens at the semantical level, `K∗ is stronger than `K∗g . Also their
respective sets of theorems coincide, and we will denote them by ThK∗ .
It is easy to prove that both `K∗ and `K∗g are sound with respect to KF∗
and gKF∗ correspondingly.
Lemma 6.6. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} be a set of formulas. Then
1. Γ `K∗ ϕ implies that Γ KF∗ ϕ,
2. Γ `K g∗ ϕ implies that Γ gKF∗ ϕ.
Proof. By definition, all non-modal axioms and rules (that is, those from L∞∗ )
are valid at any world of any ∗-model (by definition of this kind of model), so
they are valid in general in any ∗-frame. Then, they trivially hold in KF∗ and
due to the fact that this logic is weaker than the global one, also hold in gKF∗).
Then, it remains to check the soundness of M and Mg with respect to their
corresponding semantics.
We first show soundness of the axioms of these sets (which are common). Let
M be an arbitrary safe Kripke model from KF∗ and v ∈W . Observe that we do
not require for the algebra of evaluation to be linearly ordered.
K : By definition, e(v,2(ϕ → ψ)) = inf{e(w,ϕ → ψ) : Rvw} ≤ e(w,ϕ) ⇒
e(w,ψ) for all w ∈W such that Rvw. By axiom MTL1, we know→ (and so
the ⇒ operation) is decreasing in the first component and thus e(w,ϕ)⇒
e(w,ψ) ≤ inf{e(u, ϕ) : Rvu} ⇒ e(w,ψ). Applying the definition and the
previous family of inequalities, we get that e(v,2(ϕ → ψ)) ≤ e(v,2ϕ) ⇒
e(w,ψ) for all w ∈W such that Rvw. By residuation this is equivalent to
e(v,2(ϕ → ψ))  e(v,2ϕ) ≤ e(w,ψ) for all w ∈ W such that Rvw and
taking the infimum over w we get e(v,2(ϕ→ ψ))e(v,2ϕ) ≤ inf{e(w,ψ) :
Rvw} = e(v,2ψ). Again by residuation we get that e(v,2(ϕ → ψ)) ≤
e(v,2ϕ)⇒ e(v,2ψ) that is, that the K formula is valid in any state of any
model from KF∗.
21 : By definition e(v,2(c → ϕ)) = inf{e(w, c → ϕ) : Rvw} = inf{cA ⇒
e(w,ϕ)Rvw}. On the one side, inf{cA ⇒ e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ≤ cA ⇒ e(w,ϕ)
for all w ∈ W such that Rvw. We can apply residuation and so get
e(v,2(c → ϕ))  cA ≤ e(w,ϕ) for all w ∈ W with Rvw and then take
the infimum at the right side, getting (after using residuation again) that
e(v,2(c → ϕ)) ≤ cA ⇒ e(v,2ϕ) = e(v, c → 2ϕ). On the other side,
it is immediate that cA ⇒ inf{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ≤ cA ⇒ e(w,ϕ) for all
w such that Rvw and thus, taking the infimum at the right side, cA ⇒
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inf{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ≤ inf{cA ⇒ e(w,ϕ) : Rvw}. Then we have that
inf{cA ⇒ e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} = cA ⇒ inf{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw}, which concludes
the proof.
22 : By definition e(v,∆2ϕ) = δA inf{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw}. We know δA is mono-
tonic increasing (from axiom ∆5), so δA inf{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ≤ δAe(w,ϕ)
for each w ∈ W with Rvw. Then, we can take the infimum on the right
side and get that e(v,∆2ϕ) ≤ inf{δAe(w,ϕ) : Rvw} = e(v,2∆ϕ).
FS : By definition e(v,3ϕ → 2ψ) = sup{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ⇒ inf{e(w,ψ) :
Rvw}. By the monotonicity of ⇒ in each component, sup{e(w,ϕ) :
Rvw} ⇒ inf{e(w,ψ) : Rvw} ≤ e(w,ϕ) ⇒ e(u, ψ) for each w, u such
that Rvw and Rvu. Then, in particular, this is less or equal than
e(w,ϕ) ⇒ e(w,ψ) for each Rvw. Then, taking the infimum this proves
that e(v,3ϕ→ 2ψ) ≤ inf{e(w,ϕ→ ψ) : Rvw} = e(v,2ϕ).
31 : By definition e(v,2(ϕ → c)) = inf{e(w,ϕ → c) : Rvw} = inf{e(w,ϕ) ⇒
cA : Rvw}. As it happened in the (21) case, it is not difficult to check
that this is equal to sup{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ⇒ cA, which is, by defini-
tion, e(v,3ϕ → c). On the one hand, inf{e(w,ϕ) ⇒ cA : Rvw} ≤
e(w,ϕ) ⇒ cA for each w ∈ W such that Rvw. By residuation (twice)
this is equivalent to e(w,ϕ) ≤ inf{e(w,ϕ) ⇒ cA : Rvw} ⇒ c and
taking the supremum on the left we have that sup{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ≤
inf{e(w,ϕ) ⇒ cA : Rvw} ⇒ cA, which is equivalent (again by residua-
tion) to inf{e(w,ϕ) ⇒ cA : Rvw} ≤ sup{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ⇒ cA. On the
other hand, by (decreasing) monotonicity of the first component of the ⇒
operation, sup{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ⇒ cA ≤ e(w,ϕ) ⇒ cA for each w ∈ W
with Rvw. Then, we can take the infimum at the right side and get that
sup{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} ⇒ cA ≤ inf{e(w,ϕ)⇒ cA : Rvw}.
N2 : To check that the inference rule (applied over theorems) is sound with
respect to the local deduction, let ϕ be a formula such that for any ∗-
model M and any state w ∈W , it holds that e(w,ϕ) = 1A. Then, for any
v ∈W , e(v,2ϕ) = inf{e(w,ϕ) : Rvw} = 1A from the previous remark.
Ng2 : To check that the inference rule is sound with respect to the global deduc-
tion, let ϕ be a formula such that M  ϕ, that is, at any state w ∈ W ,
e(w,ϕ) = 1
A
. Then, for any v ∈W , it holds that e(v,2ϕ) = inf{e(w,ϕ) :
Rvw} which coincides with 1A by the previous assumption. 
For proving completeness, on the other hand, the path is not direct. For now,
we will focus on the local modal logic. Observe that the only modal rule added
for the local logic in both cases is (N2), which is applied only over theorems of
the logic. That allows to stablish a relation between the deductions in the modal
logic and the ones over the propositional layer over an extended set of variables.
It is necessary to add a particular infinite set of formulas to the premises, that
will stablish the behaviour of these new variables (namely, a set of formulas
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containing the theorems of the modal logic). At this point it is where we can
observe why it was important for the non-modal logic to enjoy strong standard
completeness.
Formally, we denote by Var? the extended set of variables Var ∪
{ϕ2, ϕ3}ϕ∈Fm,3 and by Fm? the set of formulas in the language of L (with-
out modal operators) over the extended set of variables Var?.
Definition 6.7. We inductively define a translation between Fm and the set of
non-modal formulas Fm? defined above ? : Fm→ Fm? by
c? := c
x? := x for x ∈ Var
(ϕ& ψ)? := ϕ? & ψ?
(ϕ→ ψ)? := ϕ? → ψ?




It is easy to see that ? is a bijective mapping reasoning inductively. It is
clearly injective by the definition: for any two different propositional variables
from Var or constant symbols their images under ? are clearly different (? be-
haves as the identity), and from that follows inductively for the rest of the
propositional formulas. For what respect formulas beginning by a modal opera-
tor, it is also immediate since the images are two different variables from Fm?.
To check that the mapping is also surjective, any propositional variable from
Var or constant symbol is the image under ? of itself and any variable ϕ2 or ϕ3
is the image under ? of 2ϕ or 3ϕ respectively. From these basis, it is clear that
any formula belonging to Fm? can be built as the image under ? of a formula
from Fm.
Now, the modal formulas from M that take the role of modal axioms of K∗
cannot be understood as schematas any more: the substitution should be done
at the level of the non-modal part of the name of the variable, which is not the
standard definition. Nevertheless, the translation through ? of each one of the
instances of the original schemata provides a (infinite) set of formulas in Fm?
that contain all the information from the original ones.
For arbitrary instances of the formulas of M with ϕ,ψ and c ∈ C∗, we get
the following translations:
(K)? : (ϕ→ ψ)2 → (ϕ2 → ψ2)
(21)? : (c→ ϕ)2 ↔ (c→ ϕ2)
(22)? : ∆ϕ2 → (∆ϕ)2
(31)? : (ϕ→ c)2 ↔ (ϕ3 → c)
(FS)? : (ϕ3 → ψ2)→ (ϕ→ ψ)2
This translation can be used to obtain an equivalence between deductions in the
local modal logic and deductions in the respective non-modal logic.
It is crucial here that we did not add any inference rule to the modal expan-
sion that is not limited to theorems. Otherwise, this result cannot be obtained
and so the completeness proof would need a different approach.
3Recall that Fm stands for the formulas with modal operators.
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Lemma 6.8. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. Then
Γ `K∗ ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ϕ?.
Proof. We can prove it by induction on the proof using the axiomatic system of
K∞∗ based on L
∞
∗ (in both directions), taking as base cases the theorems of the
logics.
To prove 1., first suppose that Γ `K∗ ϕ. The cases for the induction are the
following:
• If ϕ is a theorem of K∗, then ϕ? ∈ (ThK∗)? (observe this case includes the
deductions done using rule N2).
• Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was MP, that is to say, Γ `K∗
ψ and Γ `K∗ ψ → ϕ and the Induction Hypothesis can be used over
these cases (their proofs are shorter than the initial one). Then, Γ? ∪
(ThK∗)
? `L∞∗ ψ? and Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ (ψ → ϕ)?. By definition of the ?
operation this second statement coincides with Γ?∪(ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ψ? → ϕ?
and thus by MP (in L∞∗ ), Γ
? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ϕ?.
• Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was G∆. Then Γ `K∗ ψ for
ϕ = ∆ψ and by the Induction Hypothesis Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ψ?. Using
G∆ and the definition of ?, we get Γ
? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ (∆ψ)?.
• Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was D∞. Then ϕ = ψ → χ for
some formulas ψ, χ and Γ `K∗ (ψ → c) ∨ (c → χ) for all c ∈ C∗. By the
Induction Hypothesis, Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ((ψ → c) ∨ (c → χ))? for each
c ∈ C∗, and by the definition of ?, Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ (ψ? → c) ∨ (c →
χ?) for each c ∈ C∗. Applying the rule D∞ (in L∞∗ ) from this it follows
that Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ψ? → χ? and again by the definition of ?, that
Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ (ψ → χ)?.
For the other direction, assume that Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ϕ?. Again by induction
we can prove that Γ `K∗ ϕ. For commodity, the base case will be now reduced
to instances of the axioms of the logic. We will be using without further expla-
nations of the fact that for every ψ ∈ Fm?, there is χ ∈ Fm such that ψ = χ?
(since ? is a bijection).
• If ϕ? is an instance of an axiom of L∞∗ (by formulas over the extended set
of formulas Var?), ϕ is an instance of the same axiom in K∗.
• Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was MP, that is to say, Γ? ∪
(ThK∗)
? `L∞∗ ψ? and Γ? ∪ (ThK∗)? `L∞∗ ψ? → ϕ?. By the Induction
Hypothesis, Γ `K∗ ψ and Γ `K∗ ψ → ϕ, which immediately deduces (by
MP in K∗) Γ `K∗ ϕ.
• Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was G∆. Then Γ? ∪
(ThK∗)
? `L∞∗ ψ? for ϕ? = ∆ψ? = (∆ψ)?. Note that this implies that
∆ψ = ϕ. By Induction Hypothesis, Γ `K∗ ψ and thus by G∆ from K∗,
Γ `K∗ ∆ψ, which concludes this step.
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• Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was D∞. Then Γ? ∪
(ThK∗)
? `L∞∗ ((ψ → c) ∨ (c → χ))? for all c ∈ C∗, for ϕ? = ψ? → χ?
(again, this implies that ϕ = ψ → χ). By the Induction Hypothesis,
Γ `K∗ (ψ → c) ∨ (c→ χ) for all c ∈ C∗. By D∞ from K∗, we can conclude
that Γ `K∗ ψ → χ. 
At this point, one may wonder the necessity of presenting two equivalent
axiomatizations of K∞∗ . We have found this to be the clearest way to prove an
important result towards the completeness of these logics with respect to the
Kripke semantics. It is easy to see (using that the accessibility relation is crisp)
that, at the semantical level, deductions are closed under the 2 operator, i.e.,
for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ KF∗ ϕ implies that 2Γ KF∗ 2ϕ
for 2Γ := {2γ : γ ∈ Γ}. Then, aiming towards an axiomatization of this
semantically defined modal logic, it should be possible to check this characteristic
within the proposed axiomatic system. In fact, we will later see that this result
is of great importance. However, while proving this for the density rule D∞
(from L∞∗ ) is not clear at all, the case of the R∞x rules is not hard to check, as
we show below.
Theorem 6.9. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. Then Γ `K∗ ϕ implies that 2Γ `K∗ 2ϕ.
Proof. We do it by induction on the last rule of the proof of ϕ from Γ using the
axiomatic system of K i∗nfty based on L∞∗ . The basic case consists on the axioms
of the logic and the elements of Γ and the induction steps coincide with checking
the hypothesis over each deduction rule (for that is checking the last deduction
rule used in the proof).
• If ϕ is an axiom of K∞∗ or if it belongs to Γ, clearly 2ϕ is respectively,
either a theorem of K∞∗ (by rule N2) or an element of 2Γ by definition
and so 2Γ `K∞∗ 2ϕ.
• Suppose the last rule used for proving ϕ was MP. That is to say, Γ `K∞∗ ψ
and Γ `K∞∗ ψ → ϕ with shorter proofs. By the Induction Hypothesis,
2Γ `K∞∗ 2ψ and 2Γ `K∞∗ 2(ψ → ϕ). From this last deduction, applying
axiom K we get that 2Γ `K∞∗ 2ψ → 2ϕ and thus, by MP, 2Γ `K∞∗ 2ϕ.
• Suppose the last rule used for proving ϕ was G∆, i.e., ϕ ≡ ∆ψ and Γ `K∞∗
ψ. By the Induction Hypothesis 2Γ `K∞∗ 2ψ. Then, combining the rule
G∆ with Axiom (22) we get 2Γ `K∞∗ 2∆ψ.
• Suppose the last rule used for proving ϕ was R∞x for some x ∈ [0, 1]. That
is to say, ϕ = ψ → χ and Γ `K∞∗ (ψ → c) ∧ (d → χ) for each d ∈ [0, x)
and each c ∈ (x, 1]. By Induction Hypothesis this implies that 2Γ `K∞∗
2((ψ → c) ∧ (d → χ)) for each d ∈ [0, x) and each c ∈ (x, 1]. Observe
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that (2(ϕ ∧ ψ)) → (2ϕ ∧ 2ψ) is a theorem of K∗.4 Using this theorem
and Axioms (31) and (21), we have that 2Γ `K∞∗ (3ψ → c) ∧ (d→ 2χ)
for each d ∈ [0, x) and each c ∈ (x, 1]. Now, rule R∞x can be applied
to get 2Γ `K∞∗ 3ψ → 2χ. Now, using axiom FS1 it is immediate that
2Γ `K∞∗ 2(ψ → χ).

Getting to the previous result was all the motivation that lead to the proposal
and study of the alternative axiomatic systems for K∞∗ . From now on, for the
necessary proofs, we will use the axiomatic system of K∞∗ based on L
∞
∗ .
Completeness: the Canonical Model
To prove strong standard completeness of K∗ with respect to the local deduction
KF∗ we resort to a usual method (see Chapter 3). We define a [0,1]Q∗ -Kripke
model with the property that for any set of modal formulas Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm such
that Γ 6`K∗ ϕ, there is a world in the model which assigns the value 1 to all
γ ∈ Γ but a value strictly smaller than 1 to ϕ. The existence of truth constants
interpreted densely is of great importance to prove the existence of such model.
Definition 6.10. The canonical model of K∗ is the [0,1]
Q
∗ -Kripke model
M∗c = 〈W ∗c , R∗c , e∗c 〉 where
• W ∗c := {h ∈ Hom(Fm?, [0,1]Q∗ ) : h([(ThK∗)?]) ⊆ {1}};
• R∗cvw if for any ψ ∈ Fm such that v(ψ2) = 1 it holds that w(ψ?) = 1;
• e∗c (w, p) := w(p), for every p ∈ Var .
One may wonder about the above definition of R∗c as it is only depends on
the 2 modality and on formulas evaluated to 1. However as next lemmas show,
this suffices to prove the truth lemma for this canonical model.
Lemma 6.11. R∗cvw if and only if for any ψ ∈ Fm, the following inequalities
hold:
• v(ψ2) ≤ w(ψ?);
• v(ψ3) ≥ w(ψ?).
Proof. To prove the non-direct case, assume v(ψ2) > w(ψ
?) for some ψ ∈ Fm.
Then there is c ∈ C∗ such that w(ψ?) < c < v(ψ2), and so 1 = c ⇒∗ v(ψ2) =
v(c→ ψ2). Since the instances of the form (21)? belong to ThK∗)?, v evaluates
them to 1 getting that 1 = v((c → ψ)2). However, w((c → ψ)?) = c ⇒∗
w(ψ?) < 1, and so it does not hold that R∗cvw.
4From theorem (ϕ∧ψ)→ ϕ, the necessity rule and axiom K, we have that 2(ϕ∧ψ)→ 2ϕ
and the same for ψ.
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To check the second statement the reasoning is analogous. Assume that
v(ψ3) < w(ψ
?). Then, there is c ∈ C∗ such that v(ψ3) < c < w(ψ?). Then
1 = v(ψ3 → c), but by the instances of (31) this implies that 1 = v((ψ → c)2).
However, by assumption c < w(ψ?), so w(ψ? → c) < 1. Then, by definition v is
not related to w under R∗c . 
In the way of proving the Truth Lemma for the canonical model, we first
show a crucial result. Here, many of the important results proved up to now
are used, in particular Lemma 6.9 and the fact that L∞∗ and L∞∗ are strongly
standard complete with respect to [0,1]Q∗ .
Lemma 6.12. Let v ∈ W ∗c and ϕ ∈ Fm such that w(ϕ?) = 1 for all w ∈ W ∗c
such that R∗cvw. Then v(ϕ2) = 1.
Proof. Let w ∈W ∗c . Then, by definition, R∗cvw if and only if w([(ThK∗)?]) ⊆ {1}
and w(ψ?) = 1 for all ψ ∈ Fm such that v(ψ2) = 1. In other words, for any
w ∈ Hom(Fm?, [0,1]Q∗ ), R∗cvw if and only if w([(ThK∗ ∪ T )?]) ⊆ {1}, where
T = {ψ ∈ Fm : v(ψ2) = 1}.
Therefore, the hypothesis of the lemma amounts to assume (ThK∗ ∪
T )? |=[0,1]Q∗ ϕ?. By strong standard completeness of L∞∗ , it follows that
(ThK∗ ∪ T )? `L∞∗ ϕ? and then, by Lemma 6.8, T `K∗ ϕ as well.
Now Theorem 6.9 can be applied, obtaining 2T `K∗ 2ϕ. By the same
reasoning as before in the opposite sense (Lemma 6.8 and then applying strong
standard completeness), it follows that (ThK∗ ∪ 2T )? |=[0,1]Q∗ ϕ2. But then,
given that v ∈ W ∗c , it follows by definition that v([(ThK∗)?]) ⊆ {1}. On the
other hand, for each ψ ∈ T it holds that v(ψ2) = 1 too, hence v([(2T )?]) ⊆ {1}.
Therefore, since the whole set of premises is evaluated to 1, it also holds that
v(ϕ2) = 1, which concludes the proof. 
Using the density of the rational numbers within the reals, it is not hard to
get the Truth Lemma as a consequence of the previous result.
Lemma 6.13 (Truth Lemma). For any ϕ ∈ Fm and any v ∈W ∗c it holds that
e(v, ϕ) = v(ϕ?).
Proof. This can be proven by induction on the structure of the formulas, and
the only cases that are worth to be detailed are the modal ones.
To show that v(ϕ2) = inf{w(ϕ?) : R∗cvw}, first notice that by Lemma 6.11
v(ϕ2) ≤ w(ϕ?) for any w such that R∗cvw, so v(ϕ2) ≤ inf{w(ϕ?) : R∗cvw}. To
prove that v(ϕ2) ≥ inf{w(ϕ?) : R∗cvw} assume towards a contradiction that
v(ϕ2) < inf{w(ϕ?) : R∗cvw}. Then there is c ∈ C∗ such that v(ϕ2) < c < w(ϕ?)
for any w such that R∗cvw. This implies that w((c → ϕ)?) = 1 for any w such
that R∗cvw, and by Lemma 6.12 we have that v((c→ ϕ)2) = 1 as well. However,
since all instances of the form (21)? belong to ThK∗ , they are evaluated to 1
under v, so v((c → ϕ)2) = v(c → ϕ2), and hence c ⇒∗ v(ϕ2) = 1 too, which
contradicts the fact that v(ϕ2) < c.
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To show that v(ϕ3) = sup{w(ϕ?) : R∗cvw}, the proof is analogous. First, by
Lemma 6.11 v(ϕ3) ≥ w(ϕ?) for any w such that R∗cvw, so v(ϕ3) ≥ sup{w(ϕ?) :
R∗cvw}. To prove that v(ϕ3) ≤ sup{w(ϕ?) : R∗cvw} assume towards a con-
tradiction that v(ϕ3) > sup{w(ϕ?) : R∗cvw} Then there is c ∈ C∗ such that
v(ϕ3) > c > w(ϕ
?) for any w such that R∗cvw. This implies that v(ϕ3 → c) < 1
and since the instances of Axiom (31) hold in any world, v((ϕ→ c)2) < 1. On
the other hand, we also have that w(ϕ? → c) = 1 for any w such that R∗cvw.
Using Lemma 6.12, it follows that v((ϕ→ c)2) = 1, which is a contradiction. 
Having proved the Truth Lemma, it is easy to check completeness of K∗
with respect to KF∗ and in particular, with respect to subsets of this class
of models: Kripke models evaluated over linearly ordered L∞∗ -algebras, Kripke
models evaluated over [0,1]Q∗ and the particular canonical model of K∗ defined
before.
Theorem 6.14 (Strong completeness of K∗). Let ∗ be a left-continuous t-norm
accepting a conjunctive axiomatization. Then for any set of modal formulas
Γ ∪ {ϕ} the following are equivalent:
1. Γ `K∗ ϕ;
2. Γ M∗c ϕ;
3. Γ M[0,1]Q∗ ϕ, where M[0,1]
Q
∗ denotes the class of [0,1]
Q
∗ -Kripke models;5
4. Γ CK∗ ϕ, where CK∗ denotes the class of safe A-Kripke models such that
A ∈ L∞∗ is a chain;
5. Γ KF∗ ϕ.
Proof. Observe that the down-to-up implication chain from point 5. to 2. trivially
holds (since the models form a chain of inclusions), i.e., 5. =⇒ 4. =⇒ 3. =⇒ 2.
Soundness was checked before (see 6.6) for the whole KF∗ case, so 1. implies 5..
Therefore it remains to prove 2. implies 1. and the rest follows directly.
Assume Γ 6`K∗ ϕ. By Lemma 6.8, this happens if and only if Γ? ∪
(ThK∗)
? 6`L∞∗ ϕ?. By strong standard completeness of L∞∗ , then there is an
homomorphism v from Fm? into [0,1]Q∗ , such that v([(ThK∗)
?]) ⊆ {1} and
v([Γ?]) ⊆ {1} but v(ϕ?) < 1. Hence, v ∈ W ∗c and by the Truth Lemma 6.13,
e(v, [Γ]) = v([Γ?]) ⊆ {1} and e(v, ϕ) = v(ϕ?) < 1. Then M∗c |=v Γ and M∗c 6|=v ϕ,
so by definition Γ 6M∗c ϕ. 
The global modal logic
For the proof of completeness of the global modal logic K g∗ , the approach we will
follow is very similar to the one done for K∗ and in fact we will resort to results
proved in the previous section. The main difference is that of considering a more
5Observe [0,1]Q∗ is a complete algebra and so all the models defined over it are safe.
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specific definition for the canonical model. Instead of proving completeness with
respect to just one standard Kripke model as we did before (with respect to M∗c ),
the definition of the canonical model depends on the premises of the deduction.
We begin by noticing that Lemma 6.8 does not work for the K g∗ logic. Nev-
ertheless, the following obvious version will be enough for our purposes.
Remark 6.15. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. Then
Γ `K g∗ ϕ ⇐⇒ CnK g∗ (Γ)? `L∞∗ ϕ?
where for a logic L, CnL(Γ) := {ψ ∈ Fm : Γ `L ψ}.
At this point, a new definition of canonical model that depends on the set Γ
of premises of the deduction naturally arises as a generalization of M∗c .
Definition 6.16. Let Γ ⊆ Fm. The Γ-canonical model of Kg∗ is the [0,1]Q∗ -
Kripke model M∗c [Γ] = 〈W ∗c [Γ], R∗c [Γ], e∗c [Γ]〉 where
• W ∗c [Γ] := {h ∈ Hom(Fm?, [0,1]Q∗ ) : h([(CnK g∗ (Γ))?]) ⊆ {1}};
• R∗c [Γ]vw if for any ψ ∈ Fm such that v(ψ2) = 1 it holds that w(ψ?) = 1;
• e∗c [Γ](w, p) := w(p), for every p ∈ Var .
Observe that, if Γ = ∅, M∗c [Γ] coincides with the canonical model of K∗, i.e.,
with M∗c , and that clearly, (ThK∗)
? = (CnK g∗ (∅))?.
In order to check the Truth Lemma for the models defined above we will use
the tools developed for the local case. First, following the same reasoning that
in Lemma 6.11 the same conclusion for R∗c [Γ] can be reached. That is to say,
the following hold:
v(ϕ2) ≤ w(ϕ?) for each w such that R∗c [Γ]vw
v(ϕ3) ≥ w(ϕ?) for each w such that R∗c [Γ]vw
On the other hand, we can also prove the result corresponding to Lemma 6.12
in this new context using the same methods used there (and with that we mean
resorting to the local modal logic K∗ in the proof).
Lemma 6.17. Let v ∈ W ∗c [Γ] and ϕ ∈ Fm such that w(ϕ?) = 1 for all w ∈
W ∗c [Γ] such that R
∗
c [Γ]vw. Then v(ϕ2) = 1.
Proof. As reasoned in Lemma 6.12, w(ϕ?) = 1 for all w ∈ W ∗c [Γ] such that
R∗c [Γ]vw is equivalent to have that T
? ∪ (CnK g∗ (Γ))? |=[0,1]Q∗ ϕ?, for T = {ψ ∈
Fm : v(ψ2) = 1}. Since (ThK∗)? ⊆ (CnK g∗ (Γ))?, we can apply Theorem 6.8
(after using strong standard completeness) and get that T ∪CnK g∗ (Γ) `K∗ ϕ. As
in Lemma 6.12, it is now enough to apply Theorems 6.9 and 6.8 and finally, stan-
dard completeness again, to get (2T )? ∪ (2CnK g∗ (Γ))? |=[0,1]Q∗ ϕ2. But now ob-
serve that v([(2T )?]) ⊆ {1} by the definition of T . Moreover, since deductions in
K g∗ are closed under 2 (immediate by the N
g
2 rule), (2CnK g∗ (Γ))
? ⊆ (CnK g∗ (Γ))?,
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so by the definition of the worlds in the Γ-canonical model, (2CnK g∗ (Γ))
? is eval-
uated into {1} in any world of the model (and in particular, in v). Then we can
conclude that v(ϕ2) = 1. 
From here on, the proof of the Truth Lemma for M∗c [Γ] is the same as the
one from Lemma 6.13 and is easy to conclude the completeness results for K g∗ .
Theorem 6.18 (Strong completeness of K g∗ ). Let ∗ be a left-continuous t-norm
accepting a conjunctive axiomatization. Then for any set of modal formulas
Γ ∪ {ϕ} the following are equivalent:
1. Γ `K g∗ ϕ;
2. Γ gM∗c [Γ] ϕ;
3. Γ g
M[0,1]Q∗
ϕ, where M[0,1]Q∗ denotes the class of [0,1]
Q
∗ -Kripke models;
4. Γ gCK∗ ϕ, where CK∗ denotes the class of safe A-Kripke models such that
A ∈ L∞∗ is a chain;
5. Γ gKF∗ ϕ.
Proof. Observe that Γ 6`K g∗ ϕ if and only if (by the remark above) CnK g∗ (Γ)? 6`L∞∗
ϕ?, i.e., if there is an homomorphism v from Fm? to [0,1]Q∗ such that
v([CnK g∗ (Γ)
?] ⊆ {1} (and thus, v ∈ W ∗c [Γ] by definition) such that v(ϕ?) < 1.
Appart from this fact, the rest of the proof is analogous to the one followed in
the one concerning the completeness of the local logic (Theorem 6.14) 
6.3 Extensions and further properties
Along the study of the logics K∗ and K
g
∗ several interesting results have been
found, either concerning these logics or referring to extensions of them. We
will present within this section the main observations about the behaviour and
characteristics of the modal logics defined in the previous sections and later we
will present some results concerning some usual axiomatic extensions of them.
Interdefinability of 2 and 3
It seems clear that the usual interdefinability of 2 and 3 in this more general
context does not exist in general. We can easily build a [0,1]QΠ-Kripke model
where 2ϕ 6= ¬3¬ϕ. Simply let W = N and R = {〈0, n + 1〉 : n ∈ N} and
let e(n + 1, p) = 1n+1 (and for instance, e(0, p) = 1). Clearly, e(0,3¬p) = 0,
because for all n > 0, e(n, p) > 0. Thus, e(0,¬3¬p) = 1, but, on the other
hand, e(0,2p) = 0.
There are some special cases where the usual interdefinability keeps holding.
For instance, the class of Kripke models built over IMTLs, i.e., the left continuous
t-norms whose negation is involutive (for instance, the  Lukasiewicz t-norm).
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Indeed, since for all c it holds that 2(ϕ → c) ↔ (3ϕ → c) (Axiom (31)), in
the particular case of c = 0 this leads to 2¬ϕ ↔ ¬3ϕ. Having an involutive
negation, this can be equivalently written as ¬2¬ϕ↔ 3ϕ, that gives a definition
of 3 in terms of formulas without the 3 operation. Similarly, in these t-norms
it holds that 2ϕ↔ ¬3¬ϕ, since ¬3¬ϕ↔ 2(¬¬ϕ) (by Axiom Diamond1 again)
and here the involutive behaviour of ¬ can be used.
Out of the scope of the IMTL class, results concerning interdefinability are
not so clear. It is possible, however, to get partial characterizations of 2 in
terms of formulas without the 2 operation and similarly for 3, using the truth
constants. We will do this analysing Axiom (31), which is the only axiom of K∗
and K g∗ that relates the 2 and 3 operators.
For similarity with respect to the IMTL case, we will denote by ¬c to the
definable unary operation given by ¬cϕ := ϕ → c. It is natural now that if
¬c behaves in an involutive way over 3ϕ we can define 3ϕ as ¬c2¬cϕ and
similarly, if 2¬c¬cϕ equals 2ϕ (semantically, ¬c is invoutive over ϕ in all the
successors), we have that 2ϕ can be written as ¬c2¬cϕ. It is not hard to see
that ϕ→ ¬c¬cϕ is a theorem of K∗ for any left-continuous t-norm ∗.
However, not for any left-continuous t-norm and any value a on [0, 1] exists
a rational constant c such that ¬c¬ca = a. For instance, it is clear that for what
concerns the Go¨del t-norm,
¬c¬ca =
{
1 if c > a
c if c ≤ a
for an arbitrary rational c and so for any irrational value i ∈ [0, 1], there is no
rational c for which ¬c¬ci = i. We can give some conditions on the t-norm that
will allow to study a class of left-continuous t-norms from this point of view.
The following is a notion that allows us to uniformly study certain involutive
operations and interdefinability of operations using them.
Definition 6.19. We say that a left-continuous t-norm ∗ is quasi-involutive
whenever for any x ∈ [0, 1] and any c ∈ C∗, if x > c and x ⇒∗ c > c then
((x⇒∗ c)⇒∗ c) = x.
Some examples of quasi-involutive left-continuous t-norms are the product
t-norm, the  Lukasiewicz t-norm, and arbitrary ordinal sums of these two com-
ponents. Thus, we can talk about the left-continuous t-norms accepting a con-
junctive axiomatization (which are the t-norms that have been studied in this
chapter) and that are, moreover, quasi-involutive. In fact, concerning the con-
tinuous t-norms, these two classes are the same. Moreover, for a left-continuous
t-norm ∗, the notion of quasi-involutive can be equivalently characterized with
the elements of the algebra (instead of those from C∗.
For quasi-involutive t-norms it is possible to characterize a partial interde-
finability of the modal operators, based on the constants.
Lemma 6.20. Let ∗ be a quasi-involutive left-continuous t-norm that moreover
accepts a conjunctive axiomatization. Then the following formulas are theorems
of K∗.
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1. (¬∆2¬cϕ ∧ ¬∆¬c2¬cϕ)→ (3ϕ↔ ¬c2¬cϕ)
2. (¬3∆¬cϕ ∧3¬∆¬c¬cϕ)→ (2ϕ↔ ¬c3¬cϕ).
Proof. We will prove these statement resorting to the completeness of K∗ with
respect to the local modal logic over the crisp [0,1]Q∗ -Kripke models. Let M be
a crisp [0, 1]∗-Kripke model and v be a world of its universe.
Concerning the first implication, observe that the premise is a bi-valued term,
i.e., v(¬∆2¬cϕ∧¬∆¬c2¬cϕ) = 1 if and only if v(2¬cϕ) < 1 and v(¬c2¬cϕ) <
1, and it equals 0 otherwise (making the implication trivially true). In the first
case, from the definition of ¬c and Axiom (31) it follows that v(3ϕ) > c and
v(3ϕ)⇒∗ c > c. Since ∗ is quasi-involutive this implies that v(¬c¬c3ϕ) = 3ϕ.
On the other hand, again using Axiom (31) we get that v(¬c2¬cϕ) =
v(¬c¬c3ϕ) and from the above reasoning this is equal to v(3ϕ).
For the second implication, we can observe as before that the premise of the
implication is a bi-valued formula: v(¬3∆¬cϕ ∧3¬∆¬c¬cϕ) = 1 if and only if
v(3∆¬cϕ) = 0 and v(3¬∆¬c¬cϕ) = 1 and it equals 0 otherwise.6 In the first
case, v(3∆¬cϕ) = 0 if and only if for all w such that Rvw, w(∆¬cϕ) = 0 and so
if and only if for all such w, w(ϕ) > c. On the other hand, v(3¬∆¬c¬cϕ) = 1
means by definition that sup{w(¬∆¬c¬cϕ) : Rvw} = 1 and by the definition
of ∆ this implies that there exists w0 with Rvw0 such that w0(¬∆¬c¬cϕ) = 1.
This leads to have that w0(ϕ) ⇒∗ c > c and more in general, that for all u
such that Rvu and such that u(ϕ) ≤ w0(ϕ) it holds that u(ϕ)⇒∗ c > c. Then,
applying that ∗ is quasi-involutive we have that for all u such that Rvu and
u(ϕ) ≤ w0(ϕ), it holds that u(¬c¬cϕ) = u(ϕ).
We can split the successor worlds of v in terms of w0(ϕ), i.e.,
v(2¬c¬cϕ) = inf{w(¬c¬cϕ) : Rvw and w(ϕ) ≤ w0(ϕ)} ∧ inf{w(¬c¬cϕ) :
Rvw and w(ϕ) > w0(ϕ)}. From the previous reasoning we have that
inf{w(¬c¬cϕ) : Rvw and w(ϕ) ≤ w0(ϕ)} = inf{w(ϕ) : Rvw and w(ϕ) ≤
w0(ϕ)}. On the other hand, since ϕ→ ¬c¬cϕ is a theorem of the logic we know
that inf{w(ϕ) : Rvw and w(ϕ) > w0(ϕ)} ≤ inf{w(¬c¬cϕ) : Rvw and w(ϕ) >
w0(ϕ)} and so clearly inf{w(ϕ) : Rvw and w(ϕ) ≤ w0(ϕ)} ≤ inf{w(ϕ) :
Rvw and w(ϕ) > w0(ϕ)} ≤ inf{w(¬c¬cϕ) : Rvw and w(ϕ) > w0(ϕ)}. Then
we can write that v(2¬c¬cϕ) = inf{w(ϕ) : Rvw}, so v(2¬c¬cϕ) = v(2ϕ). Now
it is immediate to see that, applying Axiom (31), v(2¬c¬cϕ) = v(¬c3¬cϕ),
concluding the proof. 
On the Finite Model Property
Another remarkable difference of the modal expansions of logics arising from a
left-continuous t-norm with respect to the most general classical modal logic K
is that the finite model property does no longer hold. We remarked in Chapter
6Indeed, v(3∆¬cϕ) > 0 implies that there is w such that Rvw where w(∆¬cϕ) > 0, that
is to say, w(∆¬cϕ) = 1. But then, v(3∆¬cϕ) = 1 too and thus v(¬3∆¬cϕ) = 0. Similarly
if v(3¬∆¬c¬cϕ) < 1 then for all w such that Rvw it hods that w(¬∆¬c¬cϕ) < 1 and thus
w(∆¬c¬cϕ) > 0. Then for such that w as before, w(∆¬c¬cϕ) = 1 and so w(¬∆¬c¬cϕ) = 0.
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3 that this was first observed for the case of the modal expansions of Go¨del logic
(see [24]), while in other works dealing with modal expansions of finitely-valued
logics, the finite model property holds.
In the modal logics we have defined, depending on the t-norm defining the
semantics, there exist formulas that are valid in the all finite frames while they
are not theorems of the logic. Moreover, the use of ∆ allows even more linguistic
flexibility and we can prove that no left-continuous t-norm gives rise to a modal
logic with finite model property (that is, considering the modal logic with ∆ and
rational constants).
A simple example can be given, instead of using theorems (where the fact of
considering non-linear L∞∗ -algebras could lead to confusion), using deductions
that are valid over all the finite frames and not in general. Consider the following
case
2p→ c ` 3∆(p→ c)
c→ 3p ` 3∆(c→ p)
for any c ∈ [0, 1)Q. Indeed, for an arbitrary A ∈ GQ([0,1]Q∗ ), at any finite A-
Kripke model M and any state w ∈W , the premise of the first deduction holds
if and only if e(w,2p) = inf{e(v, p) : Rwv} ≤ cA. In particular, e(w,2p) < 1,
so there is some v ∈ W with Rvw. Since the model has a finite number of
states it holds that inf{e(v, p) : Rwv} = min{e(v, p) : Rwv} and so there must
exist v ∈ W such that Rwv and e(v, p) ≤ cA. This implies that e(w,3∆(p →
c)) = 1
A
. However, consider M the [0,1]Q∗ -Kripke model with universe N, with
R =
⋃
n≥1{〈0, n〉} and such that e(n + 1, p) = c + 1n+1 . It is clear that M, 0 
2p→ c, but it also hods that for any n ∈ N \ {0} (that is, all successors of 0 in
the model) e(n, p) > c and thus e(n,∆(p→ c) = 0 and so e(0,3∆(p→ c)) = 0.
The second example can be understood with an analogous reasoning.
It might seem that adding the previous set of deductions to the axiomatic
system as inference rules could lead to a logic with finite model property (even if
it would not be the minimum modal logic). However, observe that the previous
deductions impose the notion of witness but only for the modal formulas and
states of the model in which these modal formulas are evaluated by a rational
number. When this is not the case (for instance, let i ∈ [0, 1] \ C∗ and consider
a case where e(v,2p → c) = 1 for all c ∈ (i, 1] ∩ C∗ and e(v, d → 2p) for all
c ∈ [0, i) ∩ C∗), the previous rules do not imply the existence of a witness.
We consider this problem to be of great interest, since it offers a natural way
of proving decidability of the addressed logics (concerning finitary deductions).
However, we have not been able to find a suitable way, if it exists, to prove
decidability of satisfiability, validity or consequence for the logics studied along
this chapter. The approach followed in [21] does not seem to be applicable in
our context. Nevertheless, it seems one of the more interesting approaches that
should be taken into consideration when trying to solve the decidability problem.
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Some usual axiomatic extensions
As it happens in classical modal logic, it is interesting to know which axiom
schemata correspond to conditions over the frames and vice-versa, which classes
of frames have an axiomatic representation, as an extension of K∗ (or K
g
∗ ). In
general, this problem has a deep complexity, and we have not studied it for an
arbitrary class of frames or formulas. Hansoul and Teheux study this problem in
[78], in the case of the modal expansions of  Lukasiewicz logic. However, it is not
clear whether the methods used there can be applied in the more general problem
of Kripke models evaluated over arbitrary L∞∗ -algebras, since some important
characteristics of  Lukasiewicz logic and MV -algebras do not hold in this new
context.
Nevertheless, we have studied how or the most usual classes of frames (in the
sense of having particular restrictions over the accessibility relation) are linked
to their corresponding axiom schematas, also in the more general our case of
many-valued models.
The main axioms and properties we are referring to are those from Table
3.1, from Chapter 3. We have already seen that the K axiom is valid in all the
(crisp) many-valued Kripke models. On the other hand, concerning the other
properties in the table, for p ∈ {D, T ,B, 5 , 4} we denote by KF∗P the class of
∗-Kripke structures that enjoy the property P . Then, for Ax ⊆ {D, T ,B, 5 , 4},
we let KF∗Ax =
⋂
P∈Ax KF∗
P . Analogously, for Ax ⊆ {(D), (T), (B), (5), (4)} we
will denote by K∗Ax the logic obtained by extending K∗ with the set of axioms
in Ax . It is obvious there is a 1-1 relation between subsets of structural axioms
Ax and subsets of properties Ax, relating each axiom with its correspondent
property over the Kripke models. Moreover, it is not hard to prove that indeed
this relation preserves the completeness of the extensions with respect to the
classes of models that enjoy the corresponding properties.
Theorem 6.21. Let Ax ⊆ {(D), (T), (B), (5), (4)} and Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. Then
Γ `K∗Ax ϕ if and only if Γ |=KF∗Ax ϕ.
Proof. Since the axioms from Ax are clearly valid with respect to their corre-
sponding frame conditions (by definition), stated in Ax, it is enough to check
the soundness using the canonical model. For that, it is enough to define a
canonical model MAxc for K∗
Ax by letting its universe be WAxc := {w ∈ Wc :
w([ThK∗Ax ]) ⊆ {1}}. The completeness of K∗Ax with respect to this canonical
model is direct, by the Truth Lemma 6.13 To see that the extension is complete
with respect to the class of models that enjoy a certain set of properties, it is
enough to check that for each axiom in A, the canonical model MAxc enjoys the
corresponding property. We will detail two cases, the rest can be done similarly.
1. Assume D ∈ Ax . Suppose towards a contradiction that there is v ∈WAxc ,
for which there is no w ∈ WAxc such that RAxc vw. Then, by definition it
holds that v(20) = 1 and v(30) = 0, but this contradicts axiom (D), so
MAxc is serial.
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2. Assume T ∈ Ax . Suppose towards a contradiction that there is v ∈ WAxc
such that it does not hold that RAxc vv, i.e., by definition of the canoni-
cal relation, there is θ ∈ Fm such that v(2θ) = 1 but v(θ) < 1. This
contradicts axiom (T), so MAxc is reflexive.
3. Assume B ∈ Ax . Suppose towards a contradiction that there are v, w ∈
WAxc such that R
Ax
c vw but it does not hold that R
Ax
c vw (i.e., that the
model is not symmetric). Then, by definition of the accesibility relation
of the canonical model, there is a formula ϕ such that e(w,2ϕ) = 1 but
e(v, ϕ) < 1. But then, e(v,32ϕ) ≥ e(w,2ϕ) = 1, but e(v, ϕ) < 1,
contradicting axiom B.
4. Assume 5 ∈ Ax and suppose towards a contradiction that there are
v, w, u ∈ WAxc such that RAxc vw and RAxc vu but where it does not hold
that RAxc wu (that is to say, that the canonical model is not serial). By
definition, this means that there is a formula ϕ such that e(w,2ϕ) = 1
and e(u, ϕ) < 1. Then, it follows that e(v,32ϕ) = 1 and e(v,2ϕ) < 1.
But this contradicts axiom 5.
5. Assume 4 ∈ Ax and suppose towards a contradiction that there are
v, w, u ∈ WAxc such that RAxc vw and RAxc wu but where it does not hold
that RAxc vu (that is to say, that the canonical model is not transitive).
By definition, this means that there is a formula ϕ such that e(v,2ϕ) = 1
and e(u, ϕ) < 1. This implies that e(v,22ϕ) ≤ e(w,2ϕ) ≤ e(u, ϕ) < 1.
However, this contradicts axiom 4.

6.4 Possibilistic many-valued logic
It is not in the scope of this dissertation to study fuzzy modal logics defined over
non-crisp Kripke frames, that is, Kripke frames 〈W,R〉 where the accessibility
relation R is a fuzzy relation R : W×W → A valued in an arbitrary L∗∞-algebra
A (for ∗ accepting a conjunctive axiomatization). The gap between the crisp
MTL modal logics that have been studied in this chapter and these non-crisp
modal logics is quite big (we comment this on Section 12.3 on future work).
However, there is a particular kind of non-crisp modal logic over MTL algebras
that can be studied with the tools developed in this paper, namely logics with
possibilistic semantics. This is so thanks to the special characteristics of the
accesibility relation of these logics.
Possibilistic logic (see e.g. [44, 45]) is a well-known uncertainty logic for
reasoning with graded beliefs on classical propositions by means of necessity
and possiblity measures. It deals with weighted formulas (ϕ, r), where ϕ is a
classical proposition and r ∈ [0, 1] is a weight, interpreted as a lower bound for
the necessity degree of ϕ. The semantics of these degrees is defined in terms of
possibility distributions pi : Ω → [0, 1] on the set Ω of classical interpretations
124 Chapter 6. Many-valued modal logics: K∗ and K
g
∗
of a given propositional language. A possibility distribution pi on Ω ranks inter-
pretations according to its plausibility level: pi(w) = 0 means that w is rejected,
pi(w) = 1 means that w is fully plausible, while pi(w) < pi(w′) means that w′ is
more plausible than w. A possibility distribution pi : Ω→ [0, 1] induces a pair of
dual possibility and necessity measures on propositions, defined respectively as:
Π(ϕ) := sup{pi(w) | w ∈ Ω, w(ϕ) = 1}
N(ϕ) := inf{1− pi(w) | w ∈ Ω, w(ϕ) = 0}.
They are dual in the sense that Π(ϕ) = 1 − N(¬ϕ) for every proposition ϕ.
From a logical point of view, possibilistic logic can be seen as a sort of graded
extension of the non-nested fragment of the well-known modal logic of belief
KD45 .
When we go beyond the classical framework of Boolean algebras of events to
generalized algebras of many-valued events, one has to come up with appropriate
extensions of the notion of necessity and possibility measures for many-valued
events, as explored in [43]. A natural generalization is to consider Ω as the set
of propositional interpretations of some many-valued calculi defined by a t-norm
 and its residuum ⇒. Then, a possibility distribution pi : Ω → [0, 1] induces
the following generalized possibility and necessity measures over many-valued
propositions:
Π(ϕ) := sup{pi(w) w(ϕ) | w ∈ Ω}
N(ϕ) := inf{pi(w)⇒ w(ϕ) | w ∈ Ω}.
Actually, these definitions agree with the ones commonly used in many-valued
modal logics with Kripke semantics based on frames (W,R) with R being a
[0, 1]-valued binary relations R : W ×W → [0, 1] (see for example [18]), in the
particular case where the many-valued accessibility relations R are of the form
R(w,w′) = pi(w′), for some possibility distributions pi : W → [0, 1]. In the frame
of this paper, we generalize this possibilistic semantics by replacing the unit real
interval [0, 1] by an arbitrary MTL algebra.
The set of formulas over the language of the L∞∗ logic expanded with two
unary operators, N and Π, will be denoted by FmPos∗ and we will refer to them
as possibilistic formulas.
Definition 6.22. Let A be a L∞∗ -algebra. An A-possibilistic model is a
structure 〈W,pi, e〉 such that
• W is a non-empty set of worlds;
• pi : W → A is a A-valued possibility distribution;
• e : W × Var → A is an evaluation of variables in each world. It extends
to all the formulas by interpreting the propositional connectives by the
corresponding operations of A and the possibilistic operations by
e(v,Πϕ) = sup
w∈W
(pi(w) e(w,ϕ)} e(v,Nϕ) = inf
w∈W
(pi(w)⇒ e(w,ϕ)}.
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Again, if these latter two values exist for any formula in any world, the
model is called safe. The class of safe Possibilistic models over L∞∗ -algebras will
be denoted by Pos∗. For Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmPos∗ , we will write Γ Pos∗ ϕ whenever
for any M ∈ Pos∗ and any w ∈W , e(w, [Γ]) ⊆ {1} implies that e(w,ϕ) = 1.
For the sake of uniformity with the notation used in existing literature, from now
on we will denote KF∗{T ,5} (i.e., the set of reflexive and euclidean safe ∗-models,
using the notation introduced in the previous section) by S5∗ and K∗{T,5} by
S5∗, the logic which is strongly complete with respect to that class of models.
In [76], it is shown how a possibilistic modal logic over a finitely-valued
 Lukasiewicz logic can be embedded in a S5-like extension (with axioms (K), (T)
and (5)) over a language extended with a new propositional variable ρ, playing
the special role of the possibility distribution. We follow the same idea here for
arbitrary L∞∗ -algebras.
Let ? be the translation from FmPos∗ (built from a set Var of propositional
variables) to the set of modal7 formulas built from Var ∪ {ρ}, with {ρ} a new
fresh variable not in Var , defined as:
c? := c, p? := p for p ∈ Var
(ϕ&ψ)? := ϕ?&ψ?
(ϕ→ ψ)? := ϕ? → ψ?
(∆ϕ)? := ∆ϕ?
(Nϕ)? := 2(ρ→ ϕ?)
(Πϕ)? := 3(ρ&ϕ?).
Theorem 6.23. For any set of possibilistic formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} it holds that
Γ Pos∗ ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ? S5∗ ϕ?.
Proof. First, given M = 〈W,pi, e〉 ∈ Pos∗, a model M′ = 〈W ′, R′, e′〉 ∈ S5∗
can be defined by taking W ′ = W , R′ = W × W , e′(v, p) = e(v, p) for
all p ∈ Var and e′(v, ρ) = pi(v). By the definition of the evaluation of the
modal formulas in a possibilistic model, and the behaviour of the transla-
tion ? over them, it is immediate to see, by induction on the length of the
formula, that the evaluations coincide, that is, e(v, ψ) = e′(v, ψ?) for any
ψ ∈ FmPos∗ . Take for instance the possibilistic formula Nχ. By definition,
e(v,Nχ) = infw∈W (pi(w) ⇒∗ e(w,χ)} = infw∈W {e′(w, ρ) ⇒∗ e(w,χ)}. By the
induction hypothesis, this is equal to infw∈W {e′(w, ρ) ⇒∗ e′(w,χ?)} and thus,
to infw∈W {e′(w, ρ→ χ?)} = e′(v,2(ρ→ χ?)) = e′(v, (Nχ)?).
Conversely, given a model M ∈ S5ast, define M′ ∈ PosΠ by letting W ′ = W ,
pi(v) = e(v, ρ) and e′(v, p) = e(v, p) for all p ∈ Var and v ∈ W . Then it is also
easy to check, again by induction, that e(v, ψ?) = e′(v, ψ) for all ψ ∈ FmPos∗
and v ∈ W . Similarly as before, consider the case where ψ = Nχ, that is,
ψ? = 2(ρ → χ?). Then, by definition, e(v,2(ρ → χ?) = infw∈W {e(w, ρ →
χ?)} = infw∈W {e(w, ρ) ⇒∗ e(w,χ?)} = infw∈W {pi(w) ⇒∗ e(w,χ?)}. By the
induction hypothesis, this is equal to infw∈W {pi(w)⇒∗ e′(w,χ)} which is equal,
by definition, to e′(v,Nχ). 
7With usual 2 and 3 operators.
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This directly provides a completeness theorem for the possibilistic logic over
L∞∗ -algebras, which implicitly proposes an axiomatization of this logic, over an
extended language.
Corollary 6.24 (Possibilistic strong completeness). For any set of possibilistic
formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ( ⊆ FmPos∗)




In this chapter we study the algebraic semantics of the modal systems K∗ and
K g∗ presented in the previous chapter. We consider the understanding of this
algebraic semantics can, among other things, bring light to the axiomatization of
more general many-valued logics, like for instance those corresponding to Kripke
models with a fuzzy accesibility relation, or to previous logics without rational
constants.
After defining an algebraic semantics in Section 7.1, in Section 7.2 we deepen
on the relation between the two semantics obtained for the modal logics, namely
between the Kripke semantics and the Algebraic semantics. To conclude we
present in Section 7.3 we present an algebraic completeness result of the logic
K∗ with respect to the order preserving logics over the algebraic semantics of
K∗.
7.1 Algebraic semantics of K∗ and GK∗
For the algebraic semantics of K∗ and K
g
∗ it is natural to consider the class of
algebras obtained through the expansion of the L∞∗ -algebras
1 by modal opera-
tors that satisfy the equations induced by the axioms in M . The deduction rules
will affect the definition of the deductive filters.
Definition 7.1. An algebra A = 〈A,,⇒,∧, δA,2,3, {cA}c∈C∗〉 is a (modal)
K∗-algebra with (rational) constants and ∆ whenever
A = 〈A,,⇒,∧, δA, {cA}c∈C∗〉
is a L∞∗ algebra and the following equations hold in A:
(EK) 2(x→ y)→ (2x→ 2y) ≈ 1;
1Recall this class coincides with the generalized quasi-variety generated by [0,1]Q∗ .
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(E21) 2(x→ c) ≈ 3x→ c, for every c ∈ C∗ ;
(E31) 2(c→ x) ≈ c→ 2x, for every c ∈ C∗ ;
(E22) ∆2x→ 2∆x ≈ 1;
(EFS1) (3x→ 2y)→ 2(x→ y) ≈ 1
(EN2) 21 ≈ 1;
We will denote by K∗ the class of K∗-agebras, and for each A ∈ K∗, A will
denote its non-modal reduct.
A modal evaluation e over a modal K∗-algebra A is an homomorphism
from the algebra of modal formulas (with ∆ and rational constants) into A.
From now on, unless stated otherwise, Fm stands for the algebra of modal
formulas.
From the general definition of filter we know that, for what concerns the
propositional (non-modal) logic L∞∗ we can characterize the the L
∞
∗ -filters over
a L∞∗ -algebra A by the subsets F ⊆ A that
- 1
A ∈ F ,
- If x ∈ F and x⇒ y ∈ F then y ∈ F ,
- If x ∈ F then δAx ∈ F ,
- If (x⇒ cA) ∨ (cA ⇒ y) ∈ F for all c ∈ (0, 1)Q then x⇒ y ∈ F ,
In the local modal logic K∗, it follows from the definition of logical filter
that the K∗-filters over a modal K∗-algebra A coincide with the L∞∗ -filters on
A that are also closed under N2 (i.e., 21
A ∈ F ). On the other hand, for the
global modal logic we get that the K g∗ -filters on a modal K∗-algebra A are the
L∞∗ -filters on A closed under N
g
2 (i.e., if x ∈ F then 2x ∈ F , that is to say, F
is open).
Then, we can characterize more clearly the filters of K∗ and K
g
∗ over a modal
K∗-algebra A ∈ K∗.
Lemma 7.2. Given A ∈ K∗ and F ⊆ A
• F is a filter of K∗ over A if and only if F ∈ FiL∞∗ (A).
• F is a filter of K g∗ over A if and only if F ∈ FiL∞∗ (A) and F is an open
set.
It is routine to prove that {1A} is a filter of both K∗ and K∞∗ logics over all
A ∈ K∗.
Algebraic completeness of the global modal logic
It turns out that the classification of the global modal logic K g∗ in the Leibniz
Hierachy is now quite immediate, just by checking the definition of algebraizable
logic (Definition 1.7).
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Lemma 7.3. K g∗ is algebraizable with algebraic semantics K∗, with equivalence
formulas ∆(x, y) := {x↔ y} and with defining equations E(x) = {x ≈ 1}.
It is an obvious remark that Alg∗K g∗ = K∗.
From this it follows that the class of reduced models of Lg∗ is given by logical
matrices of the form 〈A, {1A}〉 for A ∈ K∗∞. We can then resort to the usual
notation of semantic deduction in an algebra. For an arbitrary set of formulas
Γ ∪ {ϕ} and A a modal K∗-algebra we write Γ |=A ϕ whenever for any modal
evaluation e over A, if e(Γ) ⊆ {1A} then e(ϕ) = 1A.
For later uses, we also consider the following more particular definition. For
an arbitrary set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, A a modal K∗-algebra and e a modal
evaluation over A, we write Γ |=A,e ϕ whenever, if e(Γ) ⊆ {1A} then e(ϕ) = 1A.
Theorem 7.4 (Algebraic completeness of K g∗ ). Let ∗ be a left-continuous t-
norm accepting a conjunctive axiomatization. For any set of modal formulas
Γ ∪ {ϕ}
Γ `K g∗ ϕ iff Γ |=K∗ ϕ.
This fact, together with the Isomorphism Theorem 1.8, ensures that for every
modal K∗-algebra A, the mappings
ρ+ : FiK g∗ (A)←→ CoK∗(A) : τ+,
defined respectively as
ρ+(F ) = ΩAF and τ+(θ) = 1/θ
for every F ∈ FiK g∗ (A) and θ ∈ CoK∗(A), are complete lattice isomorphisms
with one being the inverse of the other. We will make use of this isomorphism
in the study of the local modal logic (given that the algebraic companion will
be proven to be also K∗).
Algebraic completeness of the local modal logic
Concerning the local modal logic K∗, we begin by proving a property weaker
than being algebraizable.
Lemma 7.5. K∗ is equivalential with congruence formulas ∆(x, y) ≡ {2n(x↔
y)}n∈ω, where 2nϕ = 22n−1ϕ for n > 0 and 20ϕ = ϕ.
Proof. It suffices to see that ∆(x, y) meets the first condition of Lemma 1.9 for
K∗. It is routine to prove this using the already proven completeness of K∗ with
respect to the local logic over the class of crisp Kripke models over the standard
L∞∗ -algebra. 
This characterization classifies K∗ within the Leibniz hierarchy, and moreover
it is important for checking that the class K∗ of modal K∗-algebras is indeed the
algebraic semantics of the logic K∗.
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Lemma 7.6. Alg∗K∗ = K∗.
Proof. Let A ∈ K∗. Taking into account that {1A} is a filter of K∗ on A,
by (2) of Lemma 1.9, 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩA{1A} iff ∆(a, b) ⊆ {1A}. In particular, this
implies that (a ⇔ b) = 1A and so a = b. Therefore, ΩA{1A} = IdA and thus,
〈A, {1A}〉 ∈Mod∗K∗.
For the converse inclusion, we know that A ∈ Alg∗K∗ if and only if there
exists F ∈ FiK∗(A) for which ΩAF = IdA. To see that A ∈ K∗ if A ∈ Alg∗K∗
we have to check that the equations and quasiequations that define K∗ hold in
A as well.
Each equation αi ≈ βi corresponding to one of the identities that must hold
in an algebra belonging to K∗ comes from an associated axiom αi ↔ βi of K∗
(in general, of the form αi ↔ 1). By the (N2) rule, it follows that 2n(αi ↔ βi)
is also a theorem of the logic for each n ∈ ω and so for any h ∈ Hom(Fm,A)
it holds that ∆(h(αi), h(βi)) ⊆ F , with ∆ being the set of congruence formulas
of K∗ defined in the previous lemma. By (2) of Lemma 1.9, it follows that
〈h(αi), h(βi)〉 ∈ ΩAF for all h ∈ Hom(Fm,A) and given that by assumption
ΩAF = IdA, it must hold that h(αi) = h(βi) for all h ∈ Hom(Fm,A) (so
A |= αi ≈ βi).
For the generalized quasiequation (Q) the proof is similar using that the
filters are closed under the infinitary rule D∞. First observe that D∞ can be
equally written as
{((p→ c) ∨ (c→ q))↔ 1}c∈C∗
(p→ q)↔ 1 .
By Theorem 6.9 it follows that for any n ∈ ω, the following deduction is valid
in K∗
{2n(((p→ c) ∨ (c→ q))↔ 1)}c∈C∗
2n((p→ q)↔ 1) .
By definition, filters of K∗ are closed under valid deductions, so for any a, b ∈ A
and n ∈ ω,
if {2n(((a⇒ cA) ∨ (cA ⇒ b))⇔ 1A)}c∈C∗ ⊆ F then 2n((a⇒ b)⇔ 1A) ∈ F.
(7.1)
To see that Q holds in A, let a, b ∈ A be such that (a ⇒ cA) ∨ (cA ⇒ b) = 1A
for all c ∈ C∗.
Since ΩAF = IdA, 〈(a ⇒ cA) ∨ (cA ⇒ b), 1A〉 ∈ ΩAF for all c ∈ C∗. Given
that K∗ is equivalential with the congruence formulas given in Lemma 7.5, this
is happens if and only if {2n(((a ⇒ cA) ∨ (cA ⇒ b)) ⇔ 1A)}c∈C∗ ⊆ F . From
(7.1) it follows that {2n((a ⇒ b) ⇔ 1A)}n∈ω ⊆ F , i.e., ∆A(a ⇒ b, 1A) ⊆ F .
Following the same reasoning as before this is equivalent to 〈a⇒ b, 1A〉 ∈ ΩAF ,
and so to (a⇒ b) = 1A in A, which concludes the proof. 
It is not hard to prove that, as in the case for the local classical modal logic,
K∗ is not algebraizable. It can be proven as a consequence of the fact that
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the classes of algebras associated to K∗ and K
g
∗ coincide. There is a well known
result from abstract algebraic logic that states that two algebraizable logics with
re same algebraic semantics are either incomparable or they coincide. But on
the one hand we know that K∗ and K
g
∗ are comparable: for any set of formulas
Γ ∪ {ϕ} it holds that
Γ `K∗ ϕ =⇒ Γ `K g∗ ϕ.
On the other hand, we know they do not coincide (for instance, ϕ `K g∗ 2ϕ but
ϕ 6`K∗ 2ϕ), so it follows that K∗ is not algebraizable (since K g∗ was proven to
be so in Lemma 7.3.
We can also provide a constructive prove of this fact, obtaining a result
analogous to the one from the local classical modal logic. We show this con-
struction as an alternative proof (with respect to the previous more immediate
non-constructive method) for proving the following result.
Lemma 7.7. K∗ is not algebraizable.
Proof. For the sake of a simpler notation, in this proof we let CnX = {θ ∈ Fm :
X `K∗ θ}, and we will write Ω to denote the Leibniz operator ΩFm over the
formula algebra.
It is clear that for x, y ∈ Var ⊆ Fm such that x 6= y, we have {x, y} 6`K∗
2(x ↔ y) and so in particular, ∆(x, y) 6⊆ Cn{x, y}. From the definition of
equivalential logic and Lemma 1.10 it follows that 〈x, y〉 6∈ ΩCn{x, y}, which in
particular proves that Cn{x, y}/ΩCn{x, y} has at least two different elements:
x/ΩCn{x, y} and y/ΩCn{x, y}.
For simplicity, let A denote Fm/ΩCn{x, y}. Since Cn{x, y} ∈ FiK∗Fm it
follows that ΩA(Cn{x, y}/ΩCn{x, y}) = IdA and so
〈A, Cn{x, y}/ΩCn{x, y}〉 ∈Mod∗K∗,
which implies that A ∈ Alg∗K∗ = K∗. We know that {1A} is a filter of K∗ over
A, so 1
A
/ΩCn{x, y} ∈ FiK∗(A). Now, by Lemma 1.10, we have that
ΩA(1
A
/ΩCn{x, y}) ⊆ ΩA(Cn{x, y}/ΩCn{x, y}) = IdA,
and so ΩA(1
A
/ΩCn{x, y}) = IdA as well. Then, both
〈A, Cn{x, y}/ΩCn{x, y}〉 and 〈A, 1A/ΩCn{x, y}〉
are reduced models of K∗. Since their algebraic classes coincide, but they are
different models (given that Cn{x, y}/ΩCn{x, y} has at least two elements and
1
A
/ΩCn{x, y} is a singleton), we have that Ω is not injective and thus, it is not
an isomorphism as the Isomorphism Theorem requires. 
Recall that K∗ is strongly complete with respect to its reduced models. In-
spired by [92], where the analogous problem for the classical modal logic is
studied, we can give a more specific characterization of this class of models,
and thus, obtain a more concrete completeness result for K∗ as an immediate
corollary.
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Theorem 7.8. 〈A, F 〉 is a reduced model of K∗ if and only if A ∈ K∗, F ∈
FiL∞∗ A and {1
A} is the only open filter included in F .
Proof. For the left to right direction, let 〈A, F 〉 ∈ Mod∗K∗. From Lemma
7.6 it follows that A ∈ K∗ and it also holds that F ∈ FiL∞∗ (A). By way of
contradiction, suppose there is an open K∗-filter G on A such that {1A}  G ⊆
F . Since both {1A} and G are open filters, they are also deductive K g∗ -filters
on A. Given that K g∗ is an algebraizable logic, ΩA is a lattice isomorphism
between FiK g∗ (A) and CoK∗(A) and, in particular, ΩA : FiK∗A → CoK∗A is
injective. Then, given that {1A} 6= G, ΩA{1A} 6= ΩAG. It is clear that
ΩA{1A} = IdA and so ΩAG 6= IdA. K∗ is equivalential so ΩA is monotone over
the K∗-filters on A. Given that both F and G are K∗-filters on A it follows that
IdA 6= ΩAG ⊆ ΩAF , so ΩAF 6= IdA which contradicts the assumption that
〈A, F 〉 ∈Mod∗K∗.
As for the other direction, let F ∈ FiK∗(A) and suppose that ΩAF 6=
IdA. We know that Ω
A : FiK g∗A → CoK∗(A) is an isomorphism and also that
ΩAF ∈ CoK∗(A). Then, there is G ∈ FiK g∗ (A) such that ΩAG = ΩAF , and so
ΩAG 6= IdA. For any a ∈ G, 〈a, 1A〉 ∈ ΩAG and so 〈a, 1A〉 ∈ ΩAF too. Since
1
A ∈ F and ΩAF is congruent with F (by definition), a ∈ F and so G ⊆ F ,
which concludes the proof. 
We shall now introduce a suitable notation in order to refer to deductions in
this setting. For an arbitrary set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ} and A a modal K∗-algebra
we write Γ |=LA ϕ whenever for any modal evaluation e over A and any K∗-filter
F on A such that 〈A, F 〉 is a reduced model of the logic, if e(Γ) ⊆ F then
e(ϕ) ∈ F .
As in the global modal logic, we also introduce a more specific notation for
later uses. For an arbitrary set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ}, A a modal K∗-algebra and e
a modal evaluation over A, we write Γ |=LA,e ϕ whenever for any K∗-filter F on
A such that 〈A, F 〉 is a reduced model of the logic, if e(Γ) ⊆ F then e(ϕ) ∈ F .
We can then more neatly rewrite the previous result.
Theorem 7.9. Let ∗ be a left-continuous t-norm accepting a conjunctive axiom-
atization. For any set of modal formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}
Γ `K∗ ϕ iff Γ |=LK∗ ϕ.
At this point we can study the linearly ordered modal K∗-algebras; the ex-
istence and behaviour of the constants in the algebras from K∗ leads to a very
neat characterization of all the chains from K∗.
Theorem 7.10. If a modal K∗-algebra A = 〈A,,⇒,∧, δA,2,3, {cA}c∈C∗〉 ∈
K∗ is linearly ordered then one of the following conditions hold:
• 2 = 3 = IdA (the identity function on A);
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• 2 = 1A and 3 = 0A (the constant functions of value 1A and 0A respec-
tively).
Proof. First we can easily see that for any a ∈ A both a ≤ 2a and 3a ≤ a hold.
Indeed, if 2a < a, from Lemma 4.12, it follows that there is c ∈ C∗ such that
2a < cA < a. In that case, since cA ⇒ a = 1A, it follows that 2(cA ⇒ a) = 1A.
At the same time, 1
A
> cA ⇒ 2a = 2(cA ⇒ a), which is a contradiction. To
check that 3a ≤ a, suppose analogously that a < 3a, so there is c ∈ C∗ with
a < cA < 3a. As before, this implies that 2(a⇒ cA) = 1A, so by equation E31
it hods that 3a ⇒ cA = 1A. On the other hand, we had that cA < 3a, which
contradicts the previous statement.
Now, we will prove by cases that if either 2 or 3 are not the identity function,
then 2 = 1
A
and 3 = 0
A
. First, suppose that 2 is not the identity function.
Since for all a ∈ A it holds that a ≤ 2a, then there must exist b ∈ A such that
b < 2b (A is a chain by assumption). By Lemma 4.12 there exists c ∈ C∗ such
that b < cA < 2b, from where it follows that 1
A
= cA ⇒ 2b = 2(cA ⇒ b) =
∆2(cA ⇒ b). Given that ∆ and 2 commute in A, it follows that 2∆(cA ⇒
b) = 1
A
. Now note that (cA ⇒ b) < 1A by assumption and being A a chain,
∆(cA ⇒ b) = 0. Then 1A = 2∆(cA ⇒ b) = 20A, and using that 2 is an





element of A). Given that 2¬x = ¬3x, it is immediate that 3 = 0A.
On the other hand, suppose that for some b ∈ A, 3b < b and so 3b < cA < b
for some c ∈ C∗. It follows that 1A = 3b⇒ cA = 2(b⇒ cA), and an analogous




. From there, again as
above, one can prove that 2 = 1
A
and 3 = 0
A
and this concludes the proof. 
With this it is clear that neither K∗ nor K
g
∗ are complete with respect to
linearly ordered modal K∗-algebras. Indeed, from the previous lemma, 20
A ∨
(ϕ↔ 2ϕ) is valid in all linearly ordered modal K∗-algebras, but clearly it is not
a theorem of K∗.
7.2 Kripke semantics and algebraic semantics
Since we have developed two semantics for our modal logics, namely Kripke and
algebraic semantics, it seems natural to study their relationship. It is possible to
build a modal K∗-algebra from a ∗-Kripke model, maintaining the behaviour of
the logical deductions. Similarly, from a modal K∗-algebra it will be possible to
construct an ∗-Kripke model and in particular, a Kripke model over the standard
L∞∗ -algebra, whose deductions coincide with those over the algebra.
Moreover, the study of this relation has allowed to prove an interesting com-
pleteness result of the local modal logics K∗ with respect to the order-preserving
logics built over the modal algebras.
2It follows from (EK) that for any a, b ∈ A, if a ≤ b then 2a ≤ 2b
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From Kripke models to modal algebras: complex algebras
Complex algebras are a family of algebras that arise from Kripke frames through
a natural construction and were originally defined in the context of classical
modal logic (see for instance [26]). The construction method can be easily gen-
eralized to the case of many-valued logics, taking into account the fact that the
algebra over which the Kripke model evaluates formulas takes an explicit role in
the construction of the algebra associated to the model.
In our case, we will describe a way of translating the Kripke semantics into
the algebraic one by associating to each ∗-Kripke model a K∗-algebra and an
evaluation over it.
Remember that for two sets A,B, AB denotes the set of maps from B to A.
In some cases we will denote by [b 7→ f(b)] the element f ∈ AB that sends b ∈ B
into f(b) ∈ A.
Definition 7.11. Let A ∈ L∞∗ and M = 〈W,R, e〉 be a A-Kripke model. The
complex algebra associated to M is the modal K∗-algebra
Alg(M) = 〈AW ,W ,⇒W∗ ,∧W , (δA)W ,2,3, {cAlg(M)}c∈C∗〉
where for every f, g ∈ AW the non-modal operations ∗W ,⇒W∗ ,∧W , (δA)W and
{cAlg(M)}c∈C∗ are defined component-wise from the ones of A, and the modal
operations are given by
2f := [v 7→ inf{f(w) : w ∈W,Rvw}] 3f := [v 7→ sup{f(w) : w ∈W,Rvw}]
The associated evaluation over Alg(M) is eM : Fm→ AW with
eM(ϕ) = [v 7→ e(v, ϕ)].
It is routine to see that for any ∗-Kripke model M, its complex algebra
Alg(M) is a modal K∗-algebra. Also it is easy to check that the evalua-
tion associated to M is indeed a modal evaluation over Alg(M) (i.e., eM ∈
Hom(Fm,Alg(M))) and that coincides with the homomorphism built from the
mapping that sends each propositional variable x to [v 7→ e(v, x)].
We can study how the validity of deductions over a particular Kripke model
are translated to the associated complex algebra and the correspondent evalu-
ation. It is interesting that the more complete information of the linearly or-
dered algebras at the propositional level (in the sense that the non modal-logic
is complete with respect to its linearly ordered algebras) arises here too, and
the relation between the local deductions within a Kripke model and within its
complex algebra is stronger when the basic algebra is linearly ordered.
Lemma 7.12. Let A be a L∞∗ -algebra and M a A-Kripke model. For an arbi-
trary set of modal formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} the following hold:
1. Γ gM ϕ if and only if Γ |=Alg(M),eM ϕ,
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2. Γ 6M ϕ implies that Γ 6|=LAlg(M),eM ϕ,3
3. If A is linearly ordered, then Γ M ϕ if and only if Γ |=LAlg(M),eM ϕ.
Proof. 1. Γ gM ϕ if there is v ∈ W such that e(v, [Γ]) 6⊆ {1
A} or if for all
v ∈ W , e(v, ϕ) = 1A. In the first case, by definition of the evaluation
over the modal algebra eM[Γ] 6⊆ {1Alg(M)}. In the second case, again by
definition, it is clear that eM(ϕ) = 1
Alg(M)




2. Γ 6M ϕ whenever there is some v ∈ W such that e(v, [Γ]) ⊆ {1A} and
e(v, ϕ) 6= 1A. Then, consider the K∗-filter F on Alg(M) generated by
eM[Γ]. Since the operations that contribute to the construction of the
generated filter are not the modal ones they behave component-wise and so
for any v ∈W such that e(v, [Γ]) ⊆ {1A} it also holds that, for all f ∈ F ,
f(v) = 1
A
. Thus, it is immediate that eM(ϕ) 6∈ F , since eM(ϕ)(v) =
e(v, ϕ) < 1
A
.
3. Observe that Γ M ϕ whenever for all v ∈ W such that e(v, [Γ]) ⊆ {1A}
it holds that e(v, ϕ) = 1
A
. Consider now an arbitrary filter F of K∗
on Alg(M) such that eM[Γ] ⊆ F . Since the filters are closed under the
deductive rules, it must hold that ∆eM[Γ] ⊆ F . Assuming now that the
algebra A is linearly ordered, ∆eM[Γ] is a sequence of 0s and 1s from A.
Since for all v such that eM[Γ](v) ⊆ {1A} it holds that eM(ϕ)(v) = 1A
and the other components hold trivially (since then (∆eM[Γ])(v) = 0), we
have that ∆eM[Γ] ≤ eM(ϕ) and so eM(ϕ) ∈ F . 
When the non-modal algebra is not linearly ordered, the equivalence stated
at point 2. of the previous lemma needs not to hold. For example, we can take
the algebra [0,1]Q∗ × [0,1]Q∗ (where 〈1, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉 are incomparable elements)
and the Kripke model M evaluated over it given by the following Kripke model
• w : p = 〈0, 1〉, q = 〈1, 0〉
• v : p = 〈0, 1〉, q = 〈1, 0〉
OO
formally defined by
〈{v, w}, {〈v, w〉, 〈w, v〉},

{
e(v, p) = 〈0, 1〉
e(w, p) = 〈0, 1〉{
e(v, q) = 〈1, 0〉
e(w, q) = 〈1, 0〉
〉.
3Recall that this means that there is a reduced model of K∗ of the form 〈Alg(M), F 〉 such
that eM[Γ] ⊆ F and eM(ϕ) 6∈ F .
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It is clear that p M q (since p is always evaluated to less than 〈1, 1〉). However,
consider the filter F of K∗ on Alg(M) generated by eM(p). We can easily see
that eM(p) ∈ F whereas eM(q) 6∈ F , and so p 6|=LAlg(M),eM q.
From modal algebras to Kripke models: canonical models
It is also natural to show how to build an ∗-Kripke model from a K∗-algebra
A and a modal evaluation over it, in an inverse way to the complex algebra
construction.4
Remember that from Lemma 4.13 it follows that if a L∞∗ -filter F on a L
∞
∗ -
algebra A ∈ L∞∗ is prime (for any a, b ∈ A, it contains either a⇒ b or b⇒ a and
thus, A/F is linearly ordered), then there is a σ-embedding ρ from A/F into
[0,1]Q∗ . Then, a suitable choice for the set of worlds of a Kripke model associated
to a K∗-algebra A are the set of homomorphisms from A into [0,1]
Q
∗ .
It is important to note that the relation between the algebraic semantics and
the Kripke one, as happened before, must be done between structures that are
equivalent from the point of view of the logic. That is to say, we can establish a
relation between algebras and Kripke frames, or between a pair of an algebra and
a modal evaluation on it and a Kripke model. We will work with this second
option, since being less general allows to prove a more specific result for the
transfer of the deductions between the two semantics.
Definition 7.13. Let A be a modal K∗-algebra and e ∈ Hom(Fm,A). The
canonical 〈A, e〉-Kripke model is the model
Mod(A, e) = 〈WA,e, RA,e, eA,e〉
where:
• WA,e = Hom(A, [0,1]
Q
∗ );
• RA,evw if and only if w(a) = 1 for all a ∈ A such that v(2a) = 1;
• eA,e(v, x) = v(e(x)).
We can prove that the evaluation eA,e of the above defined canonical Kripke
model Mod(A, e) verifies the Truth Lemma, i.e., that eA,e(v, ϕ) = v(e(ϕ)) for
any ϕ ∈ Fm and any e ∈ Hom(Fm,A).
In fact, we can prove a stronger result that only depends on the frame: since
e ∈ Hom(Fm,A), the previous formulation of the Truth Lemma can be proven
as just a corollary of seeing that for any a ∈ e(Fm)5, both v(2a) = inf{w(a) :
RAvw} and v(3a) = sup{w(a) : RAvw} are true.
4It is remarkable that this construction leads to a more abstract proof of completeness of
the logic K∗ with respect to its correspondent canonical models. It turns out that the canonical
model of the Lindenbaum-Tarski formula algebra of the correspondent logic is the canonical
model of the logic. We do not however repeat the completeness proof in this fashion since the
original one is clearer.
5Observe e(Fm) is a countable subalgebra of A.
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First, observe that a generalization of Lemma 6.11 easily follows from the
fact that each w ∈ WA,e is an homomorphism from A into [0,1]Q∗ . Indeed,
for any a, b ∈ e(Fm) and any v, w ∈ WA,e, if v(a) 6≤ w(b) then w(b) < v(a)
and thus, there is c ∈ C∗ such that w(b) < c < v(a), i.e., v(cA ⇒ a) = 1 and
w(cA ⇒ b) < 1. Using the equations (E21) and (E31) we get
- v(2a) ≤ w(a) for all v, w ∈WA,e with RA,evw;
- v(3a) ≥ w(a) for all v, w ∈WA,e with RA,evw.
As for the converse inequalities, a more general version of Lemma 6.12 can
be proven. We can formulate it for an arbitrary countable algebra (which, in
our context, is the countable subalgebra of A given by e(Fm)). This restriction
on the cardinality of the algebra comes from the use of Lemma 4.10, which is
proven for countable algebras.
Lemma 7.14. Let A be a countable K∗-algebra and e ∈ Hom(Fm,A). Let
v ∈ WA,e and a ∈ A. If w(a) = 1 for all w ∈ WA,e such that RAvw then
v(2a) = 1.
Proof. First, it is easy to see that for any w ∈WA,e the following hold:
- w−1(1) is a prime L∞∗ -filter on A (remember that A is the non-modal
reduct of A) and
- 2−1w−1(1) is a L∞∗ -filter on A. Indeed, it is just necessary to check that
{a ∈ A : w(2a) = 1} contains all the axioms and is closed under the
derivation rules, which is easy to do using that w is an homomorphism
from A into [0,1]Q∗ and that the equations and generalized quasi-equations
arising from the axiomatization of K∗ hold in A. 1 ∈ 2−1w−1(1) is im-
mediate by definition of the 2 operator over the K∗ algebras (by EN2).
Moreover, this set is closed under derivations as a consequence of Theorem
6.9.
On the other hand, we can prove the following claim:
CLAIM: The set of prime L∞∗ -filters on A that contain
2−1v−1(1) coincides with the set {w−1(1) : w ∈WA,e and RA,evw}.
The fact that for each w ∈ WA,e such that RA,evw it holds that
w−1(1) is a prime filter that contains 2−1v−1(1) is immediate by
definition. To see that each prime filter that contains 2−1v−1(1) co-
incides with w−1(1) for some w ∈ WA,e that is related with v, take
for each filter F as before the homomorphism hF ∈ Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ )
defined as hF = ρF ◦ ΠF , where ΠF : A → A/F is the projection
over the quotient algebra and ρF is the embedding from A/F into
[0,1]Q∗ built in Lemma 4.13 (since F is prime, A/F is a linearly or-
dered). It is clear that F = h−1F (1). To check that RA,evhF , observe
that v(2a) = 1 means that a ∈ 2−1w−1(1) and so a ∈ F . Then,
ΠF (a) = [1]F and hF (a) = 1.
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By the previous claim and Lemma 4.10 (recall that the algebra was countable), it
follows that 2−1v−1(1) =
⋂{w−1(1) : w ∈WA,e and RA,evw}. The assumption
of the lemma was that w(a) = 1 for all w such that RA,evw and thus a ∈
2−1v−1(1), which concludes the proof. 
From here it is straightforward to prove the following lemma (using the same
reasoning in the proof of Lemma 6.13) and from which it follows the previously
mentioned more general Truth Lemma that refers to the evaluation eA of the
canonical Kripke model Mod(A, e) for a K∗-algebra A and a modal A-evaluation
e.
Lemma 7.15. Let A be a countable K∗-algebra. For any a ∈ A and v ∈ WA,e
the following hold.
- v(2a) = inf{w(a) : RAvw};
- v(3a) = sup{w(a) : RAvw}.
Observe that, for any algebra A and evaluation e on it, we can consider the
countable subalgebra of A given by e(Fm). We can straightforwardly conclude
the following result relying on this fact.
Corollary 7.16. Let A be a K∗-algebra. For any e ∈ Hom(Fm,A), any for-
mula ϕ and any v ∈WA,e, it holds that eA,e(v, ϕ) = v(e(ϕ)).
It is now possible to obtain a relation between deductions in a modal algebra
and within its associated canonical model, analogous to Lemma 7.12. It is
remarkable that in this case we can prove the equivalence on the deductions
without having to assume any condition on the (modal) algebra.
Lemma 7.17. Let A ∈ K∗ and e a modal evaluation over it, i.e., e ∈
Hom(Fm,A). Then the following hold:
1. Γ |=A,e ϕ if and only if Γ gMod(A,e) ϕ;
2. Γ |=LA,e ϕ if and only if Γ Mod(A,e) ϕ.
Proof. 1. Assume Γ |=A,e ϕ. Then, either e[Γ] 6⊆ {1A} or e(ϕ) = 1A. In the
first case, there exists an homomorphism h from A to [0,1]Q∗ such that
h(e[Γ]) 6⊆ {1} so eA,e(h, [Γ]) 6⊆ {1} and thus Γ gMod(A,e) ϕ. In the other
case, e(ϕ) = 1
A
implies that for any h ∈ Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ ), h(e(ϕ)) = 1
and thus again Γ gMod(A,e) ϕ.
For the other direction, assume on the contrary that Γ 6|=A,e ϕ. By defini-
tion, that means that e[Γ] ⊆ {1A} and that e(ϕ) < 1A. Then, there is h ∈
Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ ) such that h(e(ϕ)) < 1, while for all v ∈ Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ ),
v(e[Γ]) ⊆ {1}. This means, by definition, that Γ 6gMod(A,e) ϕ.
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2. Assume that Γ 6Mod(A,e) ϕ. This is equivalent to say that there is v ∈
Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ ) such that eA,e(h, [Γ]) ⊆ {1} while eA,e(h, ϕ) 6= 1. Let F
to be the K∗-filter on A given by h−1(1). Then, by definition of eA,e it
follows that e[Γ] ⊆ F while e(ϕ) 6∈ F and so Γ 6|=A,e ϕ.
For the other direction, suppose that Γ 6|=A,e ϕ, i.e., there exists a K∗-filter
F on A such that e[Γ] ⊆ F and e(ϕ) 6∈ F . By Lemma 4.10, for all prime
filter P such that F ⊆ P , e[Γ] ⊆ P , while there is a prime filter of this
family such that e(ϕ) 6∈ P . Consider then the homomorphism h from A to
[0,1]Q∗ defined by ρ◦ΠP , where ΠP is the projection from A to A/P and ρ
is the embedding defined in 4.13. It is clear that eA,e(h, [Γ]) = h(e[Γ]) = 1,
while eA,e(h, ϕ) = h(e(ϕ)) < 1 and so Γ 6Mod(A,e) ϕ.

Correspondence results
It is now possible to study how the compositions of the Mod() and the Alg()
functions behave. Our aim is to prove that they are up to some level inverse one
to the other, in the sense that applying these constructions one after the other
over a structure of the corresponding type produces a new structure N of the
same type in which the original one O can be “logically embedded”. With this
we mean that for an arbitrary set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ |=N ϕ implies that Γ |=O ϕ.
For the sake of a lighter notation, in what follows, given a ∗-Kripke model M,
we will write M′ to denote the model Mod(Alg(M), eM) (the canonical model
associated to its complex algebra), and we will name it its canonical model.
Analogously, for a given A ∈ K∗ and any modal A-evaluation e, we will write
A′ instead of Alg(Mod(A, e)) (the complex algebra associated to the canonical
model of A) and name it its complex algebra. Note that the modal evaluation
e does not affect the resulting algebra but only the evaluation associated to it,
since for any two evaluations e1, e2, Alg(Mod(A, e1)) = Alg(Mod(A, e2)).
Applying the previous transfer results (Lemmas 7.12 and 7.17) it is not dif-
ficult to see how a Kripke model is related to its associated canonical one and
respectively, how a modal algebra is related with its complex one.
Lemma 7.18. Let A ∈ L∞∗ , M = 〈W,R, e〉 be a A-Kripke model and let Γ ∪
{ϕ} ⊆ Fm. Then
1. Γ gM ϕ if and only if Γ 
g
M′ ϕ.
2. Γ 6M ϕ implies that Γ 6M′ ϕ.
3. If A is linearly ordered, Γ M ϕ if and only if Γ M′ ϕ.
Proof. All cases follow as immediate corollaries of Lemmas 7.12 and 7.17. 
140 Chapter 7. Many-valued modal algebras
Point 3. from the previous Lemma is not true in general, as we remarked
before.
On the other hand, we can also study the relation between a modal algebra A
and its associated complex algebra A′. Again, as a simple corollary of Lemmas
7.12 and 7.17 (observe that the algebra of evaluation of all the canonical models
is the algebra [0,1]Q∗ , always linearly ordered) we can get the following result.
Lemma 7.19. Let A ∈ K∗ and e a modal evaluation on it, i.e., e ∈
Hom(Fm,A). Then Γ |=LA,e ϕ if and only if Γ |=LA′,e′ ϕ.
Moreover, it is possible to go a bit further and obtain a result that just
depends on the algebra (and is not limited to the meaning of the modal algebra
as algebra of evaluation).
Theorem 7.20. Let A be a K∗-algebra. Then A can be embedded (in the usual
algebraic sense) into A′.
Proof. For an arbitrary modal evaluation on A, note that the universe of the
algebra Alg(Mod(A, v)) is the set [0, 1]Hom(A,[0,1]
Q
∗ ). Let θ be the function that
maps each element a ∈ A to the function from Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ ) to [0, 1] that
sends each h to h(a), i.e., θ(a) = [h 7→ h(a)] for each h ∈ Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ ).
From the Truth Lemma 7.16 it follows that θ is a (modal) homomorphism from
A to Alg(Mod(A, v)). It is an exercise to see that it is injective (using that if
for all h ∈ Hom(A, [0,1]Q∗ ) it holds that h(a) = h(b), then a = b). 
7.3 Order preserving logics
The construction of the complex algebras provides us with several concrete modal
K∗-algebras. Moreover, using the completeness result of K∗ with respect to K∗ ,
and in particular, with respect to the canonical Kripke model Mc, we will obtain
another interesting algebraic completeness result for this logic.
The intuition behind the algebraic completeness result that can be achieved
through this approach is as follows. For Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm it holds that Γ `K∗ ϕ
if and only if for all w ∈ Wc for which w[Γ] ⊆ {1} it holds w(ϕ) = 1 as
well. This condition is easily expressible within the associated complex algebra
of the canonical model, Alg(Mc). It means that for all w ∈ Wc for which
eMc [Γ](w) ⊆ {1} then eMc(ϕ)(w) = 1. Given that the ∆ operator is defined on
the complex algebras component-wisely, it is clear that for any w ∈ Wc and for
any formula ψ either eMc(∆ψ)(w) = 1 or eMc(∆ψ)(w) = 0. Then, the previous
condition can be rewritten as inf{eMc [∆Γ]} ≤ eMc(ϕ).6
We first make a natural observation concerning the elements of the algebra
that are images of the δA operation. Given a L∞∗ -algebra A, we will say that
b ∈ A is a Boolean element whenever there exists an element b′ ∈ A called
6≤ is defined component-wise, and thus for each w ∈ Wc, either ς[∆Γ](w) = 1, in which
case by assumption eMc (ϕ)(w) = 1, or inf{eMc [∆Γ]}(w) = 0, and so the inequality is trivially
true.
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complement of b such that b ∨ b′ = 1A and b ∧ b′ = 0A. We will denote the
set of Boolean elements of A by BA.
Remark 7.21. Let A ∈ L∞∗ . Then for any a, b ∈ A, δAa ∈ BA and δAa  x =
δAa ∧ x.
With the aim of generalizing the above idea of logic preserving the Boolean
degrees of truth to the whole class of K∗-algebras, we will refer to the usual
definition of logic preserving degrees of truth (cf. [16, Def. 2.1]).
Definition 7.22. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, C ∪ {A} ⊆ K∗ and h ∈ Hom(Fm,A).7
• Γ |=≤A,h ϕ if for any a ∈ A, if a ≤ h(γ) for all γ ∈ Γ then a ≤ h(ϕ).
• Γ |=≤A ϕ if Γ |=≤A,h ϕ for any h ∈ Hom(Fm,A).
• Γ |=≤C ϕ if Γ |=≤B ϕ for each B ∈ R.
In particular, if A is a complete algebra, the first definition is equivalent to say
that inf{h(Γ)} ≤ h(ϕ).
Now, a second algebraic completeness result for K∗ can be obtained just
checking the soundness of K∗ with respect to the |=≤K∗ logic defined above pre-
serving the order only for the Boolean elements.
Theorem 7.23 (Strong algebraic completeness of K∗). For any set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of
modal formulas,
Γ `K∗ ϕ iff ∆Γ |=≤K∗ ϕ
where ∆Γ stands for the set {∆γ : γ ∈ Γ}.8
Proof. Completeness is direct because Alg(Mc) ∈ K∗. If Γ 6`K∗ ϕ, by complete-
ness with respect to Mc, there exists a world v ∈ Wc such that v[Γ] ⊆ {1} and
v(ϕ) < 1. Then we have that eMc [Γ](v) = 1 (and so that eMc [∆Γ](v) = 1) but
eMc(ϕ)(v) < 1. But taking into account how the order is defined in Alg(Mc),
this means that eMc [∆Γ] 6≤ eMc(ϕ).
To prove soundness, let A ∈ K∗ and h ∈ Hom(Fm,A). Since all axioms
of K∗ are evaluated to 1
1
under any homomorphism, we just need to check the
soundness of the deduction rules of K∗ in |=≤K∗ :
MP : h(∆ψ) ∧ h(∆(ψ → ϕ)) = h(∆ψ)  h(∆(ψ → ϕ)) ≤ h(∆ψ)  (h(∆ψ) ⇒
h(∆ϕ)) ≤ h(∆ϕ) ≤ h(ϕ), by the Remark 7.21 and definitions and axioms
of MTL logic.
G∆ : It is direct by definition.
7Recall that Fm is the algebra of modal formulas.
8 Do not forget that, in general, modal K∗-algebras are not linearly ordered.
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D∞ : Let a ∈ A such that a ≤ h(∆((ϕ→ c)∨ (c→ ψ))) for all c ∈ C∗. Then, by
definition of order and distributing ∆ over ∨ and applying the homomor-
phism properties, we have that 1
A
= δA(a⇒ (δA(h(ϕ)⇒ cA))∨δA(cA ⇒
h(ψ)))). We know that the theorems of L∞∗ (and so finite deductions, ap-
plying the deduction theorem) are valid equations in all the K∗-algebras




= δA(a⇒ δA(h(ϕ)⇒ cA)) ∨ δA(a⇒ δA(cA ⇒ h(ψ))) =
δA((h(ϕ) ∧ ¬δA¬a)⇒ cA) ∨ δA(cA ⇒ (h(ψ) ∨ δA¬a)) =
((h(ϕ) ∧ ¬δA¬a)⇒ cA) ∨ (cA ⇒ (h(ψ) ∨ δA¬a))
for all c ∈ C∗.
From the generalized quasi-equation Q∞ it follows that
1
A
= (h(ϕ) ∧ ¬δA¬a)⇒ (h(ψ) ∨ δA¬a).
Using again theorems of L∞∗ (in particular, points 3., 4. and 5. from Remark
4.2), and reasoning in a similar fashion as above we get that
1
A
= δAh(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ δAh(¬ϕ) ∨ δA¬a ∨ δAh(ψ)
Since ψ → (ϕ → ψ) is a theorem of the logic and applying also 6. from
Remark 4.2, we have that 1
A
= δAh(ϕ → ψ) ∨ δA¬a. With point 10.
from Remark 4.2, we can conclude that 1
A
= (a ⇒ h(ϕ ⇒ ψ)), which by
definition means a ≤ h(ϕ⇒ ψ).
(N2) This rule is only applicable over theorems, so assume that for any modal
L∞∗ -algebra A and for any evaluation e, e(ψ) = 1
A
. Then, by definition of





, so |=K∗ 2ψ, and thus |=≤K∗ 2ψ as well. 







Intuitively, Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) can be seen as a generalization
of the SAT problem by adding the ability to handle arithmetic and other the-
ories. For what concerns this dissertation, SMT form an interesting layer over
which build non-classical logics applications. We found studies concerning the
adequacy of SMT solvers for solving Constraint Satisfaction Problems [6], and
we considered these applications could be of great use to work with the Basic
Logic and its axiomatic extensions simply by interpreting in them the constraints
imposed by these logics.
This chapter is devoted to explain and provide a formal description of Sat-
isfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) and detail some results concerning the im-
plementation and design of solvers for SMT. It is a preliminaries chapter, with
no original content and its localization out of the preliminaies chapter is due to
the fact that the notions presented here are of great importance in showing the
correctnesss of SMT, but they are not necessary for the comprehension of the
dissertation (and, over all, they do not play any role in the previous parts of this
work).
8.1 The satisfiability problem
Satisfiability, namely the problem of determining whether a formula (or in real
world applications, a constraint) has a model in a certain logic (semantically
speaking, an evaluation that sends the formula to the top element of the algebra)
is one of the most fundamental problems in theoretical computer science.
Constraint satisfaction problems arise in many diverse areas including graph
and game theory problems, planning, scheduling, software and hardware ver-
ification, extended static checking, optimization, test case generation or type
inference. The most well-known constraint satisfaction problem is propositional
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satisfiability SAT : decide whether a classical logic formula can be made true by
choosing true/false values for its variables.
Many of these constraint satisfaction problems can be encoded by Boolean
formulas and solved using Boolean satisfiability (SAT ) solvers. However, other
problems require the additional expressiveness of equality, uninterpreted function
symbols, arithmetic, arrays, datatype operations or quantifiers. For example,
many applications of formal methods that rely on generating first order formulas
over theories of the real numbers or integers (including fuzzy logics) are in need
of more expressive logical languages and solvers.
Thus, a formalism extending SAT, called Satisfiability Modulo Theories
(SMT), has also been developed to deal with these more general decision prob-
lems. An SMT instance can informally be understood as a first order Boolean
formula in which some propositional variables are replaced by predicates with
predefined interpretations from background theories. Namely, these predicates
are binary-valued functions over non-binary variables.
It is known that the complexity of the satisfiability problem of Ha´jek’s Basic
Logic and its extensions is NP-complete. This is not an exception, as many
of the Constraint Satisfaction Problems reach at least the NP complexity class.
Due to this high computational complexity and to the fact that real problems are
not interested in validity in general, but with respect to a fixed background the-
ory, the idea is not to build a procedure that can solve arbitrary SMT problems,
but to focus on specialized SMT solvers.
As done with efficient SAT solvers, when working with concrete problems,
the procedures can be highly simplified and fastened by paying attention to
implementation details. In recent years, there has been an enormous progress in
the scale of problems that can be solved, thanks to innovations in core algorithms,
data structures, heuristics and other methods, and for example, modern SAT
procedures can check formulas with hundreds of thousands variables and millions
of clauses.
In the case of SMT, similar progress has been observed in the procedures for
the more commonly occurring theories that not only work with FOL but also
in fragments of it (for instance, quantifier free formulas). For many of these,
specialized methods actually yield decision procedures for the validity of ground
formulas or some subset of them. This is for instance the case, thanks to classical
results in mathematics, for the theory of real numbers or the theory of integer
numbers with only addition and substraction. In the last two decades however,
specialized decision procedures have also been discovered for a large and still
growing, list of theories of other important data types such as certain theories
of arrays and strings, variants of the theory of finite sets, the theory of several
classes of lattices, the theories of finite, regular and infinite trees and the theory
of lists, tuples, records, queues, hash tables and bit vectors of a fixed or arbitrary
finite size.
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8.2 Formal definitions
Based on pioneer works proposing the use of SMT solvers in formal methods in
the 80s [102, 112, 19], on the last ten years we have lived an increasing interest
on this field and research on the foundational and practical aspects of SMT
has rapidly grown. Several SMT solvers have been developed in academia and
industry with continually increasing scope and performance. We can cite here
examples integrated into interactive theorem provers for high-order logic (such
as HOL and Isabelle), extended static checkers (such as CAsCaDE, Boogie and
ESC/Java 2), verification systems (such as ACL2, Frama-c, SAL and UCLID)
or model checkers (such as BLAST) among others. In industry, as important
centers with SMT-related projects we can name Microsoft Research, Cadence
Berkeley Labs, Intel Strategic CAD Labs and NEC Labs.1
Most approaches for automated deduction tools rely on case-analysis for its
core system. In the case of SMT, most of the solvers exploit SAT procedures for
performing case-analysis efficiently.
In this section, basic techniques used in state-of-the-art SAT solvers and the
more common approaches to the SMT problem are detailed.
SAT encodings
Most state-of-the-art SAT solvers (Glucose [8], Minisat [47], BerkMin [66]) to-
day are based on Conflict-Driven Clause Learning algorithm (CDCL), originally
grown from the Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) procedure [38, 37].
The DPLL algorithm is a complete, backtracking-based search algorithm for
deciding the satisfiability of propositional logic formulae in conjunctive normal
form, i.e. for solving the CNF-SAT problem. The basic backtracking algorithm
runs by choosing a literal, assigning a truth value to it, simplifying the formula
and then recursively checking if the simplified formula is satisfiable; if this is
the case, the original formula is satisfiable; otherwise, the same recursive check
is done assuming the opposite truth value. This is known as the splitting rule,
as it splits the problem into two simpler sub-problems. The simplification step
essentially removes all clauses which become true under the assignment from the
formula and all literals that become false from the remaining clauses.
The great improvements in the performance of DPLL-based SAT solvers
achieved in the last years are due, on the one hand, to better implementation
techniques and on the other, to several conceptual enhancements on the original
DPLL procedure, aimed at reducing the amount of explored search space, such as
backjumping (a form of non-chronological backtracking), conflict-driven lemma
learning, and restarts. On the other hand, correctness has been proved for each
of these methods, ensuring the coherence of their usage.
1For the interested reader, see for instance https://isabelle.in.tum.de/, http://
research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/boogie/, http://www.cs.utexas.edu/
users/moore/acl2/, http://frama-c.com/, http://sal.csl.sri.com/, http://
uclid.eecs.berkeley.edu/, http://forge.ispras.ru/projects/blast/.
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These advances make it now possible to decide the satisfiability of very com-
plex SAT problems.
Detailed description of existing procedures is out of the scope of this disser-
tation, but a uniform, declarative framework for describing DPLL-based solvers,
Abstract DPLL, can be found in [103].
SMT-solvers approach
Following the more recent SMT literature, given a signature Σ, we define a
theory T over Σ as just one or more (possibly infinitely many) Σ-models. Then,
a ground Σ-formula ϕ is satisfiable in a Σ-theory or is T -satisfiable) if and only
if there is an element of the set T that satisfies ϕ. Similarly, a set Γ of ground
Σ-formulas T -entails a ground formula ϕ (Γ |=T ϕ) if and only if every model of
T that satisfies all formulas in Γ satisfies ϕ as well.
We say the satisfiability problem for theory T is decidable if there is a pro-
cedure Υ that checks whether any ground (and hence, quantifier free) formula
is satisfiable or not. In this case, we say Υ is a decision procedure for T or a
T -solver.
The proof of correctness of SMT methods for decidable background theories
is a step that has to be checked for each solver. Satisfiability procedures must
be proved sound and complete; while soundness is usually easy, completeness
requires specific model construction arguments showing that, whenever the pro-
cedure finds a formula satisfiable, a satisfying theory interpretation for it does
indeed exist. This means that each new procedure in principle requires a new
completeness proof.
Working with a decidable theory T , there are two main approaches for deter-
mining the satisfiability of a formula with respect to T , each with its own pros
and cons: eager and lazy.
Eager SMT approach
This approach consists on ad-hoc translations from an input formula and relevant
data from the theory T into a set of propositional formulas that is satisfied in the
same points that the original formula (see for instance [114] for this procedure),
which is then checked by a SAT solver for satisfiability.
The good point of this approach is that it can always make use of the lasts
existing SAT solvers, overcoming the problem of relatively big translation results.
However, the problem lies on the exponential cost of the translation operation
for making the problem treatable by a SAT solver. For this, sophisticated ad-
hoc translations are needed for each theory and experiments have shown the
explosion on needed resources when escalating the problems (see [41]). Also
it has been studied the difficulty of combining several theories. To address
these issues, the latest research on SAT encodings focuses on general frameworks
that allow incremental translations and calls to the SAT solver, and general
mechanisms for combining encodings for different theories.
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From a theoretical point of view, proving soundness and completeness is
relatively simple because it reduces to proving that the translation is satisfiability
invariant (but that proof needs to be done for each defined translation).
Lazy SMT approach
Instead of an ad-hoc translation for each theory into a SAT problem, a specialized
T -solver for deciding the satisfiability of conjunctions of theory literals can be
defined. Then, the objective is combining the strength of this solver with the
existing SAT-solvers to produce an efficient SMT-solver.
A lot of research has been done in the matter of combining these two solvers.
The most widely used approach in the last few years is usually referred to as the
lazy approach [40, 10, 7].
The idea behind this approach is such that each atom occurring in a formula
ϕ to be checked for satisfiability is initially considered simply as a propositional
symbol, not taking into account the theory T . Then, the formula is processed by
a SAT solver, which determines its propositional satisfiability. If ϕ was found
unsatisfiable by the SAT solver, then it also is T -unsatisfiable. In other cases,
the SAT solver returned a propositional model M of ϕ and then this assignment
will be checked by a T -solver. If M is found T -consistent, it is a T -model of
ϕ. Otherwise, the T -solver generates a ground clause rejecting that assignment.
This formula is then added to ϕ by propositional conjunction and the SAT solver
is started again. This process is repeated until a T -model is found or the SAT
solver returns the formula is unsatisfiable.
For details on satisfiability in first-order theories and results on combining
several theories for working under the lazy approach see for instance [39].
Most of the currently implemented solvers follow this approach, and include
a high number of available theories like linear, difference and non-linear arith-
metics, bit-vectors, arrays and free functions among others. By modularity and
correctness of the SAT solvers, the correctness for each particular theory is the
main point proving the correctness of the solver (up to exactness of the imple-
mentation).
A general definition for SMT has been studied in [103] providing the
DPLL(T ) approach, a general modular architecture based on a general DPLL
engine parametrized by a solver for a theory T of interest. Here details about
the theories used in our particular case will be given.
• Linear arithmetic
Linear arithmetic (LA) constraints have the form c0+Σ
n
i=1ci ·xi ≤ 0, where
each ci for 0 ≤ i ≤ n is a rational constant and the variables xi range over
R. The LA-solver algorithm implemented by the SMT solver used for the
experiments, z3 [42], is based on the method proposed by de Moura and
Dutertre in [46].
• Arrays
This theory was introduced by McCarthy in [94] and its functions are
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reduced to read (a, i, v) and write(a, i, v). Depending on the theory over
which the arrays are used and the dimension specified to the array in its
creation, a and i will differ on type. In our case, the implementation of
the solver is built over arrays of dimension two of real values, so operations
are defined as follows:
write : R2 × R× {0, 1} −→ R2
read : R2 × {0, 1} −→ R
with
write([a, b], c, i) :=
{
[c, b] if i = 0,
[a, c] if i = 1.
read([a, b], i) :=
{
a if i = 0,
b if i = 1.
8.3 Standardisation: language and solvers
It seems natural that for different SMT-solvers, given their specific treatment of
problems and so their different working methods, different interfaces and input
formats are given. Until 2002, no standardization existed and so comparing
different SMT solvers was a difficult task.
To reduce this drawback, the SMT community launched in 2002 the SMT-
LIB initiative [11] which is currently backed by the vast majority of research
groups in SMT. SMT-LIB defines standard input/output formats and interfaces
for SMT solvers and also provides an on-line repository of benchmarks for several
theories.
The standardisation led to the creation of a an annual competition for SMT-
solvers, SMT-COMP [113], where state of the art SMT solvers show their
strengths in different kind of tests. We decided to use one of the winners of
several competitions, Z3 [42], a solver dveloped by Microsoft Research, not only
for its efficiency but also for the versatility it allows.
Chapter 9
The theory behind the
solver
As we commented in the introductory part of this dissertation, the software
application presented in this third part is oriented to open the practical use of
many-valued logics to a public not exclusively belonging to the logic research
community, but also to other fields. For this reason we considered it was im-
portant to allow the use of a large family of logics but without neglecting the
speed when reasoning over these systems: the answering time is often as impor-
tant as the exactness of the solution (in the sense that getting a solution near
the objective in a fast way can be as interesting as getting the exact solution
on a considerably longer time) or of the modelling of the problem. The solver
presented in the following sections will not cope with the whole family of many-
valued logics studied in Parts II and II of this dissertation for this motivation.
It supports a smaller family of many-valued logics. We will call them “Nice
BL Logics” (because they allow a nice representation) and comprehend, among
others, a large family of continuous t-norm based logics.
The motivation behind the use of this logics is mainly practical. For an ar-
bitrary left-continuous t-norm there is no general form to simplify the reasoning
and thus, a reasoner for a logic based on it would just consist on coding the
operation specified by the user (and also its residuum) into the SMT solver.
However, a preprocessing can be done for these Nice BL logics, codifying the
reasoning over them in such a way that a much faster behaviour (that the gen-
eral approach commented above) can be obtained. On the other hand, we think
that the potential users of this software will have, with this amount of logics, a
large enough basis to start exploiting the versatility of the many-valued fuzzy
logics.
Concerning the modal expansion of these logics, a similar reasoning has lead
us to face the problem in what we think is the most practical way. On the one
hand, while it seems natural to think of problems that could be modelled within
a Kripke structure (for instance, those that resort to graphs, or those related
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with the field of temporal logics), for what concerns non-theoretical uses it does
not seem clear which kind of problems would need of a structure with an infinite
number of worlds. Moreover, the time for obtaining a model -if it exists- seems
likely to be quite high, at least if a deep study on the complexity of the problem
and on the optimization of the hardest parts is not done beforehand. Since the
objectives of this dissertation do not aim of coping with these issues we think
that a first practical and useful solution is consider the modal logics arising from
models with a finite set of worlds.
This chapter is divided in two main parts. Within the first one, we begin
by giving an overview of the most important definitions for understanding and
working, from an automatic (and no symbolic) point of view, with BL and its
main schematic extensions. For the whole theoretical system comprehension, we
refer to Chapter 2, an in particular to sections 2.3 and 2.4. We define the class
of Nice BL logics that will form the propositional layer of the reasoner and we
will also provide several important results about these logics that will be later
applied to the design and implementation of the reasoner.
The second part focuses on studying the implementability of modal expan-
sions of the Nice BL logics previously defined. It contains the main definitions
and details a also describes a simple and efficient way to reason over them.
9.1 The propositional level
The non-modal logics over which the solver is settled belong to a large class of
BL logics.
We begin by presenting these logics, and then present some theoretical results
that will allow to gain efficiency on the reasoner. Later, we comment on how the
previous results affect the treatment of the constant symbols in the logic and
detail how have we approached have the problems derived from them.
Nice BL logics
Recall that any continuous t-norm can be expressed as an ordinal sum with a
denumerable cardinality of the  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product t-norms (see
Theorem 2.4). From this result, we know that a reasoner for the axiomatic ex-
tensions of the BL logic can be designed focusing only over intervals of [0, 1] with
the three previous t-norms. On the other hand, a computer application treating
logics arising from one of these t-norms needs to take as an argument the t-norm
itself. Since this is a function in [0, 1], it does not seem clear how can this value
can be specified if not as a list of  Lukasiewicz Go¨del and Product components
(each one associated with an interval in [0, 1] determining the universe of that
component), or with a unique name for some particular cases. This naturally
limits the possible t-norms, expressed as lists, to those that are a finite ordinal
sums of the three basic t-norms.
However, the logics arising from ordinal sums of the ∗ L, ∗G and ∗Π t-norms
with a finite number of components are a part, but not the totality of the logics
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that will be accepted by our software application.
First, thinking in the possible applications, we have also included an addi-
tional family of operations (not strictly speaking continuous t-norms) that, in
the same way that above, have naturally an associated (semantical) logic. We
are talking about ordinal sums (with a finite number of components!) whose
components can be either the previously commented three basic ones, or range
over a finite universe, with uniformly distributed points. While it is well known
that there do not exist finite linearly ordered product algebras different from the
boolean one (see for instance [31]), and thus there is no way to reason with the
product operations over a finite universe, the cases of the Go¨del and  Lukasiewicz
logics can have this behaviour. Then, it is possible to consider as components of
an ordinal sum restrictions of the  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del ones to a finite universe
over which the operations are closed. In order to simplify the notation, in this
case we denote the operations in the representation of the ordinal sum by ∗ Ln
and ∗Gn, for n being the number of elements considered in the universe.
We extend the definition of ordinal sum in order to include these new oper-
ations as possible components in such a way that the sum of just one of them
respectively coincides with the usual algebraic definition of the n-valued  Luka-
siewicz and Go¨del logics over the real interval [0, 1]:
•  Ln is the subalgebra of [0,1] L with universe {0, 1n−1 , ..., n−1n−1}.
• Gn is the subalgebra of [0,1]G with universe {0, 1n−1 , ..., n−1n−1}.
Now, we will abuse notation regarding ordinal sums and generalize that
name to a wider family. Given {∗i}i∈I a set of operations in {∗ L, ∗G, ∗Π} ∪
{∗ Ln, ∗Gn}n∈Z,n>1, and {(bi, ti)}i∈I a family of pairwise disjoint open intervals











[bi, ti] if ∗i ∈ {∗ L, ∗G, ∗Π}
bi + (ti − bi) · {0, 1n−1 , ..., n−1n−1} if ∗i is either ∗ Ln or ∗Gn
where for X ∪ {y} ⊆ [0, 1], we write y ·X to denote the set {y · x}x∈X .
This new notion allows to specify the well known n-valued  Lukasiewicz and
Go¨del logics (which seem likely to be useful from an applied point of view), and
also combinations of these with infinitely valued components.
On the other hand, thanks to several theoretical results concerning BL, we
will be also able to deal with this logic too. As we remarked in Chapter 2
(see Theorem 2.5) BL logic coincides with the logic of the t-norm obtained as
ordinal sum of infinite  Lukasiewicz components. Only with this, it could seem
that BL does not fall in the cases detailed above, but when dealing with a
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particular deduction (with a finite amount of variables), whether is valid or not
on BL coincides with the answer to the same question on an ordinal sum of
finite components. Indeed, from Theorem 2.5, follows following corollary, more
naturally applicable to our case.
Corollary 9.1. (cf. [3]) Given a formula ϕ and a finite set of formulas Γ,
Γ |=BL ϕ⇐⇒ Γ |=(n+1)[0,1] L ϕ
where n is the number of different variables in Γ ∪ {ϕ} and by (n+ 1)[0,1] L we
denote the BL-algebra 
i∈{0,...,n}
[0,1] L.
With this corollary, the validity of a formula ϕ in the logic BL is reduced to
validity in the logic defined from the algebra of (n + 1) copies of [0,1] L, where
n is the number of variables in ϕ.
After all the previous details, we can finally provide a description of the logics
that are allowed into the reasoner.
Definition 9.2. We say that a logic L is a Nice BL Logic when one of the
following cases holds:
1. L is equivalent to BL. That is to say, for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}
Γ `L ϕ if and only if Γ `BL ϕ
2. L coincides with the logic associated to the ordinal sum ∗ of
{〈∗i, (bi, ti)〉}i∈I for |I| < ω, {∗i}i∈I a set of operations in {∗ L, ∗G, ∗Π} ∪
{∗ Ln, ∗Gn}n∈Z,n>1 and {(bi, ti)}i∈I a family of pairwise disjoint open in-
tervals of [0, 1]. That is to say, for ∗ ordinal sum as above, and for any set
of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}
Γ `L ϕ if and only if Γ `[0,1]∗ ϕ
Efficiency issues: the product components case
Studying previous works towards the development of a solver for fuzzy logics,
we found out that the reasoners that had implemented the product logic case
(see [6]) showed much worse results, in terms of reasoning time, than the other
cases ( Lukasiewicz and Go¨del).
After some research, we realized this is a problem intrinsic to the operations
of the associated algebra: while reasoning with linear operations (sums, sub-
tractions and minimum/maximum operations) is fast in general and also in the
particular case of the SMT-solvers, finding solutions for equation systems with
multiplication and division operations is a much harder problem (since it makes
the solver face non-linear equations) .
Nevertheless, Cignoli and Torrens presented in [31] important studies con-
cerning the product logic. In particular, they proved the following result, which
states the equivalence of the theorems over the standard product algebra and
those over a fragment of the so-called Presburger arithmetic, which entirely omits
multiplication
9.1. The propositional level 155








0 if x ≤ y
−∞ if x > y and y = −∞
y − x otherwise
For any formula ϕ it holds that
∅ |=[0,1]Π ϕ if and only if ∅ |=Z−• ϕ.
Gaining inspiration in the ideas behind the proof of the previous result,
we can resort to an alternative and more efficient codification of the product
logic and also, as shown below, of the product components of any Nice BL logic.
Motivated by the possibility of the addition of rational constants to the language,
we rather considered to use the extension over the negative real numbers, R−• ,
instead of Z−• itself. Formally,
R−• := 〈{x ∈ R : x ≤ 0} ∪ {−∞},+,−′, 0,−∞〉
where the operations are defined as in Z−• , but over the extended universe of the
negative real numbers.
This is also a product algebra and its operations keep being linear as in the
Z−• case, which is what we need in order to gain practical efficiency.
It is natural to see that the standard product algebra is in fact isomorphic
to R−• and so the logics arising from them coincide.
Lemma 9.4. For any pair 〈a, b〉 ∈ (0, 1) × {z ∈ R : z < 0}, the function
σ〈a,b〉 : [0, 1]→ {x ∈ R : x ≤ 0} ∪ {−∞} defined by
σ〈a,b〉(x) =
{
−∞ if x = 0
b · logax otherwise
is an isomorphism between [0,1]Π and R
−
• (sending · to + and → to −).
Proof. It is first clear that σ is order preserving: being a ∈ (0, 1), the function
loga is monotonically decreasing (in (0, 1]) and being b a negative number, b·loga
is monotonically increasing. With the same basic calculus we know that it is also
a bijection and extending it by mapping 0 to −∞ results in a bijective mapping
between [0, 1] and {x ∈ R : x ≤ 0} ∪ {−∞}.
In order to prove it is an homomorphism, it is first clear that the top and
bottom elements are properly mapped between the two algebras. For what
concerns the operations, the results follow naturally using basic properties of
the logarithm function.
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Let x, y ∈ [0, 1]. If x = 0, then clearly σ〈a,b〉(x · y) = σ〈a,b〉(0) = −∞ =
σ〈a,b〉(0) + σ〈a,b〉(x). On the other hand, if both x, y > 0, then σ〈a,b〉(x · y) =
b · loga(x ·y). By the properties of the logarithm, this is equal to b ·(logax+ logby)
and so to σ〈a,b〉(x) + σ〈a,b〉(y).
For what respects the → operation, consider x, y ∈ [0, 1]. If x ≤ y, then
σ〈a,b〉(x→Π y) = σ〈a,b〉(1) = 0. On the other hand, since σ〈a,b〉 is order preserv-
ing, we know that σ〈a,b〉(x) ≤ σ〈a,b〉(y) and so σ〈a,b〉(x) − σ〈a,b〉(y) = 1 too. If
x > y, then by definition we know that σ〈a,b〉(x →Π y) = σ〈a,b〉(y/x). If y = 0
then clearly σ〈a,b〉(y/x) = σ〈a,b〉(0) = −∞ = σ〈a,b〉(y) − σ〈a,b〉(x). Otherwise,
σ〈a,b〉(y/x) = b · loga(y/x). Again, by the properties of the logarithm function,
this is equal to b·(logay−logax) which is the definition of σ〈a,b〉(x)−′σ〈a,b〉(y). 
With the previous result in mind, it becomes clear how to translate each
product component from an ordinal sum to a component formed by 〈R−• , i〉,
where i denotes the index of the original product component. In fact and due to
the behaviour of the product algebras, it is enough to translate only the interior
of the product components (to the interior of copies of R−• ), and thus we avoid
the problem of having the same element addressed in two ways.1
Let ∗ = ⊕i∈I〈∗i, (bi, ti)〉 for I a finite indexes set, {∗i}i∈I a set of operations
in {∗ L, ∗G, ∗Π}∪{∗ Ln, ∗Gn}n∈Z,n>1, and {(bi, ti)}i∈I a family of pairwise disjoint
open intervals of [0, 1]. Our objective is to substitute the product fragments (i.e.,
(bi, ti) such that ∗i = ∗Π) by copies of the R−• properly positioned. First of all,










{〈x, i〉 : x ∈ R, x < 0}
The order relation in S is the natural one, understanding that the 〈x, i〉
elements (for a fixed i) are placed (strictly) in between bi and ti Formally the
definition is a follows.
Definition 9.5. Let S be the universe defined above and x, y ∈ U . Then x is
smaller or equal to y in S (x ≤S y) whenever one of the following cases holds:
• For x, y ∈ [0, 1], then x ≤ y with the usual order of the reals
• For x = 〈z, i〉 and y ∈ [0, 1], then y ≥ ti
• For x ∈ [0, 1] and y = 〈z, i〉, then x ≤ bi
• For x = 〈z1, i1〉 and y = 〈z2, i2〉 with i1 6= i2, then ti1 ≤ bi2
• For x = 〈z1, i〉 and y = 〈z2, i〉, then z1 ≤ z2 with the usual order of the
reals.
1 Observe that, naturally, the elements bi of component of these type could either be referred
to by bi ∈ [0, 1], as belonging to the component below, or by 〈−∞, i〉 and the same happens
for ti, which could lead to problems in the computation of the problem.
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From here, we can define a new conjunction operation ∗′, over the universe
S as follows:
x ∗′ y :=

x ∗ y if x, y ∈ [0, 1]
min{x, y} if

x ∈ [0, 1] and y = 〈z, i〉 or
x = 〈z, i〉 and y ∈ [0, 1] or
x = 〈z1, i1〉, y = 〈z2, i2〉 and i1 6= i2
〈z1 + z2, i〉 if x = 〈z1, i〉 and y = 〈z2, i〉
Clearly, the corresponding residuated operation is given by:
x→∗′ y :=

1 if x ≤S y
x→ y if x >S y and x, y ∈ [0, 1]
y if x >S y and

x ∈ [0, 1] and y = 〈z, i〉 or
x = 〈z, i〉 and y ∈ [0, 1] or
x = 〈z1, i1〉, y = 〈z2, i2〉 and i1 6= i2
〈z2 − z1, i〉 if x >S y and x = 〈z1, i〉 and y = 〈z2, i〉
We will denote S∗′ the BL-algebra defined from these two operations over S,
i.e.,
S∗′ := 〈S, ∗′,→′, 0, 1〉
Clearly, in this algebra, the interpretation of & is ∗′ and that of →, →∗′ .
Theorem 9.6. Let ∗ be a Nice BL Logic conjunction operation. Then [0,1]∗
and S∗′ are isomorphic BL-algebras.
Proof. It is easy to see that we can define an embedding from [0,1]∗ into S∗′ that
moreover is surjective, by adjusting the proof of Lemma 9.4. It is just necessary
to take into account a normalization of the values of the product components
before applying the σ mapping defined before (and the identity function as the
mapping from the elements outside the products components).
For each i ∈ I with ∗i = ∗Π, define the normalization function ni : (bi, ti)→
(0, 1) by ni(x) =
x−bi
ti−bi . Note that for x, y ∈ (bi, ti), it holds that ni(x ∗ y) =
ni(x) · ni(y).
Given that in the case of Lemma 9.4 each pair of elements from (0, 1) ×
{z ∈ R : z < 0} determines a different isomorphism, it is natural that now
each set with one of this pairs for each product component determines different
isomorphisms between the two algebras.
Let then P be a set of pairs of values from the product components at each
side, i.e., for each P = {〈xi, 〈−vxi , i〉〉 : i ∈ I with ∗i = ∗Π, xi ∈ (bi, ti), vxi ∈
R, vxi > 0}.
We define the function σP : [0, 1]→ S by
σP (x) :=
{
〈−vxi · logni(xi)ni(x), i〉 if x ∈ (bi, ti) for some i ∈ I with ∗i = ∗Π
x otherwise













h vxi · logni(xi)ni(y), iiy
Figure 9.1: Diagram of σ isomorphism over a product component
Following the same reasoning that in the proof of Lemma 9.4, and taking in
consideration that outside the product components we have the identity, it is
easy to check that σP is injective and surjective because the identity function and
the logarithm are so. As for proving that σP is an homomorphism, the methods
coincide with those of Lemma 9.4, taking into consideration the possible types
of pairs of elements depending on their position in [0, 1] for what concerns the
components.
Observe that the inverse of σP is the identity function for all the elements
outside a product component and for the rest, it is




Figure 9.1 represents the σ isomorphism in both directions, where (bi, ti) is a
product component.

From the previous theorem, it is immediate that the logics arising from [0,1]∗
and those from S∗′ coincide, which allows us to use the later algebra in order to
compute the solutions.
Rational constants and ∆ operator
Two different ways to expand at propositional level the previously presented log-
ics are very interesting to point out: truth constants and the Monteiro-Baaz ∆
projection operator. Both are natural extensions of the classical fuzzy language
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and have been widely studied from a theoretical point of view. On the other
hand, the applicability, or we could even say necessity, of this enhanced express-
ibility level from the point of view of applications is clear: it allows to address
a particular variable of the system and fix its value to a previously known one
(that is, use a constant), or being able to reason differently if a variable is equal
to 1 or not (which is reachable using the ∆ operator).
For what this work is concerned, it is clear how to work with the ∆ operation,
since it has a very determined semantic definition (over linearly ordered algebras,
which is our case). As explained in Chapter 2, in any BL-chain,
∆(x) =
{
1 if x = 1
0 otherwise
In the case of Nice BL-logics, the two associated algebras we are concerned
with (namely [0,1]∗ and S∗′) are linearly ordered and so the definition of the
∆ operation coincides with the one above in both cases. Moreover, it is clear
that the σ and σ′ mappings used in the proof of Theorem 9.6 keep behaving as
restricted embeddings when the ∆ operation is also considered.
The case of working with truth constants and in particular, with rational
constants that fall within a product component, was already remarked at the
end of Theorem 9.6. Indeed, using constants was the main reason behind the
use of the negative cone of the real numbers instead of that of the naturals,
which, on the other hand, led to a more constructive proof in order to show the
logical equivalence of these two algebras. The key fact in order to understand
the treatment of constants in these kind of components is that the function
f(x) = xk is an endomorphism of the standard product algebra [0,1]Π for any
k ∈ R with k > 0. This means that the deductions over [0,1]Π extended with
rational constants interpreted by its name coincide with those over [0,1]Π with
the constants ”moved” arbitrarily (but consistently among them). That is to say,
the interpretation of one arbitrary constant c can be set to any value (different
from the top and bottom elements), and the other ones will take their values
depending on it (and on the relation of their names).
As usual, we denote by [0,1]Q∗ the standard algebra of ∗ expanded with
rational constant symbols interpreted by its name.
On the other hand, for our purposes, we need not to address a unique rational
expansion of S∗ (that is to say, fix a unique interpretation of the rational con-
stants). It is only needed that, while the constants that fall out of any product
component maintain their interpretations as rationals from [0, 1], the other ones
will have a different particular behaviour. Let Ci = [0, 1]Q ∩ (bi, ti) for i ∈ I.
Definition 9.7. We say that an algebra SQ∗′ is a rational expansion of S∗′
when SQ∗′ has the form 〈S, ∗′,→∗′ , 0, 1, {cS
Q
∗′}c∈[0,1]Q〉 and the following holds:
• For i ∈ I such that ∗i = ∗Π, there is ci0 ∈ Ci with ci0
SQ∗′ = 〈−vi, i〉 with
vi ∈ R, vi > 0 and dS
Q
∗′ = 〈−vi · logn(ci0)n(d), i〉 for each d ∈ Ci (where
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n stands for the normalization function defined in the proof of Theorem
9.6).
• For each d in [0, 1]Q such that d 6∈ Ci for any i ∈ I such that ∗i = ∗Π,
d
SQ∗′ = d.
Now, the addition of constants slightly changes the formulation of Theorem
9.6 and its proof.
Lemma 9.8. [0,1]Q∗ is isomorphic to any rational expansion of S∗′ .
Proof. The proof is analogue to that of Theorem 9.6 in almost all aspects. The
only different point is that of not having an embedding for each pair of values of
the product components, but now the set of pairs is limited to pairs of constants
from each side. For simplicity on the calculus, we will take these constants to
be the ci0 outlined at the definition of free rational expansion of S∗′ . Let S
Q
∗′ be
a free rational expansion of S∗′ and P = {〈ci0, ci0
SQ∗′ 〉 : i ∈ I with ∗i = ∗Π, ci0 ∈
(bi, ti) ∩ [0, 1]Q} where ci0
SQ∗′ = 〈−vi, i〉 for some vi ∈ R, vi > 0.
The rest of the proof coincides with the one of Theorem 9.6 and the only
point that needs to be checked is that σP is an homomorphism for the constants
too, which is immediate.
First, it is clear that σP behaves as the identity for all the constants whose
name is a rational value out of all the product components, and so they are sent
to their interpretation in SQ∗′ .
Consider a constant c such that c ∈ (bi, ti) where ∗i = ∗Π. By definition of
σ we know that σ(c) = σ(c) = 〈−vi · logni(ci0)ni(c), i〉. This coincides with the
definition of cS
Q
∗′ , which concludes the proof. 
As before, this implies that the logic arising from [0,1]Q∗ coincides with that
of any free rational expansion of S∗′ . It is natural to see that using the inverse
of σ, we can translate a particular evaluation over some SQ∗′ to [0,1]
Q
∗ .
9.2 Some modal expansions
Within this section, we will detail the approach followed towards the implemen-
tation of some modal expansion of the Nice BL logics defined in the previous
section. Our objective is to design the methods to treat finite structures with a
crisp accessibility relation and evaluate over Nice BL logics.
As explained in Chapter 6, the L∗ logics do not enjoy in general the finite
model property. It is then unclear whether the process to decide if a formula
is a theorem (or satisfiable) in L∗ is decidable. It was not in the scope of this
dissertation to study this problem, but our intuition is that, given the strong
relation of these logics with first order fuzzy logics, it is semi-decidable and thus,
only in some cases the solver would produce an answer.
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Since our main objective was producing an application useful from a practical
point of view, we also wondered whether a real-world problem would truly require
modal structures with an infinite number of worlds. Thus we decided to restrict
the solver to reason over finite Kripke structures, even though these do not fully
coincide with those of K∗. Starting from a Nice BL logic L, we will refer to this
modal expansion KωL and its definition is given semantically as expected.
Definition 9.9. Let L be a Nice BL-logic. For a finite set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ},
Γ `KωL ϕ if for any L-valued Kripke model M with crisp accessibility relation
and a finite set of worlds it hods that Γ M ϕ.
To treat the problem of generating a finite model (either to prove that a cer-
tain formula is not a theorem, or to prove that a set of equations are satisfiable),
we exploit the notion of witness of a modal formula in a world. This is, the
existence of a particular world among the successors of the of the original one
where the effective value of the modal formula on the original world is taken by
the non-modal version of the formula. This clearly exists, since working over a
finite model, the definitions of the 2 and 3 operations now become min and
max of a set of values.
Formally and in order to get a clear design of the application and low com-
puting times, for a given formula (or equivalently, a finite set of formulas) we
generate a Kripke frame with some attached information, which will generate all
possible models in terms of the evaluation of the formula in a certain world. This
allows to quickly generate a counter-model for a formula that is not a theorem
(and also for a set Γ ∪ {ϕ} such that Γ 6|=KωL varphi.
The construction of this frame is similar to that done by Ha´jek in [73] in
the context of fuzzy description logics. For our purposes, we will define it here
in a purely modal way. It is based on the decomposition of the formulas up to
modal level, which are the elements that end up determining the structure and
complexity of this general frame.
Definition 9.10. Let ϕ be a formula. The set of propositional subformulas
of ϕ, PS(ϕ) is inductively defined by:
PS(p) := {x} for p being a propositional variable or a constant symbol
PS(Mψ) := {Mψ} for M ∈ {2,3}
PS(ψ & χ) := PS(ψ) ∪ PS(χ)
PS(ψ → χ) := PS(ψ) ∪ PS(χ)
PS(∆ψ) := PS(ψ)
Using the previously defined set and taking into account that any formula
has a finite number of subformulas (in the usual sense of the word), it is possible
to generate recursively the structure commented above. It will consist on a tree
where all the worlds except for the root one are pairs of the form 〈n,Mψ〉 with
n ∈ N, M ∈ {2,3} and ϕ ∈ Fm. The Mψ modal formula associated to each
world indicates that the value of Mψ at the father of the world (it is only one,
since it is a tree) coincides with the value of ψ in the current world.













Figure 9.2: Examples of the Skeleton tree
The following algorithm shows how this structure can be constructed recur-
sively, starting from a structure with only a root note S = {〈0, ∅〉}, the index of
that (root ) world labelled by 0 and from an empty set of accessibility relations
R = ∅. We will write mod(χ) to the denote the function that returns true if χ
is of the form Mψ and false otherwise. Also, for a set of worlds as the above one,
we will denote by last(S) the greatest index in the worlds from S.
Listing 9.1: Skeleton(Formula S R f)
NewS = S
NewR = R
MPS(Formula) = {g in PS(Formula) such that mod(g)}
if MPS(Formula) is empty, return S, R
otherwise do:
for each g in MPS(Formula) do:
newIndex = last(NewS)+1
NewS = NewS \cup \langle newIndex, g \rangle
NewR = NewR \cup \langle f, newIndex \rangle
NewS, NewR$ = Skeleton(g NewS NewR newIndex)
Figure 9.2 gives some examples of this construction.
This algorithm generates a finite tree for a given formula ϕ, with maximum
depth given by the maximum number of nested modalities in ϕ (MMD(ϕ)).
Following the algorithm, it is easy to check that that the size of the skeleton
tree (i.e., the number of worlds of the frame) is given by the amount of modal
operators appearing in the formula. Indeed, a new world is only added for each
formula beginning by 2 or 3.
We can see that this skeleton is enough in order to ”witness” the value of a
formula in a particular world from an arbitrary model.
Lemma 9.11. Let M = 〈W,R, e〉 be a finite [0,1]∗-kripke model, w ∈ W and
ϕ a formula. Then, there is a model Sk = 〈Wsk, Rske′〉 where 〈Wsk, Rsk〉 is a
restriction of the Skeleton(ϕ) frame and
e(w,ϕ) = e′(0, ϕ)
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(where 0 is the root of the skeleton tree).
Proof. Since W is finite, we know the model is witnessed. This implies that the
set WS(M, w,Mψ) = {v ∈ W such that Rwv and e(w,Mψ) = e(v, ψ)} is empty
if and only if it does not exist any v ∈W with Rwv. Then, define the function
wit(M, w,Mψ) =
{
∅ if WS(M, w,Mψ) = ∅
any v ∈WS(M, w,Mψ) otherwise
For practical reasons, we will define wit(M, ∅,Mψ) = ∅. 2
It is now easy to formalize the strong relation between the worlds in Wsk and
those chosen by the wit function. Let σ be the mapping from Wsk into W ∪{∅}
defined by:
σ(0) = w
σ(〈v,Mψ〉) = wit(M, σ(father(〈v,Mψ〉)),Mψ)
Now, consider the restriction of Skeleton(ψ) to the universe W ′ = {w ∈
Wsk : σ(w) 6= ∅}, and let e′ be the evaluation over this frame given by
e′(w, x) = e(σ(w), x)
It is clear that σ(w) ∈ W for all w ∈ W ′. Moreover, observe that
wit(M, σ(v),Mψ) = ∅ if and only if σ(v) has no successors in M. More-
over, wit(M, σ(v),Mψ) = ∅ implies that σ(w) = ∅ for any w ∈ Wsk such
that Rskvw. From here it follows that for any v, w ∈ W ′ such that R′skvw,
Rσ(v)σ(w) (in M). In particular, it is interesting to remark that for any v ∈W ′,
wit(M, σ(father(〈v,Mψ〉)),Mψ) 6= ∅.
Now, for any 〈v,Mψ〉 ∈W ′ we can prove the following chain of equalities
e′(〈v,Mψ〉, ψ) = e(σ(〈v,Mψ〉), ψ) = e(wit(M, σ(father(〈v,Mψ〉)),Mψ), ψ) =
e(σ(father(〈v,Mψ〉)),Mψ) = e′(father(〈v,Mψ〉),Mψ)
In particular, this implies that e′(0, ϕ) = e(w,ϕ), concluding the proof. 
Having a structure defined in the above way, we can see that the computa-
tional complexity of the problem of determining whether a formula is true in all
the finite [0,1]Q∗ -Kripke models is of the same order than in the propositional
case.
2If ∅ ∈W , consider in the whole proof the model M with the world ∅ renamed to ∅′.

Chapter 10
mNiBLoS: modal Nice BL
Logics Solver
To the best of our knowledge, little attention has been paid to the development of
a generic solver for systems of mathematical fuzzy logic. Some theoretical works
about computations (mainly for  L logic) have been presented and there is also
an important number of studies on complexity and proof theory on fuzzy logics
too, but a working application that copes with the most common fuzzy logics
has still not been implemented. We consider this is a problem that limits the use
of fuzzy logics in real applications, mainly in the field of Artificial Intelligence,
where several theoretical projects that resort to these logics can been found.
In [6], a new approach for implementing a theorem prover for  L, Go¨del and
Product fuzzy logics using Satisfiability Modulo Theories was proposed. The
idea of using Satisfiability Modulo Theories solvers for this problem was new
and the results were interesting for  L and Go¨del because the results were op-
timistically efficient. Also, the modularity this approach enjoys allows to cope
with several fuzzy logics. However, in the case of Product logic, the results were
far from being satisfactory. In [121] a solver for the whole family of logics based
on a continuous t-norm was presented and the particular case of the product
logic was strongly enhanced using theoretical equivalences for reasoning over an
equivalent but less hard -computationally talking- algebra that the original one.
For what respects modal expansions of these logics, almost no work seems to
have been developed. Some notes towards the implementation of a solver (that
works with the problem of positive satisfiability) for product description logic
(a fragment of product modal logic) over the standard product algebra can be
found in [5]. However, the work presented there uses the possibility of reduc-
ing a problem of positive satisfiability to the satisfiability of a quantifier free
boolean formula, which is not proved to work in more general cases. Moreover,
the resulting formula has non-linear real arithmetic properties, making it very
challenging from an efficiency point of view.
In the current chapter, we provide details on the theoretical basis necessary
165
166 Chapter 10. mNiBLoS: modal Nice BL Logics Solver
for the extension of Anso´tegui et al.’s work. We present an application that
is able to solve problems involving reasoning over a wide family of BL-chains,
namely the Nice BL logics we defined in the previous chapter, and also supports
modal operators whose semantic behaviour will be determined by finite crisp
Kripke structures (evaluated over Nice BL chains). We present some implemen-
tation details and the obtained results of a new solver which is a generalization of
the one shown in [121], integrating more efficient ways of reasoning for the prod-
uct logic in the cases where this can be done (i.e., whenever there is a product
component on the definition of the t-norm).
10.1 What does mNiBLoS do?
The software application presented here, mNiBLoS, performs, over a certain
modal logic, either the task of checking whether a given formula is a theorem
(valid for all possible evaluations over all possible finite frames), whether a pair
formed by a sequence of premises and a formula hold in the logical consequence
relation in the same sense that above, or finally, whether a given set of equations
is locally satisfiable (i.e., in a world of a structure) and provides a model for this
if the answer is affirmative. Explicitly, as a concise presentation of the solver, its
use can be summarized in terms of the inputs and outputs through the following
lines:
• First, a nice BL logic L is chosen. The exact format is the one specified in
the piece of code 10.1
• Then, a particular task op to execute must be specified by the user. This
determines the remaining arguments of the program.
– With op =th, the specified task is theoremhood checking. A formula
will be asked and after the execution, the program will show a message
confirming whether the formula is or not a theorem in the logic L.
– With op =d, the specified task is logical consequence checking (c).
A formula and a set of formulas (premises) shall be given. After the
execution, the program will show a message confirming whether the
formula is or not a logical consequence of the premises set in the logic
L.
– With op =s, the specified task is satisfiability checking. A set of
equations is asked to the user and the result of the execution will be
a message confirming whether the set of equations is locally satisfi-
able or not in the logic L and if it is so it will show a model (the
relation matrix and the assignment of each variable in each world of
the models) that satisfies it in world #0.
The notation in which the formulas and equations are asked for is the Polish
prefix notation (which is much simpler to treat internally), using the variables,
constants, operations and relation symbols formally described in the piece of
code 10.2.
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10.2 Design of the application
In this work we generalize the idea presented in [6], exploiting results pre-
sented on Chapter 9 to expand the solver tasks and to enhance its performance.
The metodology behind the design of the application is based in the possibil-
ity of defining the strong conjunction as the ordinal sum of the basic cases
( Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and product ones) specified over certain intervals, as de-
tailed in 2.3. Moreover, while the BL logic was not considered in [6], it is not
hard to include in our reasoner, making use of Theorem 9.1: we can reduce
reasoning over BL, when dealing with a particular set of formulas, to work over
the logic defined with the t-norm given by an ordinal sum of (n+1)  Lukasiewicz
components, where n is the number of different variables in the set of formulas
involved.
To implement the ordinal sum as defined above we initially considered the
classical definition of the three basic t-norms,  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product.
Realizing the slow behaviour of the product logics, due to its non-linear nature,
we developed some theoretical results that allow us to obtain a more efficient
encoding (see Theorem 9.6).
As a negative effect of doing this change, there exist some potential problems
with the treatment of the constant symbols from the product components. This
is due to the fact that it is problematic from a computational point of view, to
use the logarithmic function, which is a keystone in the construction of the iso-
morphism from Theorem 9.6. Computer applications are not able to instantiate
all the real numbers for a simple reason it is not possible to provide a finite codi-
fication for them. Since it is not known whether if for two arbitrary a, b, logab is
rational or not, this takes us to a problematic point. While the theory tells how
to move [0,1]Π to R
−
• and vice-versa (that is, the isomorphism from Theorem
9.8 and its inverse), if there exist several constant symbols specified by the user
in the same product component, the codification of the book-keeping axioms
in R−• (that is to say, point one from Definition 9.7) is not possible in general.
This happens whenever that logarithm is not a rational -or it is a rational with
more than 16 decimals, the maximum sensibility of Python, our programming
language-. We though of several options to overcome this obstacle, all passing
through giving to the user a minimal inexactness or imposing some limitations
in the set of constants allowed. We comment the possible solutions here, with
their respective pros and cons, and justify the chosen one.
• Imposing to the user to provide a ”seed” within each product component
with constants and then expressing the constants as any rational number,
which will be the power to which the seed is elevated to in order to get the
real value. Pros: No inexactness can happen (the logarithm in base ”seed”
of each constant is a rational number, easy to deal with). Cons: It imposes
a limitation on the language allowed and, overall, it forces the users to do
a very complex and quite unnatural codification of the constants.
• Looking for the previously commented seed. Pros: Again, no inexactness
can happen. Cons: This process is not even decidable (this seed can not
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exist), and for some tested cases with solution, takes a really long time
even with only a pair of values.
• Forcing a slight modification (of the order of 10−5) the constants given by
the user, in order to get the previous value. Pros: There is no inexactness
in the reasoning over the new constants. Cons: We modify the user data
and to a larger extent to that of the following point.
• The chosen option. Again, forcing a slight modification of the values
given by the user (except of one, c0), but in order to get that the logarithm
in base c0 of these new values are a rational numbers. The modification in
this case depends on the sensibility of the programming language: the value
given by the user and the one used in the reasoner will be indiscernible in
the used language. In our case, using python, we have a sensibility of 16
decimal numbers.Pros: As before, There is no inexactness in the reasoning
with the new constants. Cons: As before, we modify the user data, but in
a very slightly way.
With our codification, there exists the possibility of getting wrong results, for
cases when z3 values a variable in a wrong interval, that is, somewhere between
the real value and the approximated one. It is an open work to fix this problem:
since the sensibility allowed to the user constants is, again, that of python, it
is possible to make use of a discrete universe (instead of that of R−• ) with step
equal to the minimum distance expressible in python (that is, 10−16). This
would fix the uncontrolled results and we think is the highest accuracy that can
be achieved with a computer application. However, some tests have resulted in
highly inefficient systems and so they are not a satisfactory solution.
Finally, from a purely technical point of view, the theory from SMT we have
used in mNiBLoS includes also the theory of the arrays, which allow a cleaner
design of the application. First, arrays serve the purpose of storing the values of
the product components (that is, the natural number associated to the index of
the product component and the negative real value of the variable). Moreover,
when dealing with the modal expansions, the use of arrays simplifies the practical
approach and we can define the modal variables as lists (of length determined by
the number of worlds created with the Algorithm 9.1), each item of the list being
the variable in the world determined by that index. Even though, being this list
of finite length, this is not the only way to deal with the problem, we though
it was the clearest one and also, one of the fastest, since SMT is optimized to
deal with the theories it has implemented (while, on the other hand, we are no
experts on theory of arrays and data accessibility).
10.3 Use of mNiBLoS
By now, the interface of our solver is limited to command lines. This allows a
simpler codification and a more direct access to the options of the solver. More-
over, intensive and automated executions can be easily coded. The development
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of a graphical interface to make the application more accessible and user-friendly
is left for future work.
Pre execution
The program is implemented in python and calls the SMT-solver z3 developed
by Microsoft Research, and it is meant to be used from the terminal or command
line.
Before its use, a configuration file should be filled by the user. Since the
SMT solver is internally used, in file
configuration.py the line
Z3_LOCATION = "/.../z3"
must be modified to meet the user’s z3 folder. It shall have the relative (to the reasoner
main folder) or the absolute path in the user’s computer to the z3 solver general folder,
obtained after downloading and decompressing the z3 solver ([130]).
Inputs
From the main solver, the application is called as
>python mniblos.py
The previous command starts the interactive application, that is, the arguments
are asked to the user in order and help messages can be generated (with the form of
the arguments required). It is important to remark that we have no implemented error
control for what concerns the inputs from the used. This means that if the inputs
are not properly given, i.e., following the specifications we remark, the results will be
uncontrolled (and, in most cases, the program will crash).
First, mNiBLoS asks for the logic L to be used. The following help message can
be reached writing h, which contains all the information concerning the form of L:
Listing 10.1: help on logic formatting message
The logics accepted by mNiBLoS have two main possible formats:
* bl (to indicate Hajek’s Basic Logic)
* (b1, t1)v1+(b2,t2)v2+...+(bn, tn)vn (to indicate the ordinal
sum of the logics vi in the intervals (tk, t(k+1)) where:
- bi,ti are rational values in [0,1] with bi < ti and ti
<= b(i+1)
- vi are of the following form:
l (for denoting a Lukasiewicz component)
ln with n natural number >= 2 (for denoting an n-
valued Lukasiewicz component)
g (for denoting a Godel component)
gn with n natural number >= 2 (for denoting an n-
valued Godel component)
p (for denoting a Product component)
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Note that if the logic bl is selected, it will be internally computed as n+1 (equally
distributes in [0, 1]) copies of the  Lukasiewicz t-norm, for n being the number of vari-
ables appearing in the formulas considered (following Corollary 9.1). Thus, the use of
rational constants in this case must be careful: the user must be aware of the kind of
logic used internally and to which extent two constants belong to the same component
or not.
After specifying the logic, the user is asked for the task that will be done over L.
That is, he must choose between th, d or s to select the operation, corresponding each
one of these to, respectively, theoremhood proving of a formula, checking if a formula
can be deduced from a set of premises or looking for a model that locally satisfies a set
of equations.
Depending on the option selected by the user, the rest of the program will be
slightly different, starting from asking for different data. In any case, the rest of the
data corresponds to formulas or equations of the logic. The following message with the
specification of the notation of the formulas and equations accepted by mniblos can be
obtained writing h.
Listing 10.2: help on formulas formatting message
The format of the formulas accepted by mNiBLoS is as follows:
1) The variables must be named by xi, where i are natural
numbers
2) The constants can be either rational numbers in (0,1)
3) The formulas are built inductively from variables and constant
symbols as follows:
*The notation must be Polish (prefix) and in parenthesis, i.e.,
(operation arg1... argn) for an n-ary operation and argi
valid formulas
* The possible operations with their corresponding arity and
usual meaning is the following:
- wcon/2 (weak conjunction = minimum)
- wdis/2 (weak disjunction = maximum)
- con/2 (conjuntion = t-norm)
- impl/2 (implication = residuum)
- neg/1 (negation = (impl x 0))
- delta/1 (Monteiro-Baaz Delta)
- box/1 (modal box operation)
- diamond/1 (modal diamond operation)
The equations (for the satisfiability operation) must be of the form
(R form1 form2), where
* form1 and form2 are formulas in the previous format
* R is a relation operation among the following ones:
- eq (equal)
- leq (less or equal)
- l (strictly less)
- ge (greater or equal)
- g (strictly greater)
If the operation selected by the user is th, only one formula is asked for. In case
the operation is d, mniblos asks for a non-empty set of formulas which will conform
the premises set and for a final formula that will play the role of the consequence of
the deduction. Finally, if the operation selected is s, the user needs to provide mniblos
with a non-empty set of equations.
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In order to easily allow the execution of the solver from a bash script (or other
program), it is also possible to include all the previously commented parameters as
arguments of the program. That is, it is also accepted the following format for executing
mniblos (when the formatting of each argument is as detailed above).
non-interactive mniblos
>python mniblos.py L op dataOperation
where L is the Nice BL logic, op is the operation to perform and dataOperation is,
depending on op:
• If op is th, dataOperation must be a formula
• If op is th, dataOperation is of the form [prem1,..., premn, cons],
where premi are formulas (for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n) which will denote the premises
set and cons is a formula referring to the consequence.
• If op is th, dataOperation is of the form [eq1,..., eqn], where eqi are
equations.
The generated SMT-code
Running the program with the desired options, an auxiliary output file named smtcode
will be generated in the z3codes folder. This file will contain the necessary SMT-code
to call the z3 solver over it and get the desired answer.
The generated file will be different depending on all the attributes given. We will
sketch here the most remarkable parts.
The first part of the file will be the same for all tasks and logics. In the case of
working with the option to generate a model, an extra line
(set-option :produce-models true)
will be added in the head of the file to specify that we are willing to get the models in
z3.
The first section of code begins by the definition of the propositional variable’s type
with its corresponding access methods (value and component of each variable) and
the definition of the top and bottom propositional constants. Observe that we fix the
component of the non-product components to −1 (i.e., ( 1.0)), in order to simplify
further codifications. Below, the order relations are specified between pairs of these
variables (implementing the order definition from 9.5 and so depending deeply on the
product components appearing in the logic). Finally, we conclude this ”propositional”
part by defining the operations over propositional variables. The common ones, min-
imum and maximum, that directly refer to the order relations previously defined and
then, depending on the logic, the more specific definitions of the conjunction, the im-
plication and the negation, that resort to the theoretical definition of the algebra S∗′
described in 9.
The following code illustrates a simple example of this code, for the particular logic
L = (0.1, 0.4)l+(0.4,0.7)p+(0.9,1)l4. 1. 2
1For a more easy comprehension of the following code, observe that the (ite sentence
stands for if... then... else.. and that z3 is a programming laguage that relies on
the Polish prefix (or polish) notation
2The indentation is here optimized for the comprehension of the code. Since the z3 is not
intentation-sensible, this code is to all effects equal to the one generated by mniblos.
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;propositional variable type definitions
(define-sort pvar () (Array Int Real))
(define-fun component ((x pvar)) Real
(select x 1))
(define-fun value ((x pvar)) Real
(select x 2))
(define-fun setComponent ((x pvar) (comp Real)) pvar
(store x 1 comp))
(define-fun setValue ((x pvar) (val Real)) pvar
(store x 2 val))
;truth const
(declare-const pT pvar)
(assert (and (= (component pT) (˜ 1.0)) (= (value pT) 1.0)))
(declare-const pF pvar)
(assert (and (= (component pF) (˜ 1.0)) (= (value pF) 0.0)))
;;RELATIONS
;eq(x,y) T if x = y, F else
(define-fun eq ((x pvar) (y pvar)) Bool
(and (= (component x) (component y)) (= (value x) (value y))))
;g (x,y) true if x > y, false otherwise
(define-fun g ((x pvar) (y pvar)) Bool
(ite (= (component x) (component y))
;same component
(< (value y) (value x))
;values in different components
;non-prod, prod
(ite (and (= (component x) (˜ 1.0)) (> (component y) (˜ 1.0)
))
(ite (= (component y) 1.0)
(<= 0.7(value x))
;this case in never reached
false)
;prod, non-prod
(ite (and (> (component x) (˜ 1.0)) (= (component y) (˜
1.0)))
(ite (= (component x) 1.0)
(<= (value y) 0.4)
;this case in never reached
false)
;prod-prod
(< (component y) (component x))))))
;geq (x,y) true if x >= y, false otherwise
(define-fun geq ((x pvar) (y pvar)) Bool
(or (eq x y) (g x y)))
;l (x,y) true if x < y, false otherwise
(define-fun l ((x pvar) (y pvar)) Bool
(not (geq x y)))
;leq (x, y) true if x <= y, false otherwise
(define-fun leq ((x pvar) (y pvar)) Bool
(not (g x y)))
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;;OPERATIONS
;pmin(x,y)
(define-fun pmin ((x pvar) (y pvar)) pvar
(ite (leq x y) x y))
;pmax(x,y)
(define-fun pmax ((x pvar) (y pvar)) pvar
(ite (geq x y) x y))
;weak conjunction = pmin (x, y)
(define-fun pwcon ((x pvar) (y pvar)) pvar
(pmin x y))
;weak disjunction pmax (x, y)
(define-fun pwdis ((x pvar) (y pvar)) pvar
(pmax x y))
;delta pdelta = 1 iff x = 1, 0 oth.
(define-fun pdelta ((x pvar)) pvar
(ite (= (value x) 1.0) pT pF))
;pcon(x, y)
(define-fun pcon ((x pvar) (y pvar)) pvar
(ite (and (<= 0.1 (value x)) (<= 0.1 (value y))
(<= (value x) 0.4) (<= (value y) 0.4))
;they are in the same luk-component
(setValue x
(ite (<= 0.1 (- (+ (value x) (value y)) 0.4))
(- (+ (value x) (value y)) 0.4)
0.1))
(ite (and (= (component x) 1.0) (= (component y) 1.0))
;they are in the same prod-component
(setValue x (+ (value x) (value y)))
(ite (and (<= 0.9 (value x)) (<= 0.9 (value y))
(<= (value x) 1.0) (<= (value y) 1.0))
;they are in the same luk-component
(setValue x
(ite (<= 0.9 (- (+ (value x) (value y)) 1.0))




(define-fun pimpl ((x pvar) (y pvar)) pvar
(ite (leq x y)
pT
(ite (and (<= 0.1 (value x)) (<= 0.1 (value y))
(<= (value x) 0.4) (<= (value y) 0.4))
;they are in the same luk-component
(setValue x (+ 0.4 (- (value y) (value x))))
(ite (and (= (component x) 1.0) (= (component y) 1.0))
;they are in the same prod-component
(setValue x (- (value y) (value x)))
(ite (and (<= 0.9 (value x)) (<= 0.9 (value y))
(<= (value x) 1.0) (<= (value y) 1.0))
;they are in the same luk-component
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(setValue x (+ 1.0 (- (value y) (value x))))
;different components
y)))))
;negation (pneg x = x -> 0)
(define-fun pneg ((x pvar)) pvar
(pimpl x pF))
The next section of the generated SMT-code comprehends the definitions and meth-
ods associated with the modal expansion of the logic given by the user. The modal
extent of the codifications is given by the structure generated by the modal skeleton
(see Algorithm 9.1) generated by all the formulas in the data corresponding to the
operation. That is to say, if the operation is th, the skeleton associated to the formula;
if the operation is d, the union by the root of the skeletons of all the formulas from
the premises set and the consequence; and if the operation is s, similarly, the union
by the root of all the formulas involved in the set of equations. Among other things,
this implies that even if there are no modal operations in the formulas, the solver will
work with a modal structure, which will only have one world (the root).
At the beginning of the section we have defined the variable’s type, and the access
functions to get the value of the variable on a certain world of the structure. Similarly
to the propositional level, we define the top and bottom constant elements, as variables
that are evaluated to 1 or 0 in all the worlds of the structure. Next, the modal version of
the previously defined propositional operations is given, by just calling to the respective
propositional version component-wise for all the effective values of the variable. That
is, the number of worlds, which we know after running the skeleton algorithm.
It is noticeable that z3 does not allow the use of loops, or even the definition
of recursive functions and so the length of the variables must be explicitely given in
each operation that concerns it. In the previously commented operations, while the
definition would be nice and clean using recursion, we have had to resort to the case-
by-case definition that generates a different code depending on such length.
Later on, we have defined the real modal operations. For that, first we have defined
the accessibility square matrix R of boolean elements, which is of length equal to the
number of worlds of the skeleton structure in each side. Then, the values on coordinates
〈i, j〉 for which 〈i, j〉 was not in the accesibility relation of the skeleton structure are
set to false. This way, any assignation of R is a restriction of the skeleton structure
and so we will be in the premises of Lemma 10.3. Later on, some methods related
with the definition of the box and diamond operations are defined (those that get the
minimum/maximum of the list of values corresponding to the successors of a certain
world, those setting respectively to 1/0 the values associated to non-related worlds)
and from these, the final definitions of the modal operators are given.
While the part of code associated with the propositional level commented above
depended on the logic, this part depends on the skeleton structure generated. The
following is the codification associated with the formula (con (box (con x2 x1))
(box (con x1 (diamond x2)))), whose skeleton is built over the frame
〈{0, 1, 2, 3}, {〈0, 1〉, 〈0, 2〉, 〈2, 3〉}
Listing 10.3: Modal level STM-code
;modal types and functions
(define-sort var () (Array Int pvar))
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(assert (= (valueInWorld T 0) pT))
(assert (= (valueInWorld T 1) pT))
(assert (= (valueInWorld T 2) pT))
(assert (= (valueInWorld T 3) pT))
(declare-const F var)
(assert (= (valueInWorld F 0) pF))
(assert (= (valueInWorld F 1) pF))
(assert (= (valueInWorld F 2) pF))
(assert (= (valueInWorld F 3) pF))
;auxiliar var to generate the results
(declare-const results var)
;weak conjunction
(define-fun wcon ((x var) (y var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (pwcon (select x 3) (select y 3)))
2 (pwcon (select x 2) (select y 2)))
1 (pwcon (select x 1) (select y 1)))
0 (pwcon (select x 0) (select y 0))))
;weak disjunction
(define-fun wdis ((x var) (y var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (pwdis (select x 3) (select y 3)))
2 (pwdis (select x 2) (select y 2)))
1 (pwdis (select x 1) (select y 1)))
0 (pwdis (select x 0) (select y 0))))
;delta
(define-fun delta ((x var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (pdelta (select x 3)))
2 (pdelta (select x 2)))
1 (pdelta (select x 1)))
0 (pdelta (select x 0))))
;con(x, y)
(define-fun con ((x var) (y var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (pcon (select x 3) (select y 3)))
2 (pcon (select x 2) (select y 2)))
1 (pcon (select x 1) (select y 1)))
0 (pcon (select x 0) (select y 0))))
;impl(x y) -residuum-
(define-fun impl ((x var) (y var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (pimpl (select x 3) (select y 3)))
2 (pimpl (select x 2) (select y 2)))
1 (pimpl (select x 1) (select y 1)))
0 (pimpl (select x 0) (select y 0))))
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;negation (neg x = x -> 0)
(define-fun neg ((x var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (pneg (select x 3)))
2 (pneg (select x 2)))
1 (pneg (select x 1)))
0 (pneg (select x 0))))
;MODAL OPERATIONS
;accessibility relation matrix
;the values will meet conditions from [skeleton]
(declare-fun R () (Array Int (Array Int Bool)))
;some relations are always false from the skeleton construction:
(assert (not (select (select R 0) 0)))
(assert (not (select (select R 0) 3)))
(assert (not (select (select R 1) 0)))
(assert (not (select (select R 1) 1)))
(assert (not (select (select R 1) 2)))
(assert (not (select (select R 1) 3)))
(assert (not (select (select R 2) 0)))
(assert (not (select (select R 2) 1)))
(assert (not (select (select R 2) 2)))
(assert (not (select (select R 3) 0)))
(assert (not (select (select R 3) 1)))
(assert (not (select (select R 3) 2)))
(assert (not (select (select R 3) 3)))
;; auxiliary functions
;box related functions
;given a var and an index i, returns a list of reals of length
nworlds (i.e., a var) with
;1s in the possitions p where R[p][i] = false and the original value
of the variable otherwise
(define-fun tfunc ((x var) (orig Int)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 3))
pT
(select x 3)))
2 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 2))
pT
(select x 2)))
1 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 1))
pT
(select x 1)))
0 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 0))
pT
(select x 0))))
;returns the minimum of a list of reals of lentgh nworlds
(define-fun minList ((x var)) pvar
(pmin (pmin (pmin (select x 0) (select x 1)) (select x 2)) (select
x 3)))
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;minSuccessors
;takes a variable and an index and returns the corresponging pVar
with the value of the minimum
;over the successors of the world given by the index
(define-fun minSuccessors ((x var) (i Int)) pvar
(minList (tfunc x i)))
;box
(define-fun box ((x var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (minSuccessors x 3))
2 (minSuccessors x 2))
1 (minSuccessors x 1))
0 (minSuccessors x 0)))
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;diamond functions
;given a var and an index i, returns a list of reals of length
nworlds (i.e., a var) with
;0s in the positions p where R[p][i] = false and the original value
of the variable otherwise
(define-fun bfunc ((x var) (orig Int)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 3))
pF
(select x 3)))
2 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 2))
pF
(select x 2)))
1 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 1))
pF
(select x 1)))
0 (ite (not (select (select R orig) 0))
pF
(select x 0))))
;returns the maximum of a list of reals of lentgh nworlds
(define-fun maxList ((x var)) pvar
(pmax (pmax (pmax (select x 0) (select x 1)) (select x 2)) (select
x 3)))
;maxSuccessors
;takes a variable and an index and returns the corresponging pVar
with the value of the maximum
;over the successors of the world given by the index
(define-fun maxSuccessors ((x var) (i Int)) pvar
(maxList (bfunc x i)))
;diamond
(define-fun diamond ((x var)) var
(store (store (store (store results
3 (maxSuccessors x 3))
2 (maxSuccessors x 2))
1 (maxSuccessors x 1))
0 (maxSuccessors x 0)))
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Within a third part of the generated SMT code we have first included the specific
instantiations of the variables appearing in the formulas/equations and the definition
of the constant symbols. For the first ones, the values allowed for each variable in each
world are determined by the logic (in the sense of definition S∗ from Chapter 9, i.e.,
propositional variables with component equal to ( 1.9) and value, a real number in
[0,1] for the  Lukasiewcicz, Godel and non-determined components; the same with value
in the corresponding finite set of (bi, ti) for the finitely valued components; and finally,
for the product components in (bi, ti), propositional variables with component equal
to the index of the component in the ordinal sum and value a negative real number.
For what respects the constants, if the rational specified is not within a product
component, the associated variable is evaluated in every world of the structure to that
value. On the other hand, for the constants within a product component, the method
followed is that of leaving free one of the constants (that is, evaluating it in world
0 to an arbitrary negative number and copying this value to the other worlds) and
define the other constants in terms of this one using the relation among the rational
values with the logaritmic function. Since z3 does not support the logarithm nor the
exponential function, we had been forced to compute this values (i.e., logc0d for c0
being the free constant and d any other constant in the component) in the python
codification and just giving to z3 an approximation of 16 decimals to the real number.
We have remarked in the previous section the possible irregularities inherited from this
treatment.
Finally, in this part of code, we include also some lines oriented purely towards
the efficiency of the modal computations. As it was seen in the construction of the
skeleton model (Algorithm 9.1) and also in the proof of Lemma 10.3, the main point
behind each world of this frame is that of becoming the witness from a certain modal
formula of the father node. In our implementation, we have stored these pairings (of
modal formula and father node) when building the skeleton and thus it is possible to
fix some of the values of the formulas.
In this part, both the logic and the formulas involved in the reasoning are relevant:
the values allowed to each variable and constant are determined by the logic, while the
skeleton construction is intrinsic to the shape of the formulas.
The following piece of code illustrates the SMT-code generated for the logic (0.1,
0.4)l+(0.4,0.7)p+(0.9,1)l4 and the formula (con (impl 0.3 (box (con
x2 x1))) (impl x1 (diamond (impl 0.55 (con (box x2) 0.475))))),
whose skeleton is shown in Figure 10.1. We pick here this rather complicated formula
in order to show the codification of all the possible different cases. On the one
hand, it can be seen definition of the three kind on possible universes (i.e., infinite
valued  Lukasiewiczor Go¨del components, product components and finitely valued
components). It is also shown the treatment of the constant symbols, both within and
outside product components. And finally, the nested modalities give an idea of what
we mean by fixing the values of the modal formulas following the skeleton definition.
In order to not include unnecessary repetitive code, we present here, for what
respects the variables, only the code corresponding to variable x1 and world 0. The
complete codification includes the repetition of that piece of code, changing the 0
world to all the other possible indexes (in this case, 1,2 and 3) and the same for what
respects variable x2.
Listing 10.4: Declarations SMT-code
;;DECLARATIONS
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0
h1,⇤(x1&x2)i
h2, x1 ! ⌃(0.55 ! ⇤(x2&0.475))i
(0.3! ⇤(x1&x2))&(x1 ! ⌃(0.55! (⇤x2&0.475)))
h3,⇤x2i
Figure 10.1: skeleton tree
;;;assingments of the variables
(declare-fun x1 () var)
(assert (or
;real values
(and (= (component (valueInWorld x1 0)) (˜ 1.0))
(or (and (<= 0.0 (value (valueInWorld x1 0))) (<= (
value (valueInWorld x1 0)) 0.4))
(and (<= 0.7 (value (valueInWorld x1 0))) (<= (
value (valueInWorld x1 0)) 1.0))))
;non real values, i.e., those from the product components
(or (and (= (component (valueInWorld x1 0)) 1.0)
(< (value (valueInWorld x1 0)) 0.0)))))
;limitations for the finitely valued components
(assert (ite (and (<= 0.9 (value (valueInWorld x1 0))) (>= 1.0 (
value (valueInWorld x1 0))))
(or (= (value (valueInWorld x1 0)) (+ 0.9 (* 0.1 (/
0.0 3.0))))
(= (value (valueInWorld x1 0)) (+ 0.9 (* 0.1 (/
1.0 3.0))))
(= (value (valueInWorld x1 0)) (+ 0.9 (* 0.1 (/
2.0 3.0))))
(= (value (valueInWorld x1 0)) (+ 0.9 (* 0.1 (/
3.0 3.0)))))
true))
/******* repetition of the previous code moving 0 through {1,2,3}
and also considering the case with x2 instead of x1 *********/
;declaration of the constants
;constant outside any product component
;WARNING: no control of constants in the finitely-valued components
is done!
(declare-const c1 var )
(assert (and (= (value (valueInWorld c1 0)) 0.3)
(= (component (valueInWorld c1 0)) (˜ 1.0))))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c1 1) (valueInWorld c1 0)))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c1 2) (valueInWorld c1 0)))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c1 3) (valueInWorld c1 0)))
;constant in product component 1
(declare-fun c2() var )
(assert (= (component (valueInWorld c2 0)) 1.0))
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;it is the reference constant of the component
(assert (< (value (valueInWorld c2 0)) 0.0))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c2 1) (valueInWorld c2 0)))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c2 2) (valueInWorld c2 0)))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c2 3) (valueInWorld c2 0)))
;constant in product component 1
(declare-fun c0() var )
(assert (= (component (valueInWorld c0 0)) 1.0))
;constant relativized to the reference one
(assert (= (value (valueInWorld c0 0)) (* (value (valueInWorld c2 0)
) 2.0)))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c0 1) (valueInWorld c0 0)))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c0 2) (valueInWorld c0 0)))
(assert (= (valueInWorld c0 3) (valueInWorld c0 0)))
;the values of parts of the functions are fixed following the
skeleton definition
(assert (or (not (select (select R 0) 1))
(= (select (box (con x2 x1)) 0)
(select (con x2 x1) 1))))
(assert (or (not (select (select R 0) 2))
(= (select (diamond (impl c2 (con (box x2) c0))) 0)
(select (impl c2 (con (box x2) c0)) 2))))
(assert (or (not (select (select R 2) 3))
(= (select (box x2) 2)
(select x2 3))))
The last part of code is the one that formalizes, finally, the problem to treat. We
will present here an example of each case, to show how each one of them is faced.
The following code is generated in order to ask whether (con (impl 0.3
(box (con x2 x1))) (impl x1 (diamond (impl 0.55 (con (box x2)
0.475))))) is a theorem.
Listing 10.5: Theoremhood example
(assert (< (value (valueInWorld (con (impl c1 (box (con x2 x1))) (
impl x1 (diamond (impl c2 (con (box x2) c0))))) 0)) 1.0))
(check-sat)
If z3 concludes the previous code is unsatisfiable, that means (applying
Lemma ) that (con (impl 0.3 (box (con x2 x1))) (impl x1 (diamond
(impl 0.55 (con (box x2) 0.475))))) is a theorem. Otherwise, there is a
model and a world that evaluates the formula to less than 1 and thus, is is not a
theorem.
For what respects checking if a formula is logical deduction of a certain set of
premises, the approach is quite similar. The following code is generated to check
whether (con (box x1) x2) is consequence of (impl (box x1) (con (impl
0.3 (diamond x1)) x2))
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Listing 10.6: Deduction example
(assert (= (value (valueInWorld (impl (box x1) (con (impl c0 (
diamond x1)) x2)) 0)) 1.0))
(assert (< (value (valueInWorld (con (box x1) x2) 0)) 1.0))
(check-sat)
As before, if there is a model satisfying the previous assignments it means that the
deduction consequence does not hold over the given formulas and vice-versa.
Finally, the operation of looking for a model that locally satisfies a set of equa-
tions is similar to the previous cases, but considering the value in world 0 for the
two formulas of each equation. Moreover, in this case, an extra piece of code is at-
tached in order to get the model, if it exists. The following code illustrates this case
for the equation (eq (con (box x1) x2) (impl (box x1) (con (impl 0.3
(diamond x1)) x2)))
Listing 10.7: Local satisfiability example
(assert (eq (valueInWorld (con (box x1) x2) 0)




(get-value((select (select R 0) 0)))
(get-value((select (select R 0) 1)))
(get-value((select (select R 0) 2)))
(get-value((select (select R 0) 3)))
(get-value((select (select R 1) 0)))
(get-value((select (select R 1) 1)))
(get-value((select (select R 1) 2)))
(get-value((select (select R 1) 3)))
(get-value((select (select R 2) 0)))
(get-value((select (select R 2) 1)))
(get-value((select (select R 2) 2)))
(get-value((select (select R 2) 3)))
(get-value((select (select R 3) 0)))
(get-value((select (select R 3) 1)))
(get-value((select (select R 3) 2)))
(get-value((select (select R 3) 3)))
(get-value((component (select x2 0))))
(get-value((value (select x2 0))))
(get-value((component (select x1 0))))
(get-value((value (select x1 0))))
(get-value((component (select x2 1))))
(get-value((value (select x2 1))))
(get-value((component (select x1 1))))
(get-value((value (select x1 1))))
(get-value((component (select x2 2))))
(get-value((value (select x2 2))))
(get-value((component (select x1 2))))
(get-value((value (select x1 2))))
(get-value((component (select x2 3))))
(get-value((value (select x2 3))))
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(get-value((component (select x1 3))))
(get-value((value (select x1 3))))
Output
Depending on the task we are performing, the output of the program will be different.
• If the chosen operation was that of proving theoremhood (th), the output mes-
sage will be either the confirmation or the negation that the specified formula is
a theorem in the given logic. Namely,
THE SPECIFIED FORMULA (IS/ IS NOT) A THEOREM
• Similarly, if the task to be done was proving if a certain formula was derivable
from a set of premises, the output message will be either the confirmation or the
negation that the specified formula is a logical consequence of the premises in
the given logic. Namely,
THE FORMULA SPECIFIED (IS/ IS NOT) DERIVABLE FROM THE GIVEN SET
OF PREMISES
• If the selected operation was that of checking satisfiability and generating a
model of a set of equations, the output message will either confirm or deny
that the equations set is locally satisfiable (i.e., that there exists a kripke model
evaluated on the given logic and a world within this model that satisfies the set
of equations). If the previous answer is affirmative, said model will be shown,
taking into account that the differentiated world is 0. The format of the model
will be that of first showing the accessibility matrix (an square matrix of side
equal to the number of worlds of the model, with the position [i][j] being either
1 or 0 respectively if world i is related to j or not. Then, for each variable, a list
of values is given, indicating each one of these the value of the variable in the
world indexed by the position in the list.
To explain it with an example, the output of running the sat-
isfiability operation with logic (0.1, 0.4)l+(0.4,0.7)p+(0.9,1)l4
and equation (eq (con (box x1) x2) (impl (box x1) (con (impl
0.3 (diamond x1)) x2))) is the following one:
Output example
A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR THE SET OF EQUATIONS IS THE FOLLOWING ONE:
The matrix of accessibility relations of the Kripke Structure
is given by:
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
---+---+---+---+---+
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
---+---+---+---+---+
The tuple of values of each variable on each world
(ordered from the value on world 0 on) is the following:
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x2: <0.55, 0.55, (/ 7.0 10.0), (/ 7.0 10.0)>
x1: <0.55, 0.55, 1.0, (/ 7.0 10.0)>
The model represented by the previous codification can be simply reduced (seeing
that, in fact, only worlds 0 and 3 are relevant for the evaluation) to
M = 〈{0, 3}, {〈0, 3〉}, e〉
with e(0, x1) = 0.55 = e(0, x2) and e(3, x1) = 0.7 = e(3, x2).
On the other hand, for what respects intensive and automatic testing procedures,
we have only proposed an output of the program accounting on the boolean answer
of the process, that is, whether, respect to the specified task, the data associated to
the operation meet the requirements. This is because the model generated when the
operation is satisfiability checking is not useful from the point of view of an intensive
testing oriented to check not the correctness of the software (already checked) but its
efficiency.
Formally, mNiBLoS will return 1 whenever:
• The operation selected is theoremhood proving and the formula specified is a
theorem of the given logic.
• The operation selected is deduction checking and the consequence formula spec-
ified is derivable from the proposed set of premises in the given logic.
• The operation selected is satisfiability and the set of equations is locally satis-
fiable in the given logic.
On the other hand, the program will return 0 in the other cases, namely:
• The operation selected is theoremhood proving and the formula given is not a
theorem of the given logic.
• The operation selected is deduction checking and the consequence formula spec-
ified is not derivable from the proposed set of premises in the given logic.
• The operation selected is satisfiability and the set of equations is not locally
satisfiable in the given logic.
Examples
For an easier comprehension on the usage of the mNiBLoS, we include here a collec-
tion of examples of use, with their respective output messages. We express them by
specifying the logic, the operation and the data required by this last one.
• |=BL (x1 ∗ x2)→ (x2 ∗ x1)
> logic: bl
> operation: th
> formula : (impl (con x1 x2) (con x2 x1))
will provide the output
THE SPECIFIED FORMULA IS A THEOREM
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• 6|=BL ¬¬x1 → x1
> logic: bl
> operation: th
> formula : (impl (neg (neg x1)) x1)
will provide the output
THE SPECIFIED FORMULA IS NOT A THEOREM
• |=[0,1] L ¬¬x1 → x1
> logic: (0,1)l
> operation: th
> formula : (impl (neg (neg x1)) x1)
will provide the output
THE SPECIFIED FORMULA IS A THEOREM
• |=(0,0.5) L (¬∆(0.5→ x1)) ∨ ¬¬x1
> logic: (0,0.5)l
> operation: th
> formula : (wdis (neg (delta (impl 0.5 x1))) (neg (neg x1)))
will provide the output
THE SPECIFIED FORMULA IS A THEOREM
• ¬∆(x1 → 0.5) |=(0.5,1) L2 x1
> logic: (0.5,1)l2
> operation: d
> premises : (neg (delta (impl (x1 0.5))))
> consequence : x1
will provide the output
THE FORMULA SPECIFIED IS DERIVABLE FROM THE GIVEN SET OF
PREMISES
• |=KωBL (3x1 → 2x2)→ 2(x1 → x2)
> logic: bl
> operation: th
> formula : (impl (impl (diamond x1) (box x2)) (box (impl x1 x2
)))
will provide the output
THE SPECIFIED FORMULA IS A THEOREM
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> premises: (neg (delta (neg (box x1)))), (impl (diamond x1)
0.5)
> consequence: (box (neg (neg x1)))
will provide the output
THE FORMULA SPECIFIED IS DERIVABLE FROM THE GIVEN SET OF
PREMISES





> premises: (neg (delta (neg (box x1)))), (impl (diamond x1)
0.5)
> consequence: (box (neg (neg x1)))
will provide the output
THE FORMULA SPECIFIED IS NOT DERIVABLE FROM THE GIVEN SET OF
PREMISES
• exists? M (0, 0.6) L-Kripe stucture such that M |=0 {2x1 > 0 and 3x1 ≤
0.5 and 2¬¬x1 < 1}
> logic: (0,0.6)l
> operation: s
> equations: (l F (box x1)), (leq (diamond x1) 0.5), (l (box (
neg (neg x1))) T)
will provide the output
A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR THE SET OF EQUATIONS IS THE FOLLOWING ONE:
The matrix of accessibility relations of the Kripke Structure
is given by:
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
---+---+---+---+---+
0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
---+---+---+---+---+
The tuple of values of each variable on each world (ordered
from the value on world 0 on) is the following:





We devote this chapter to show the results obtained after running intensive testing of
the mNiBLoS application detailed in the previous chapters. We begin showing some
results of intensive tests over families of BL theorems that have been already used
as benchmarks in some previous works in the literature, and thus we can compare
our results with the existing ones. Since we can see some objections concerning the
generality of the previous benchmark (because the number of variables is constant),
we later present some other studies. First, we propose a family of BL whose number
of variables increases with the parameter. Next, we present some results obtained
over a randomly generated set of formulas, seeing TO DO. Finally and inspired by the
classical logic case, where the formulas expressed in clausal form are the most widely
used in terms of satisfiability problems and testing, we devote the last section of this
chapter to study this approach from the many-valued point of view.
11.1 Tests of BL theorems
Since all possible theorems on BL so are on any of its extensions, experiments over two
different families of BL-theorems were conducted, see (11.1) and (11.2) below. First,
for comparison reasons with [6], the following generalizations (based on powers of the
& connective) of the first seven Ha´jek’s axioms of BL [71] were considered:
(A1) (pn → qn)→ ((qn → rn)→ (pn → rn))
(A2) (pn&qn)→ pn
(A3) (pn&qn)→ (qn&pn)
(A4) (pn&(pn → qn))→ (qn&(qn → pn))
(A5a) (pn → (qn → rn))→ ((pn&qn)→ rn)
(A5b) ((pn&qn)→ rn)→ (pn → (qn → rn))
(A6) ((pn → qn)→ rn)→ (((qn → pn)→ rn)→ rn)
(11.1)
where p, q and r are propositional variables and n ∈ N \ {0}. It is worth noticing that
the length of these formulas grows linearly with the parameter n.
In [6] the authors refer to [110] to justify why these formulas can be considered a
good test bench for (at least)  Lukasiewicz logic. In our opinion, these formulas have
the problem to be a good evaluator set of using only three variables. We consider this
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is a serious drawback because the known results on BL complexity state that  Lukasi-
ewicz-SAT is an NP-complete problem when the number of variables in the input is
not fixed. However, we consider that proving that tautologicity for formulas with three
variables can be solved in polynomial time could be done.
With this in mind, to overcome the drawback of the bounded number of variables,
we present a new family of BL-theorems to be used as a bench test.







is a BL-theorem which uses n2 variables; the length of these formulas grows quadrat-
ically with n. As an example, we note that for n = 2 we get the BL-theorem(
(p11&p12) ∧ (p21&p22)
) → ((p11&p21) ∨ (p12&p22)). These formulas can be con-
sidered significantly harder than the ones previously proposed in [110]; and indeed, the
experimental results support this claim. It is important to notice that the natural way
to compare this new formula with parameter n with the previous set is to consider the
formulas in [110] with the integer part of
√
n as parameter.
Experiments were run on a machine with a i5-650 3.20GHz processor and 8GB of
RAM. Evaluating the validity in  Lukasiewiczand Go¨del logics of the generalizations of
the BL axioms (11.1), ranging n from 0 to 500 with increments of 10, throws better
results than the ones obtained in [6], but since the new solver is, on these logics, an
extension of their work, this can be assumed to be due to the use of different machines.
For Product Logic, very good timings were obtained. They are still worse than the ones
for  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del logics in several cases, but the difference with the previous
approach is clear: complex formulas are solved in a comparatively short time, whereas
in [6] they could not even be processed. In Figure 11.1 one can see and compare
solving times (given in seconds) for some of the axioms of the test bench for the cases
of BL,  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product logics. It is also interesting to observe how
irregularly the computation time for Product Logic varies depending on the axiom and
the parameter. This probably happens due to the way the z3-solver internally works
with the integer arithmetic theory.
The experiments done with the other family of BL-theorems (11.2) (see Figure 11.2
for the results) suggests that here the evaluation time is growing non-polynomially on
the parameter n. In the graphs we give here, only those answers (for parameters
n ≤ 70) obtained in at most 3 hours of execution are shown (e.g. for the BL case
answers could be reached within this time only for the problems with n ≤ 4). The
high differences in time when evaluating the theorems were expectable:  Lukasiewicz
and Go¨del are simpler than BL when proving the theoremhood because of the method
used for BL (considering n2 + 1 copies of  Lukasiewicz, where n is the parameter of the
formula). On the other hand, the computation times for Product logic modelled over
Z− are also smaller than for BL.
11.2 Randomly generated formulas: number of
variables vs. length of the formula
With the aim of understanding the behaviour of mNiBLoS when faced with a more
irregular set of formulas, we designed and implemented a test that produces random
formulas of varying length and number of variables. Using these, we have executed
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several kind of tests over the solver, in order to determine particular behaviours or
patterns.
The following tests show, for logics expanding  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del, Product and BL
logics, the times of response of mNiBLoS trying to determine whether a formula with
certain length and number of variables is a theorem of the logic or not.
In figure 11.2, we show the times considering the previous four logics alone, that
is, without accepting constants in the language and not using modalities.
Some characteristics of these graphs fit into our expectations, but we can only guess
concerning some points of the experiment. Seeing the two first graphs (of Product
and Go¨del logics), it is clear that alternative semantics of the product components
pays a central role in the system: mNiBLoS treats Product logic almost as fast as
Go¨del logic. We consider this to be a very interesting result, since in previous works
product logic was the slowest one and its faster computation can open the door a
more demanding applications. Moreover the increasing in the reasoning time of BL are
naturally expected from the fact that the t-norm used internally in that case is much
more complex than just one component of the basic ones (it depends on the number
of variables).
On the other hand, we find intriguing the irregular behaviour of, over all,  Lukasiew-
icz. We think this can be due to the internal methods used by z3, since the external part
is a general code (in the sense that there are no high differences in between executions)
that does not have the capacity of changing that times. Moreover, it is also interesting
to remark that, except in the BL case (where there is an explanation), the increasing
of the number of constants in the formulas do not uniformly increase the output times.
This is also a behaviour we do not know how to explain and we think it would be very
interesting some further study on this matter and find the reason for it.
Concerning the addition of constants to the language, the results are clearly fas-
tened, see Figure 11.3.
Using constants simplifies in some sense the calculus because, in a sense, they
behave like variables that do not need to be tested by the solver. For this, the ratio
length vs. number of variables of the formula gets much higher: nor formulas include
arbitrary constants, so they can be larger without adding new variables.
On the other hand, concerning the modal tests, the first result that we got was that
the time of pre-processing of the modal formulas (that is, the creation of the skeleton
structure) does not add any valuable time to the total reasoning time. The graphs
in Figure 11.4 show some examples when adding modal operators to the formula’s
language.
The processing times of formulas with modalities are much higher. This is reason-
able, since the calculus are in some sense multiplied by the modal complexity of the
formula (the skeleton it generates). However, it is remarkable that the solver works
fine up to formulas of length up to 80 elements and up to 25-30 variables, which is a
good result for a first attempt on automated reasoning for many-valued modal logics.
































































































































































Figure 11.1: Generalizations of BL-axioms given in (11.1).

























Figure 11.2: Our proposed BL-theorems given in (11.2).
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Product logic
Go¨del logic
11.2. Randomly generated formulas: number of variables vs. length of the formula193
 Lukasiewicz logic
BL logic
Figure 11.2: Times of response, no constants and no modalities in the language.
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 Lukasiewicz logic
Go¨del logic
Figure 11.3: Times of response, constants and no modalities in the language.










In this dissertation, we have focused on the study of the modal logics arising from
Kripke semantics with a crisp accessibility relation and evaluation ranging over MTL-
algebras. We are concerned with this problem both from a theoretical and from an
applied point of view.
From a theoretical point of view, the study of these modal logics has revealed
some characteristics that are desirable to hold at the propositional level in order to
axiomatize the modal expansions. Namely, that the logic is strongly standard complete
and, moreover, that it has a set of truth constants that are interpreted densely in the
standard algebra. The characterization and study of logics enjoying these properties
have enlarged the current work with results not exactly linked to the modal logics
but rather motivated by them. For this reason, regarding theoretical developments,
the results presented in this dissertation are of two types. First, those that study the
strong standard completeness of MTL logics with truth constants and second, those
that are concerned with the modal expansion of the previous logics. More precisely
• We have proposed, for each left-continuous t-norm ∗, an axiomatic system L∞∗
that is strongly complete (i.e., for deductions with infinite premises) with re-
spect to the standard canonical algebra of ∗ expanded with the ∆ operator. It
is based on an infinitary rule called density rule that determines the density of
the constants on the linearly ordered algebras. We also present a general result
concerning semilinearity of some infinitary logics. In particular, we show that
the prime theory extension property holds for a large family of logics extending
MTL∆ with up to a denumerable set of infinitary inference rules. Up to now,
proofs of this property when infinitary inference rules were considered in the
axiomatization of the logic were done ad-hoc, so we think this more general so-
lution can be quite useful to the community. Moreover, we have studied how
this infinitary rule allows to axiomatize also any expansion of the previous stan-
dard algebra by additional operations defined in [0, 1] that only need to satisfy
some regularity conditions. These results have closed several problems, like the
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(strongly complete) axiomatization of the Go¨del logic with truth constants and
∆ and the same problem concerning arbitrary ordinal sums. These works were
presented in [125] and [126].
• Motivated by the bad behaviour of the previous systems when expanded with
modalities (in the sense that it is not clear how to prove the density rule is
closed under the 2 operator), we consider the left-continuous t-norms whose
associated infinitary logic can be axiomatized using, instead of the infinitary rule
from before, a larger set of infinitary inference rules that have a better-behaved
schemata (from the modal expansion point of view). These are the t-norms that
accept a conjunctive axiomatization. We prove not all left-continuous t-norms
have this kind of representation, but we also observe that for instance all the
ordinal sums formed with  Lukasiewicz and Product t-norms belong to this class.
The fragment of this work referring to product logic was presented in [122].
• We propose axiomatic systems for the local and global modal logics arising from
the class of Kripke models with crisp accessibility relation and worlds evaluated
over algebras associated to a t-norm that accepts a conjunctive axiomatization.
We prove these systems are strongly complete with respect to their corresponding
intended semantics and study some of their characteristics. With these results we
solve some open problems in the literature; in particular, the product modal logic
had not been axiomatized before and nor had any ordinal sums of continuous
t-norms. The fragment of this work referring to product logic was presented in
[124].
• We study the algebraic semantics of the previously defined families of modal log-
ics. We characterize their algebraic companion, classify them within the Leibniz
hierarchy of abstract algebraic logic and present algebraic completeness results.
We also study some relations between the Kripke and the algebraic semantics
of these modal logics and show how the canonical model and complex algebra
construction is generalized to the MTL context. These studies contribute to the
state of the art on many-valued modal algebras and also leave several results
to the community, enlarging the knowledge about many-valued Kripke frames,
modal algebras and their relationship. The previous results (including the pre-
vious point) regarding the product logic were presented in [123] and have also
been published in [127].
On the other hand, we have tried to bring closer the many-valued modal logics
studied before to an applied scenery. For this reason, we have developed a solver,
mNiBLoS, to reason automatically over a large family of continuous t-norm based
logics, allowing also modal operations that are computed up to finite structures. There
were very few implementations of solvers for many-valued (and particularly, for infinite-
valued) logics and the existing ones solved the  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and Product logics
only (this latter one, with important efficiency problems). Our work generalizes some
previous approaches and implements a solver for most continuous t-norm based fuzzy
logics and further considers modal operators up to finite structures. Moreover, it
improves the state of the art on the Product logic and related cases.
In the design of mNiBLoS we have paid great attention to two main points: effi-
ciency and versatility. Concerning the first point, we have proven that for our concerns,
it is equivalent to reason (after the corresponding translations) with a linear arithmetic
(over the negative real numbers with + and - operations) than with the non-linear alge-
bra that naturally arises from the product components of the t-norm. This has strongly
shortened the reasoning times of mNiBLoS in all the logics involving the product one.
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Moreover, we have developed an algorithm that given a formula builds up the smaller
(finite) modal structure in which it could fail, which is also an efficiency enhancement
concerning the modal reasoning. On the other hand, we have tried to make mNiBLoS
as expressive as possible and for that allow the user freedom to choose the logic and
the operation that he wishes to execute. mNiBLoS enables the specification of a large
family of BL-logics (slightly limited only because of technical reasons coming from the
finitary character of a computer) and implements three different operations that can
be tested over these logics: theoremhood proving, deduction proving (of a formula
from a set of premises) and model generation. A partial version (without including
modalities) of this work was presented in [121].
12.2 Publications and Comunications
The development of this doctoral dissertation has lead to the publication of some results
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12.3 Future work
During the development of this research several interesting problems have appeared.
Some of them are still open and we think worth of future works. We present here some
of the most remarkable ones:
• We have resorted to the use of rational constants (and ∆ operation) in order
to be able to successfully axiomatize the modal logics based on left-continuous
t-norms. Are these truly necessary (in order to get a finite axiomatic system)?
Previous works have remarked the importance that these constants seem to have
([18]), but we are not certain there are no other approaches that could avoid the
truth constants. In particular, it is still open to axiomatize the modal expansion
of Product logic.
• We have limited the modal expansions to a family of left-continuous t-norms with
a certain “good behaviour” talking from the modal expansion point of view. It
would be interesting to know if this process can be done, more in general, for all
left-continuous t-normss, or be able to determine (if that is the case) that there
is not a recursively enumerable axiomatic system for some of these other modal
logics. It would also be interesting to know more examples of left-continuous
t-norms that belong to this class.
• We have studied the modal expansion considering Kripke models with a crisp
accessibility relation. The problem of axiomatizing the modal logics when the
accessibility is a mapping from pairs of worlds into the many valued algebra is
a problem not addressed in this dissertation. The solution of this problem does
not seem to follow from the methods developed in our work, but its resolution
would be very interesting being it the more general modal fuzzy logic. It does
not seem like a simple task, since it seems clear that different techniques -and
even, possibly, a different approach- to the ones used in the current work must
be followed. For the interested reader, we comment here some points that stress
out this differences. First, as we commented in the Chapter 3, the K axiom
does no longer hold and nor does the Lemma 6.8. Moreover, the definition of
the canonical model shall be different to the one given in this chapter, in order
to capture the many-valued character of the accessibility relation. This fact,
together with the previous point, make it seem unlikely to be able to prove an
analogous result to Lemma 6.12 and so reach the Truth Lemma prove with some
tools similar to the current ones.
• It is known that, for some modal logics, duality results between the Kripke mod-
els associated to them and other categorical structures exist. We have already
done some steps towards these kind of characterizations in Chapter 7, but it
would be interesting to further develop them. Moreover, this could open the
door to treat the canonicity problem more in general that what we do in Sub-
section 6.3 from Chapter 6, presenting a very promising set of results.
12.3. Future work 201
• Decidability and, if it proceeds, complexity studies concerning 1-validity, 1-
satisfiability and other problems over the modal fuzzy logics studied along this
dissertation have been not developed. It is clear that this problem is interesting
when limiting the logic to the finitary one, but nevertheless these are problems
very important to treat. It could be the case that, as in the classical case, modal
fuzzy logics are a decidable fragment of firs-order fuzzy logics and also that the
algorithmic studies of these logics can have (or not) a viable procedure (opening
the door to implement a solver not only for finite modal structures).
• mNiBLoS is an application that has still many features unimplemented. The
generalization of the modal part of the solver in order to cope with non-crisp
accessibility relations seems a natural and not difficult step (if we still consider
only finite models). Studies on how to implement the full modal logic (over
possibly infinite Kripke structures) would be of great interest, but it seems to
present more difficulties, since it is not known whether these logics are decidable.

Bibliography
[1] R. Adillon and V. Verdu´. On a contraction-less intuitionistic propositional logic
with conjunction and fusion. Studia Logica, Special Issue on Abstract
Algebraic Logic, 65(1):11–30, 2000. 33
[2] P. Agliano and F. Montagna. Varieties of BL-algebras. I. General properties.
Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra, 181(2-3):105–129, 2003. 36
[3] S. Aguzzoli and B. Gerla. On countermodels in Basic Logic. Neural Network
World, 12(5):407–421, 2002. 154
[4] C. Alsina, E. Trillas, and L. Valverde. On some logical connectives for fuzzy sets
theory. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 93(1):15–26,
1983. 4
[5] T. Alsinet, D. Barroso, R. Be´jar, F. Bou, M. Cerami, and F. Esteva. On the
implementation of a fuzzy dl solver over infinite-valued product logic with smt
solvers. In W. Liu, V.S. Subrahmanian, and J. Wijsen, editors, Scalable Uncer-
tainty Management, volume 8078 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 325–330. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. 165
[6] C. Anso´tegui, M. Bofill, F. Manya`, and M. Villaret. Building automated theorem
provers for infinitely valued logics with satisfiability modulo theory solvers. In
Proceedings of the IEEE 42nd International Symposium on Multiple-
Valued Logic (ISMVL 2012). IEEE Computer Society, 2012. 145, 154, 165,
167, 187, 188
[7] A. Armando, C. Castellini, E. Giunchiglia, and M. Maratea. A SAT-based de-
cision procedure for the boolean combination of difference constraints. In Pro-
ceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory and Applica-
tions of Satisfiability Testing, SAT’04, pages 16–29. Springer-Verlag, 2005.
149
[8] G. Audemard and L. Simon. Predicting learnt clauses quality in modern SAT
solvers. In Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on
Artifical intelligence, IJCAI’09, pages 399–404. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers
Inc., 2009. 147
[9] Matthias Baaz. Infinite-valued Go¨del logics with 0-1-projections and relativiza-
tions. 6:23–33, 1996. 36
[10] T. Ball, B. Cook, S. Lahiri, and L. Zhang. Zapato: Automatic theorem proving
for predicate abstraction refinement. In 16th International Conference on
Computer Aided Verification (CAV 2004), volume 3114 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 457–461. Springer, 2004. 149
203
204 Bibliography
[11] C. Barrett, A. Stump, and C. Tinelli. The SMT-LIB standard: Version 2.0.
Technical report, Department of Computer Science, The University of Iowa, 2010.
Available at www.SMT-LIB.org. 150
[12] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema. Modal logic. Number 53 in
Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2001. 41, 44
[13] W. J. Blok and B. Jo´nsson. Equivalence of Consequence Operations. Studia
Logica, 83(1–3):91–110, 2006. 20
[14] W. J. Blok and D. Pigozzi. Protoalgebraic logics. Studia Logica, 45:337–369,
1986. 21
[15] W. J. Blok and D. Pigozzi. Algebraizable logics, volume 396 of Mem. Amer.
Math. Soc. A.M.S., Providence, January 1989. 21, 25
[16] F. Bou, F. Esteva, J. M. Font, A. Gil, L. Godo, A. Torrens, and V. Verdu´.
Logics preserving degrees of truth from varieties of residuated lattices. Journal
of Logic and Computation, 19(6):1031–1069, 2009. 141
[17] Exploring a syntactic notion of modal many-valued logics. Mathware Soft
Computing15(2):175–188, 2008 52
[18] F. Bou, F. Esteva, L. Godo, and R. Rodr´ıguez. On the minimum many-valued
modal logic over a finite residuated lattice. Journal of Logic and Computa-
tion, 21(5):739–790, 2011. 6, 7, 8, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 105, 124, 200
[19] R. S. Boyer and J. Strother Moore. A computational logic. Academic Press
[Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers], New York, 1979. ACM Monograph
Series. 147
[20] S. Burris and H.P. Sankappanavar. A course in Universal Algebra. The
Millennium, 2012 Update edition, 2012. 15
[21] X. Caicedo, G. Metcalfe, R. Rodr´ıguez, and J. Rogger. A finite model property
for go¨del modal logics. In L. Libkin, U. Kohlenbach, and R. de Queiroz, editors,
Logic, Language, Information, and Computation, volume 8071 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. 6, 7, 58, 59,
121
[22] X. Caicedo and R. O. Rodr´ıguez. A Go¨del modal logic, 2009. Available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.2767.
[23] X. Caicedo and R. O. Rodriguez. Bi-modal Go¨del logic over [0, 1]-valued kripke
frames. Journal of Logic and Computation, 25(1):37–55, 2015. 6, 7, 48, 58
[24] X. Caicedo and R. Oscar Rodr´ıguez. Standard Go¨del modal logics. Studia
Logica, 94(2):189–214, 2010. 6, 7, 8, 56, 58, 59, 121
[25] M. Cerami, F. Esteva, and F. Bou. Decidability of a description logic over
infinite-valued product logic. In F. Lin, U. Sattler, and M. Truszczynski, editors,
Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings
of the Twelfth International Conference, KR 2010, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, May 9-13, 2010, pages 203–213. AAAI Press, 2010. 59
[26] A. Chagrov and M. Zakharyaschev. Modal Logic, volume 35 of Oxford Logic
Guides. Oxford University Press, 1997. 41, 44, 134
[27] B. F. Chellas. Modal Logic: an introduction. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, Cambridge, 1980. 41, 44
Bibliography 205
[28] A. Ciabattoni, F. Esteva, and L. Godo. T-norm based logics with n-contraction.
Neural Network World, 12(5):441–452, 2002. 34
[29] A. Ciabattoni, G. Metcalfe, and F. Montagna. Algebraic and proof-theoretic
characterizations of truth stressers for MTL and its extensions. Fuzzy Sets
and Systems, 161(3):369–389, 2010. 6, 48
[30] R. Cignoli, F. Esteva, L. Godo, and A. Torrens. Basic fuzzy logic is the logic of
continuous t-norms and their residua. Soft Computing, 4(2):106–112, 2000. 5,
30
[31] R. Cignoli and A. Torrens. An algebraic analysis of product logic. Multiple-
valued logic, 5:45–65, 2000. 153, 154
[32] P. Cintula. From fuzzy logic to fuzzy mathematics. Ph. D. thesis, Czech
Technical University in Prague, 2004. 39, 65
[33] P. Cintula. Short note: on the redundancy of axiom (A3) in BL and MTL. Soft
Computing, 9(12):942–942, 2005. 29
[34] P. Cintula. A note on axiomatizations of pavelka-style complete fuzzy logics.
Fuzzy Sets and Systems, (To appear, 201x). 39, 65, 66, 68, 80, 91, 93
[35] P. Cintula, P. Ha´jek, and C. Noguera, editors. Handbook of Mathematical
Fuzzy Logic, 2 volumes, volume 37 and 38 of Studies in Logic. Mathe-
matical Logic and Foundation. College Publications, 2011. 27
[36] J. Czelakowski. Protoalgebraic logics, volume 10 of Trends in Logic—
Studia Logica Library. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2001. 21
[37] M. Davis, G. Logemann, and D. Loveland. A machine program for theorem-
proving. Commun. ACM, 5:394–397, 1962. 147
[38] M. Davis and H. Putnam. A computing procedure for quantification theory.
Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 7:201–215, 1960.
147
[39] L. de Moura, B. Dutertre, and N. Shankar. A tutorial on satisfiability modulo
theories. In W. Damm and H. Hermanns, editors, CAV, volume 4590 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 20–36. Springer, 2007. 149
[40] L. de Moura and H. Ruess. Lemmas on demand for satisfiability solvers. In
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Theory and Appli-
cations of Satisfiability Testing, SAT’02. Springer-Verlag, 2002. 149
[41] L. de Moura and H. Ruess. An experimental evaluation of ground decision pro-
cedures. In R. Alur and D. Peled, editors, Proceedings of the 16th Interna-
tional Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV’04 (Boston,
Massachusetts), volume 3114 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 162–174. Springer, 2004. 148
[42] L. Mendonc¸a de Moura and N. Bjørner. Z3: An efficient SMT solver. In C. R. Ra-
makrishnan and J. Rehof, editors, Tools and Algorithms for the Construc-
tion and Analysis of Systems, 14th International Conference, TACAS
2008, Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and
Practice of Software, ETAPS 2008, Budapest, Hungary, March 29-
April 6, 2008. Proceedings, pages 337–340, 2008. 10, 149, 150
[43] P. Dellunde, L. Godo, and E. Marchioni. Extending possibilistic logic over Go¨del
logic. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 52(1):63–75,
2011. 124
206 Bibliography
[44] D. Dubois, J. Lang, and H. Prade. Possibilistic logic. In Handbook of logic in
artificial intelligence and logic programming, Vol. 3, Oxford Sci. Publ.,
pages 439–513. Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1994. 123
[45] D. Dubois and H. Prade. Possibilistic logic: a retrospective and prospective view.
Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 144(1):3–23, 2004. 123
[46] B. Dutertre and L. de Moura. A fast linear-arithmetic solver for DPLL(T). In
CAV, pages 81–94. Springer, 2006. 149
[47] N. Ee´n and N. So¨rensson. An extensible SAT-solver. In Enrico Giunchiglia and
Armando Tacchella, editors, SAT, volume 2919 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 502–518. Springer, 2003. 147
[48] F. Esteva, J. Gispert, L. Godo, and C. Noguera. Adding truth-constants to logics
of continuous t-norms: Axiomatization and completeness results. Fuzzy Sets
and Systems, 158(6):597–618, March 2007. 39, 64, 66
[49] F. Esteva and L. Godo. Monoidal t-norm based logic: towards a logic for left-
continuous t-norms. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 124:271–288, 2001. 5, 28, 34
[50] F. Esteva, L. Godo and A`. Garc´ıa-Cerdan˜a35
. On the hierarchy of t-norm based residuated fuzzy logics. On the hierarchy
of t-norm based residuated fuzzy logics, Studies in Fuzziness and Soft
Computing, Ed. M. Fitting and E. Or lowska. 114 251–272, 2003
[51] F. Esteva, L. Godo, P. Ha´jek, and M. Navara. Residuated fuzzy logics with an
involutive negation. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 39(2):103–124, 2000.
34, 39
[52] F. Esteva, L. Godo, and M. Montagna. Equational Characterization of the Sub-
varieties of BL Generated by t-norm Algebras. Studia Logica, 76(2):161–200,
2004. 30, 64, 66
[53] F. Esteva, L. Godo, and C. Noguera. Expanding the propositional logic of a
t-norm with truth-constants: completeness results for rational semantics. Soft
Computing, 14:273–284, 2010. 39, 40
[54] F. Esteva, L. Godo, and C. Noguera. On expansions of WNM t-norm based
logics with truth-constants. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 161(3):347–368, 2010.
39
[55] C. G. Fermu¨ller and H. Langsteiner. Tableaux for finite-valued logics with
arbitrary distribution modalities. In Automated reasoning with analytic
tableaux and related methods (Oisterwijk, 1998), volume 1397 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 156–171. Springer, Berlin, 1998.
7
[56] G. Fischer-Servi. On modal logics with an intuitionistic base. Studia Logica,
36:141–149, 1977. 108
[57] M. Fitting. Many-valued modal logics. Fundamenta Informaticae, 15:235–
254, 1992. 6, 7, 48
[58] M. Fitting. Many-valued modal logics, II. Fundamenta Informaticae, 17:55–
73, 1992. 6, 7, 48
[59] J. M. Font and R. Jansana. A general algebraic semantics for sentential
logics, volume 7 of Lecture Notes in Logic. Springer-Verlag, 1996. 135 pp.
Presently distributed by the Association for Symbolic Logic. 21
Bibliography 207
[60] J. M. Font, R. Jansana, and D. Pigozzi. A survey of Abstract Algebraic Logic.
Mathematics Preprint Series 329, IMUB (University of Barcelona), April 2003.
21
[61] D. M. Gabbay and J. Woods, editors. Logic and the modalities in the
Twentieth Century, volume 7 of Handbook of the History of Logic.
North-Holland (Elsevier), 2006. 47
[62] N. Galatos, P. Jipsen, T. Kowalski, and H. Ono. Residuated Lattices: an
algebraic glimpse at substructural logics, volume 151 of Studies in Logic
and the Foundations of Mathematics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007. 33
[63] M. Gehrke and Y. Venema. Algebraic Tools for Modal Logic. Manuscript.
ESSLLI’01 (Helsinki), 2001. 46
[64] S. Givant and P. Halmos. Introduction to Boolean Algebras. Undergraduate
Texts in Mathematics. Springer, 2009. 96
[65] K. Go¨del. Zur intuitionistischen Aussagenkalku¨l. 1932. English traslation,
with an introduction note by A. S. Troelstra, in {Kurt Go¨del, Collected
Works, Volume 14, 32
, Solomon Feferman et. al. (eds.), Oxford University Press, 1986, 222–
225.
[66] E. Goldberg and Y. Novikov. Berkmin: A fast and robust sat-solver.
Discrete Appl. Math., 155(12):1549–1561, 2007. 147
[67] R. I. Goldblatt. Metamathematics of modal logic, I. Reports on Mathe-
matical Logic, 6:41–78, 1976. 47
[68] R. I. Goldblatt. Metamathematics of modal logic, II. Reports on Math-
ematical Logic, 7:21–52, 1976. 47
[69] R. I. Goldblatt and S. K. Thomason. Axiomatic classes in propositional
modal logic. In J. Crossley, editor, Algebra and logic, volume 450 of
Lecture Notes in Mathematics, pages 163–173. Springer, 1974. 47
[70] P. Ha´jek. Basic fuzzy logic and BL-algebras. Soft Computing, 2:124–128,
1998. 5
[71] P. Ha´jek. Metamathematics of fuzzy logic, volume 4 of Trends in Logic—
Studia Logica Library. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1998.
5, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 67, 187
[72] P. Ha´jek. Observations on the monoidal t-norm logic. Fuzzy Sets and
Systems, 132(1):107–112, 2002. Possibility theory and fuzzy logic. 34
[73] P. Ha´jek. Making fuzzy description logic more general. Fuzzy Sets and
Systems, 154(1):1–15, 2005. 161
[74] P. Ha´jek. On fuzzy modal logics S5(C). Fuzzy Sets and Systems,
161(18):2389–2396, 2010. 59
[75] P. Ha´jek, L. Godo, and F. Esteva. A complete many-valued logic with
product-conjunction. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 35:191–208, 1996.
5, 33, 34
[76] P. Ha´jek, D. Harmancova´, F. Esteva, P. Garcia, and L. Godo. On
modal logics for qualitative possibility in a fuzzy setting. In R. Lo´pez
de Ma´ntaras and D. Poole, editors, Proceedings of the 10th Annual Con-
ference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-94), pages 278–285, San
Francisco, CA, 1994. Morgan Kaufmann. 125
208 Bibliography
[77] G. Hansoul and B. Teheux. Completeness results for many-valued
 Lukasiewicz modal systems and relational semantics, 2006. Available
at http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0612542. 6
[78] G. Hansoul and B. Teheux. Extending  lukasiewicz logics with a
modality: Algebraic approach to relational semantics. Studia Logica,
101(3):505–545, 2013. 6, 7, 54, 55, 105, 122
[79] D. Harel. Dynamic logic. In D. M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors,
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume II: Extensions of Classical Logic, vol-
ume 165 of Synthese Library, chapter II.10, pages 497–604. D. Reidel
Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1984. 41
[80] D. Harel, D. Kozen, and J. Tiuryn. Dynamic logic. Foundations of
Computing Series. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. 41
[81] A. Heyting. Die formalen regeln der intuitionistischen logik. Sitzungs-
berichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pages 42–56, 1930.
4
[82] U. Ho¨hle. Commutative, residuated l-monoids. In U. Ho¨hle and E. P.
Klement, editors, Non-classical logics and their applications to fuzzy subsets
(Linz, 1992), volume 32 of Theory Decis. Lib. Ser. B Math. Statist. Methods,
pages 53–106. Kluwer Acad. Publ., Dordrecht, 1995. 33
[83] R. Jansana. Abstract modal logics. Studia Logica, 55(2):273–299, 1995.
46
[84] S. Jenei and F. Montagna. A proof of standard completeness for Esteva
and Godo’s logic MTL. Studia Logica, 70:183–192, 2002. 5, 28
[85] C. D. Koutras. A catalog of weak many-valued modal axioms and
their corresponding frame classes. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics,
13(1):47–72, 2003. 7
[86] C. D. Koutras and C. Nomikos. The computational complexity of
satisfiability in many-valued modal logic. In Proceedings of the 3rd Pan-
hellenic Logic Symposium, Anogia, Greece, July 2001. 7
[87] C. D. Koutras, C. Nomikos, and P. Peppas. Canonicity and com-
pleteness results for many-valued modal logics. Journal of Applied Non-
Classical Logics, 12(1):7–41, 2002. 7
[88] C. I. Lewis. A survey of symbolic logic. University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1918. 2
[89] J.  Lukasiewicz. Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen syste-
men der Aussagenlogik. Comptes Rendus des Se´ances de la Socie´te´ des ciences
et des Lettres de Varsovie, Cl. III, 23:51–77, 1930. English translation in
[91], 153–178. 32
[90] J.  Lukasiewicz. On three-valued logic (1920). In S. McCall, editor,
Polish Logic, pages 16–18. Oxford University Press, 1967. 3
[91] J.  Lukasiewicz. Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowksi. Studies in Logic
and the Foundations of Mathematics. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1970. 208
[92] J. Malinowski. Modal equivalential logics. Journal of Non-Classical Logic,
3:13–35, 1986. 46, 131
Bibliography 209
[93] Y. Maruyama. Algebraic study of lattice-valued logic an lattice-valued
modal logic. In R. Ramanujam and S. Sarukkai, editors, Logic and Its
Applications. Third Indian Conference, ICLA 2009 Chennai, India, January 7-
11, 2009 Proceedings, volume 5378 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 170–184. Springer-Verlag, 2009. Lecture Notes in Artificial In-
telligence. 46
[94] J. McCarthy. Towards a mathematical science of computation. In In
IFIP Congress, pages 21–28. North Holland, 1962. 149
[95] G. Metcalfe and N. Olivetti. Towards a proof theory of Go¨del modal
logics. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 7(2):27, 2011. 58, 59
[96] J. Ch. Meyer and W. van der Hoek. Epistemic logic for AI and computer
science, volume 41 of Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995. 41
[97] A. M. Mironov. Fuzzy modal logics. Journal of Mathematical Sciences,
128(6):3641–3483, 2005. 6, 48
[98] F. Montagna. Generating the variety of BL-algebras. Soft Computing,
9(12):869–874, 2005. 36
[99] F. Montagna. Notes on strong completeness in  Lukasiewicz, product
and BL logics and in their first-order extensions. In Algebraic and Proof-
theoretic Aspects of Non-classical Logics, pages 247–274, 2006. 66, 71
[100] F. Montagna, C. Noguera, and R. Horcˇ´ık. On weakly cancellative
fuzzy logics. Journal of Logic and Computation, 16(4):423–450, 2006. 34
[101] P. S. Mostert and A. L. Shields. On the structure of semigroups on a
compact manifold with boundary. Annals of Mathematics. Second Series,
65:117–143, 1957. 5, 35
[102] G. Nelson and D. Oppen. Fast decision procedures based on congru-
ence closure. J. ACM, 27(2):356–364, 1980. 147
[103] R. Nieuwenhuis, A. Oliveras, and C. Tinelli. Solving SAT and
SAT modulo theories: From an abstract Davis–Putnam–Logemann–
Loveland procedure to DPLL(T). Journal of the Association for Computing
Machinery, 53:937–977, 2006. 148, 149
[104] P. Ostermann. Many-valued modal propositional calculi. Zeitschrift fu¨r
Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 34(4):343–354, 1988.
55
[105] J. Pavelka. On fuzzy logic. I. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematische Logik und
Grundlagen der Mathematik, 25(1):45–52, 1979. Many-valued rules of
inference. 38
[106] J. Pavelka. On fuzzy logic. II. Enriched residuated lattices and se-
mantics of propositional calculi. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematische Logik und
Grundlagen der Mathematik, 25(2):119–134, 1979. 38
[107] J. Pavelka. On fuzzy logic. III. Semantical completeness of some
many-valued propositional calculi. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathematische Logik und
Grundlagen der Mathematik, 25(5):447–464, 1979. 38
[108] H. Rasiowa. An algebraic approach to non-classical logics, volume 78 of
Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. North-Holland, Ams-
terdam, 1974. 24
210 Bibliography
[109] N. Rescher and A. Urquhart. Temporal logic. Springer-Verlag, 1971.
41
[110] R. Rothenberg. A class of theorems in  Lukasiewicz logic for bench-
marking automated theorem provers. In N. Olivetti and C. Schwind,
editors, TABLEAUX ’07, Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and
Related Methods, Position Papers, number LSIS.RR.2007.002, pages 101–
111, 2007. 187, 188
[111] P. Savicky´, R. Cignoli, F. Esteva, L. Godo, and C. Noguera. On
product logic with truth-constants. Journal of Logic and Computation,
16(2):205–225, 2006. 39, 40
[112] R. Shostak. Deciding linear inequalities by computing loop residues.
J. ACM, 28(4):769–779, October 1981. 147
[113] SMT-COMP. http://smtcomp.sourceforge.net/. 150
[114] O. Strichman, S. Seshia, and R. Bryant. Deciding separation formulas
with SAT. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer
Aided Verification, CAV ’02, pages 209–222, London, UK, UK, 2002.
Springer-Verlag. 148
[115] G. Takeuti and S. Titani. Intuitionistic fuzzy logic and intuitionistic
fuzzy set theory. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 49(3):851–866, 1984. 68
[116] B. Teheux. A duality for the algebras of a  Lukasiewicz n + 1-valued
modal system. Studia Logica, 87(1):13–36, 2008. 7, 54
[117] B. Teheux. Algebraic approach to modal extensions of  Lukasiewicz logics. Ph.
D. Dissertation, Universite´ de Lie`ge, 2009. Electronically available at:
http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/10887/1/These.pdf. 6, 7,
54, 55
[118] J. van Benthem, J. van Eijck, and B. Kooi. Logics of communication
and change. Information and Computation, 204(11):1620–1662, 2006. 41
[119] J. F. A. K. van Benthem, S. van Otterloo, and O. Roy. Preference
logic, conditionals and solution concepts in games. Research Report
PP-2005-28, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 2005. 41
[120] Y. Venema. Temporal logic. In L. Goble, editor, The Blackwell guide to
philosophical logic, Blackwell Philos. Guides, pages 203–223. Blackwell,
Oxford, 2001. 41
[121] A. Vidal, F. Bou, and L. Godo. An smt-based solver for continuous t-
norm based logics. In E. Hu¨llermeier, S. Link, T. Fober, and B. Seeger,
editors, Scalable Uncertainty Management, volume 7520 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 633–640. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
165, 166, 199
[122] A. Vidal, F. Esteva, and L. Godo. About standard completeness of
product logic. In F. Bobillo et al., editor, XVII Congreso Espan˜ol sobre
Tecnolog´ıas y Lo´gica Fuzzy (ESTYLF), pages 423–428, 2014. 198
[123] A. Vidal, F. Esteva, and L. Godo. Axiomatising a fuzzy modal logic
over the standard product algebra. In M. Baaz, A. Ciabattoni, and
S. Hetzl, editors, Logic, Algebra and Truth Degrees 2014. Booklet of Abstracts,
pages 275–279, 2014. 198
Bibliography 211
[124] A. Vidal, F. Esteva, and L. Godo. A product modal logic. In
T. Flaminio et al., editor, 35th Linz Seminar on Fuzzy Set Theory, pages
127–130, 2014. 198
[125] A. Vidal, F. Esteva, and L. Godo. On strong standard completeness
of mtl*(q) expansions. In Topology, Algebra and Categories in Logic, pages
275–276, 2015. 198
[126] A. Vidal, F. Esteva, and L. Godo. On strongly standard complete
fuzzy logics: Mtl*(q) and its expansions. In Proceedings of the 9th Confer-
ence of the European Society for Fuzzy Logic and Technology (IFSA-EUSFLAT),
pages 828–835. Atlantis Press, 2015. 198
[127] A. Vidal, F. Esteva, and L. Godo. On modal extensions of product
fuzzy logic. Journal of Logic and Computation, (In press, 2015). 198
[128] L. A. Zadeh. Fuzzy sets. Information and Control, 8:338–353, 1965. 3
[129] L. A. Zadeh. Preface in Fuzzy Logic technology and Applications (R.
J. Marks-II Ed.), IEEE Technical Activities Board, 1994.
[130] Z3. http://research.microsoft.com/en-
us/um/redmond/projects/z3/index.html. 169
